

From Mars and Venus Down to Earth: Understanding the Transatlantic Climate Divide

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Abstract

We examine the sources of the transatlantic climate divide between the US and Europe. First, we take up the proposition that differences in the material conditions of the US and Europe are responsible for the dustup over global warming. We argue that relative power positions do not determine a nation's choice of broad climate policy approaches. Moreover, we emphasize that mitigating climate change will ultimately require wrenching policy adjustments for both the US and Europe. While there may be short-run differences in cost profiles, these should not pose such a hindrance that careful policy design cannot overcome them. Next, we evaluate the claim that a difference in values or culture is responsible for the rift. A highly oversimplified version of the argument holds that Europeans just care about climate change more than the Americans. We find evidence for this to be mixed. We suggest that differences between the US and Europe derive not so much from material interests or cultural values but from different political systems that shape the interests and values that have influence on policy. America's political system permits certain interests—namely climate skeptics and business interests—to exercise veto power over external environmental commitments. European decision-makers, by contrast, face environmental movements more capable of exercising influence over electoral politics. The interaction of the two systems internationally has hobbled global climate policy cooperation. Negotiations are complicated by inadequate sensitivity to each other's internal political conditions. Better understanding of each other's domestic politics and more careful institutional design of climate change policies may yet overcome these obstacles.

Introduction

Climate change is one of the most significant issues that divides the US and Europe, raising crucial questions about human relationships with nature, the structure of the world economic system to come, the future of the West, North-South relations, and intergenerational equity. It is a complex issue that has significance for almost every area of life. Climate policy is not simply environmental policy, as it touches other core issue areas from energy and economics to transport and tax policy.

Climate policy, compared to other arenas of international relations, has a short history. Compared to the free trade architecture, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto process are institutional infants. With 188 countries party to the Framework Convention, it is no wonder that agreement on this issue has been hard to come by. However, with decisions taken now having a fundamental impact on greenhouse gas emissions for decades to come, the global community really has little time to dally. If the US and Europe, closest of allies for over fifty years, cannot agree on how to deal with climate change, then it is highly unlikely other actors will rise to the occasion.

Climate change has taken on new significance since 2001 when the George W. Bush administration repudiated the United States' commitment to the Kyoto Protocol.¹ Since then, the issue has been elevated to high politics, a symbol to both the US and its European allies of an underlying disunity in the transatlantic partnership. In this essay, we explore the source of the differing approaches to climate change between the US and Europe. In so doing, we go beyond the present cast of characters in governments to understand the deeper foundations of recent difficulties.²

Relations between the US and Europe have actually been contentious since the beginning of international negotiations in the early 1990s. The US and Europe throughout have advocated different views about several aspects of climate policy, including: (1) the necessity of binding targets; (2) the kinds of instruments/measures and how to implement them; and (3) who should participate in the international regime. Broadly stated, the US has favored non-binding targets, market mechanisms, and the inclusion of developing countries, while

Europe has backed binding targets, more direct regulation, and supported the idea that mitigation should begin with the advanced, industrialized countries (see Oberthür and Ott, in this volume).

From the very beginning of the UNFCCC process, the debates about climate change within Europe and the US have been conducted in very different ways. In the US, there is no consensus that binding emissions reductions are necessary, whereas a broad cross-party consensus exists in much of Europe. If we take Germany as an example, the Bundestag unanimously backed the Kyoto Protocol.³ Likewise, in the UK, both Labor and Conservative governments have supported ambitious climate change policies internationally. By contrast, in the US, there was and still is a majority in the Senate, the House, and the Executive Branch that opposes Kyoto.

From our perspective, the degree of disagreement is puzzling because Europe and the US share similar interests. We identify three general explanations—not necessarily mutually exclusive—that might potentially explain the climate divide. The first explanation emphasizes a difference in material conditions, the second a difference in values, and the third focuses on domestic political systems. Ultimately, we place greater emphasis on the final explanation, suggesting that our respective political systems permit different material interests and values to influence policy. This complicates mutually acceptable bargains and exacerbates other differences between us.

Before turning our attention to climate change, it may help to situate the issue in a wider strategic setting. While something of a caricature of public opinion, average Americans continued to worry about new potential terrorist threats in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. By contrast, the average European worried more about George Bush. Europeans were concerned his policies would provoke war and instability in their near abroad.⁴ In fact, the differences between Americans and Europeans go deeper than this, have other roots, and are manifested in other ways.

Are the ties that bind us, the US and Europe, less significant, less important than the pressures that pull us apart? At first glance, the signs are ominous. Aside from Iraq, on a host of other issues—from global warming to landmines to the International Criminal Court—it appears the United States and its allies in Europe are out-of-step with

each other. Although the events of September 11, 2001 have reminded us of our continued shared interests, it is unclear whether these other issues will enjoy future consensus. Even if the possibility of war and balance of power politics among the advanced industrialized countries has receded, the potential for pervasive diplomatic conflict remains. At the same time, despite the rallying effect of September 11, broader concerns about US unilateralism remain.⁵

Fears of a maverick US foreign policy were fed by decisions by the Bush Administration to repudiate the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court (ICC), its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and its efforts to derail enforcement of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Despite broad support for the war in Afghanistan, intervention in Iraq has renewed and intensified these fears.⁶ This falling out may have important consequences for the world, not only for issues over which a difference of opinion exists, but may also cross-contaminate issues over which there is more widespread agreement.

It would be easy enough (and wrong) to suggest that the so-called “transatlantic divide” is only a recent product of George W. Bush’s unilateral policies. While his presidency accelerated a worrisome trend, he did not initiate it. Bill Clinton’s presidency, on issues like landmines, the International Criminal Court, and Kyoto, was already out of sync with its European allies. Clinton differed from his successor in the way he managed to persuade the Europeans to like him even as he told them “No.” Indeed, Clinton and Bush may differ less in substance than in form.

Perhaps the difference—on substance—between George W. Bush and Bill Clinton is actually quite vast. Left to his own devices, Clinton may well have ratified Kyoto and the ICC and banned landmines. In a sense, that is precisely the point. The American system is not one that leaves the President to his own devices. The system of checks and balances is such that decisions are not made by one but by the many.

Despite a growing sense of distance in some quarters, there are reasons to remain hopeful, not least of which is our shared history of cooperation since WWII and Europe’s concomitant defeat of inter-state rivalry through the European Union. Others are less san-

guine. In an influential article, Robert Kagan concluded: “on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less.”⁷ What follows is an assessment of this view and an exploration of the fissures that tear at the fabric of US-European solidarity, with specific reference to the climate change debate.

Material Conditions and Preferences

What is the source of the “transatlantic divide” and how is it manifested in the case of climate change politics? One explanation would ascribe differences to divergent material conditions between the US and Europe. This argument has two strands. The first is offered by Kagan, who suggests that differences in preferred means and ends are a product of underlying power positions.⁸ The second strand, more relevant to climate change, emphasizes the different costs of compliance with Kyoto commitments.

For Kagan, the US, as the most powerful country on earth, is unilateralist because it can be, while Europe, as a relatively weak region militarily, is multilateralist because it must be. However, John Ikenberry, in his book *After Victory*, reminds us that, through careful design of multilateral institutions like NATO, the World Bank, and the IMF, the US was able to extend its power and legitimate its influence after the Second World War.⁹ The interests of great powers are not always best served through the expedient choice of unilateral means. Another way to put this point is that while the US possesses enough military power to achieve most of its ends through force alone, there are better (read: less costly) ways to get things done in the international system than through coercion. Indeed, if Ikenberry’s analysis is correct, the “ambivalent internationalism” that has characterized US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War demonstrates a misunderstanding of the US national interest and the lessons of history.¹⁰

Indeed, transnational problems like climate change demand global solutions because of the impossibility for any one country to solve the problem on its own. Even if the US is relatively more powerful militarily than all rivals, it is not all powerful and cannot get its way without, at the very least, token overtures to its allies to participate.

This was clearly evidenced by US difficulties to secure basing rights from Turkey before the war in Iraq and has since been borne out in problems the Americans have experienced in inducing others to contribute to Iraq's reconstruction. The climate arena more clearly requires policy adjustments by all states, as emissions reductions by only some countries might not have any meaningful impact on mitigating global warming.

Even if we accept that underlying power positions do not necessarily lead to divergent policy approaches in this case, the "climate divide" between the US and Europe may be the manifestation of different costs of mitigation. In its crudest form, the argument suggests that the Europeans are more enthusiastic about climate change policies because it is relatively cheap for them to meet their Kyoto commitments. America, by contrast, is resistant to climate change mitigation measures because of the costs. Germany and the UK, for example, find it relatively easy to meet their mandated emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol, partially as a result of other policy choices having little to do with climate policy per se.¹¹ The US, by contrast, experienced such robust economic growth during the 1990s that it now finds it exceptionally expensive to meet its commitments. Moreover, American geography—vast distances, varied climates—makes it all the more costly to adjust to the problem.¹²

At first blush, this argument has persuasive appeal. On deeper inspection, there are a number of flaws that make it less convincing. While the US and Europe are markedly diverging in greenhouse emission trends, economic models that predict the costs of mitigating climate change do not conclusively find significantly lower costs for Europe.¹³ Indeed, given the current emission trends in the European Union (EU), politically and economically costly policy measures will have to be enacted. In fact, the European Union has recently put in place a raft of policy measures (and is considering a number of new ones) to try to meet its Kyoto commitments, most notably an emissions trading directive. Together, these new policy initiatives suggest Europe is more prepared to take decisive action on climate policy despite facing similarly high material constraints to the United States. In our view, we have to look elsewhere for the main source of differences in climate policy between the US and Europe.

To substantiate our argument, let us review the state of greenhouse gas emissions in the US and Europe. Under the Framework Convention, the US made a voluntary commitment to return its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the start of the new millennium. However, US emissions in 1999 were 11.7% higher than the 1990 baseline.¹⁴ In 2001, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) prepared a draft of its third Climate Action Report. In the report, the EPA estimated US business-as-usual aggregate gross greenhouse emissions in 2010 would be 44.2% higher than its Kyoto reduction target of 7% below 1990 base levels.¹⁵

Europe faces a very different situation. In 2001, the EU's greenhouse gas emissions were down by 2.3% compared to 1990. Europe is part of the way towards meeting its 8% collective reduction under the Kyoto Protocol. European emissions reductions, however, were almost exclusively the result of emissions reductions in Germany and the UK, where emissions in 2001 were, respectively, 18% and 12% lower than in 1990.¹⁶ Only three other EU countries—Sweden, Luxemburg, and France—also reduced emissions in this time period. Together, Germany (69.88%) and the UK (27.85%) account for 97.73% of gross European emissions reductions.¹⁷

Trends in Europe are now moving in the opposite direction, however. In 2001, greenhouse emissions in Europe went up for the second year running. Emissions were 1% higher than a year earlier. In 2000, emissions were 0.3% higher than in 1999. Moreover, 10 of 15 EU members are not on track to meet their EU burden-sharing emissions targets. Ireland, for example, is allowed to increase its emissions 13% by 2008-2012. By 2001, Irish greenhouse emissions had already increased 31% above the 1990 base line. Austria had an emissions reduction target of 13%, but its emissions in 2001 were 10% higher than 1990 levels.¹⁸ For the ten countries not on track to meet Kyoto, emissions are up 14.4% from 1990 levels. Moreover, despite the collective Kyoto commitment of an increase in emissions of only 0.7% by 2010 for these 10 states, their 2010 emissions are projected to be nearly 30% higher than 1990 levels.¹⁹ Based on these trends, the European Environment Agency (EEA) concluded, "If no over-delivery by Member States is considered, the EU as a whole is projected to achieve a 0.5% greenhouse gas reduction *with existing policies and meas-*

ures,” well shy of its 8% Kyoto commitment. With additional domestic policies, the EEA calculated, Europe could obtain a 6% reduction.²⁰

Even if Europe ultimately attains only a 0.5% reduction, this would still be a markedly different situation from the US, where emissions are projected to be 34% higher in 2010 than in 1990.²¹ Is this difference alone enough to warrant the problems between us? Given these different emissions profiles, is it necessarily true to say that emissions reductions in the longer term are more costly in the United States than in Europe?

Higher emissions trajectories in the US compared to Europe do not translate cleanly into higher mitigation costs for a number of reasons. It is true that the US—as of 2003—is in no position to meet its Kyoto target in the first commitment period. A 44% reduction in carbon emissions in less than a decade would prove prohibitively costly for the US. However, the marginal costs of mitigation in the US initially are likely to be low. Moreover, the use of flexibility mechanisms, according to modelers, will narrow the cost differential of mitigation between the US and Europe. While these mechanisms will bring down the costs, particular for the US, mitigation is likely to require costly adjustments in both the US and Europe. We need to look beyond aggregate emissions trends to better understand the issues at stake.

A 1999 Stanford study, summarized in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2001 Mitigation report, projected the differential net economic costs for different regions of the world if a carbon tax were imposed to meet Kyoto commitments. Using the assumptions of a dozen different modeling teams, the Stanford study examined what each model would predict. Of the seven models that made projections for net GDP losses in 2010 to meet emissions targets, GDP losses were generally higher in the United States than Europe.²²

Even if the US faces higher overall costs of abatement given its emissions trends, its marginal costs of mitigation were predicted to be lower in seven of ten models.²³ In other words, given how little has so far been done in the US, the incremental cost of emissions reductions for the Americans is lower than for the Europeans. While lower marginal costs in the US suggest some low-hanging fruit can be gathered with greater investment in energy efficiency and other measures, the

overall GDP losses incurred by fully meeting Kyoto commitments would be daunting. For example, if US GDP had been 1.3% lower in 2002 than it actually was, this would have meant a loss of \$135.4 billion from an overall \$10.4 trillion economy.²⁴ This is roughly comparable to the impact the attacks of September 11, 2001 had on the American economy.²⁵

If there were a way to reduce the costs associated with mitigating climate change, then one could imagine there might be a threshold at which the US would be willing to bear those costs. For example, let us suppose that in 2002 US GDP had declined by only 0.98%—equivalent to the average GDP loss predicted for Europe from the various climate models—instead of 1.3%, the average predicted GDP loss for the US. While 1.3% and 0.98% may not seem markedly different, this would translate into an extra \$33.3 billion for the American economy. Even then, the \$102 billion in lost GDP might not be a cost US politicians would be willing to bear.

Could climate mitigation costs be even lower? Yes. Modelers have also projected costs of mitigation with emissions trading. If emissions trading were limited to Annex 1 countries,²⁶ the models studied by the IPCC predicted that GDP loss in the US in 2010 would be limited to between 0.31% and 1.03%, with an average of 0.59%. The GDP loss in Europe would range from 0.13% to 0.81%, (and average 0.42%), reducing the discrepancy between America and Europe. An even more optimistic scenario is predicted if trading is extended globally. Predicated on “ideal implementation” of Clean Development Mechanism projects with developing countries, the models predicted that GDP losses would fall in the US to between 0.06% and 0.66%, with the average loss being 0.265%. In Europe, losses ranged from 0.03% to 0.54%, with an average of 0.212%.²⁷

To put these numbers into perspective, if US GDP had been 0.265% lower in 2002, this would have been equivalent to \$27.6 billion, saving the US more than \$100 billion in lost income from climate mitigation compared to the pre-trading situation. European losses would be a comparable \$18.28 billion from an \$8.263 trillion economy.²⁸ Obviously, we have front-loaded these losses to 2002 instead of 2010 for illustrative purposes only.²⁹ There may be heroic assumptions about implementation involved in this trading scenario, but, even if these models are somewhat dated, the lesson is clear:

emissions trading may reduce the material discrepancies in costs between the US and Europe. On both sides of the Atlantic, the costs of climate change are likely to be significant, though trading may make it cheaper to meet commitments.³⁰

Thus, in our view, an argument that seeks to explain differences between the US and Europe over climate change on the basis of differences in military capabilities or the material costs of mitigation is inadequate. This argument perhaps suggests at a general level what obstacles faced the Kyoto negotiators, but it tells us little concretely about why some acceptable compromise has not been reached. In particular, it is of little help in explaining why the Europeans and Americans could not agree on flexibility mechanisms. We need to dig deeper by looking for other, perhaps more significant, sources of this transatlantic divide. If the US continues without policy adjustments and the Europeans do implement the slate of mitigation measures they have announced, the material discrepancy which has been a contributing factor to past disputes may become the central barrier to future agreements.

Values Gap

A second set of arguments, also echoed in Robert Kagan's book *Of Paradise and Power*, locates the source of conflict in a widening cultural gap between the US and Europe over fundamental values. Here, national preferences are not mere reflections of underlying material conditions, but are more durable values that may transcend and run counter to material incentives. The existence of a so-called "values gap" or ideological divide between the US and Europe has already become conventional wisdom. In a German Marshall Fund-sponsored poll taken in June 2003 in seven European countries and the United States, more than three quarters of both Europeans and Americans polled believed there to be a "difference in social and cultural values."³¹

Rather than emanating from different material (read: military or economic) conditions, the argument goes, differences between us derive from distinct historical trajectories and demographic trends. We now want different things. There may be a "values gap" that matters for climate change politics, but we need to specify what it is. There are at least five possibilities:

1. Different values in terms of the use of force.
2. Different values in terms of broad policy approaches.
3. Different preferences about the significance of climate change.
4. Different preferences for kinds of policy tools.
5. Different attitudes about scientific uncertainty.

With respect to the use of force, this has perhaps limited relevance for climate change, for this problem cannot be solved through military might. To the extent that the US and Europe differ over the use of force, this may contribute to negative spillover effects on other policy dimensions. For example, with Europeans largely hostile to the use of force in Iraq and less willing to support the use of force more broadly,³² American and European cooperation on other matters—namely climate change—may be cross-contaminated. It might also affect threat perception and the relative importance assigned to climate change, the third potential area for a values gap. While this is potentially a problem, Americans and Europeans can and do work together on areas of mutual concern such as the trade agenda.³³

Do Americans and Europeans have different preferences over policy approaches? Are the Americans broadly unilateralist while Europeans are multilateralist? If this were true, this might explain the Americans' willingness to drop out of the Kyoto Protocol process and the Europeans' continued faith in it.³⁴ Polls do not show much support for the thesis that mass publics in the United States are unilateralist. As Benjamin Page and Dukhong Kim argued in a recent paper, "The evidence from three decades of Chicago Council surveys indicates that strong support for international cooperation has been an enduring feature of US public opinion."³⁵ A June 2003 poll by the German Marshall Fund found continued support for this view; both Americans and Europeans believe that US unilateralism is a problem.³⁶ Both Americans and Europeans also support the UN. To be fair, US support for the UN declined as a result of the failure to reach agreement over Iraq, with 70% supporting strengthening the UN in 2003, down from 77% in 2002. Europeans held similar views, as 75% and 74% supported strengthening the UN in 2002 and 2003, respectively.³⁷ Americans, unlike Europeans, were more likely to agree that bypassing the UN when necessary for national interest was justified.³⁸

That said, it is difficult to argue that the American public is broadly unilateralist in orientation.³⁹

We should note that American public opinion is not monolithically multilateralist. There is somewhat of a split along partisan lines. As Page and Kim noted: "For example, about 80% of Democrats, compared with only a little over 60% of Republicans, favored making joint decisions with the European Union. But even among strong Republicans a majority (53%) agreed."⁴⁰ Similarly, when asked about strengthening the UN, 90% of strong Democrats and 89% of liberals were supportive, but only 54% of strong Republicans and 67% of self-described conservatives agreed.⁴¹

If Americans and Europeans are both broadly multilateralist, then might there be another cultural source of variation? One view is that Europeans are generally more concerned about the environment than Americans. For many in the United States, this would seem a bit incongruous, as the green movement got its start in the US in the 1970s. Europeans, in many instances, were inspired by US models in both policy and advocacy.⁴² Have cultural attitudes undergone a transformation in the last thirty years? Do Europeans simply care more about global warming than Americans?

One immediate objection to this line of argument is to ask what it means to say Europeans culturally share a certain view.⁴³ Even if views in Europe in favor of action on climate change were higher on average than in the United States, would calling this a deep-seated cultural value be meaningful? Even if we look at the aggregate concern in Europe and compare it to America, the evidence is mixed. Most Americans believe that global warming is real and worth doing something about. A September 2001 Harris poll showed that 75% of the respondents believed global warming was real, up from 72% in 2000 and 67% in 1997.⁴⁴ Is this significantly different from European opinion? Again, there is mixed support for the idea of a marked difference of opinion. A 1998 survey found that, although US and European publics largely agreed that global warming was real, Europeans were more prepared to take action despite the costs. In France, Germany, and Italy, more than 70% of those surveyed suggested we should, assuming the worst, take action despite the possible costs. The US and the UK were more equivocal, as 46% and 52% respectively said action should be taken. More recent pre-9/11 surveys suggested increasing

American enthusiasm for taking action.⁴⁵ Even after 9/11, when American and European views might be expected to have been colored by their opinions about the threat posed by terrorism, polls suggested similar percentages of Americans (46%) and Europeans (49%) regarded global warming as an extremely important threat.⁴⁶

While Americans and Europeans both can be said to be broadly multilateralist and concerned about climate change, is it possible that Europeans and Americans have, by virtue of the cultural divide, distinct preferences for different kinds of policy tools? Europeans, the argument goes, are more accustomed to state intervention and therefore favor or are amenable to regulation as a means to solve problems. Americans, by contrast, are accustomed to and favor market mechanisms to resolve problems. Europeans are skeptical of the market as a means of pursuing public purposes.

There is potentially some merit to this view, but we need to ask if it is supported by the evidence and, even if valid, is it actually a manifestation of culture. On the European side, the 2002 Eurobarometer poll found that Europeans believed stricter regulation and fines from national governments and the EU (48%), greater environmental awareness (45%), and better enforcement of existing legislation (40%) were the three most effective ways of resolving environmental problems. Higher taxes and incentives for industry figured much lower on the list, partially suggestive that Europeans favor regulatory over market mechanisms.⁴⁷ However, in examining the evidence from the American side, we are immediately confronted by public opinion polls that show little support for emissions trading. A 1998 poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland found that 61% of Americans thought trading was a bad idea. However, when presented with more information and a question phrased slightly differently to emphasize the draw-backs of mitigation without trading and the benefits for developing countries, public opinion reverses, with 66% supporting trading.⁴⁸ This variation depending on the form of the question hardly suggests a deep-seated cultural predilection for market mechanisms, even in the United States. In any case, Kyoto includes a number of market mechanisms.

Even if we had found evidence for this view, we might question whether or not it represents a cultural perspective. If we identify culture with durable mass attitudes, it may be difficult to imagine that

European and American publics have consistently structured views about particular policy tools (regulation vs. market mechanisms). Elites are more likely to hold such views. Even then, actual policy behavior may be less a cultural phenomenon than a result of institutional inertia and past practice.

European environmental protection may be more characterized by regulation as a force of institutional path-dependency rather than deep ideological attachment. American environmental protection used to be like this more than a decade ago. In the face of business opposition and new policy ideas, the US experimented with market mechanisms such as sulfur dioxide emissions trading. Europe has recently embraced emissions trading as a means of meeting its Kyoto commitments. Was the lag in views a reflection of "European" culture/ideology? Just a few years ago, emissions trading found few supporters in Europe. A cultural or ideological defense would argue that the failure of the climate negotiations at The Hague in 2000, followed by George W. Bush's rejection of Kyoto, led to a crisis of belief in Europe. European leaders re-evaluated their options, leading to a radical transformation in elite attitudes if not mass publics.

In our view, mass publics are not deeply culturally committed to certain environmental policy tools. They are environmental pragmatists, less likely to have opinions on specific measures, but generally supportive of whatever policy international agreement produces, provided it appears to have a chance at working. In terms of specific policy measures, they take their cues from leaders and internationally respected experts they trust. In the case of climate change, the US public currently believes the scientists and the environmental community that the problem is real and Kyoto is the appropriate mechanism. In a 2002 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll, 64% said that the US should participate in "the Kyoto agreement to reduce global warming."⁴⁹ Support actually increased to 70% when the question was re-phrased to include arguments against the agreement ("Some people say this would hurt the US economy and is based on uncertain science.")⁵⁰ However, if the environmental community were to disavow Kyoto and shift its allegiance to some other mechanism, we submit that public attitudes would likely change. In any case, the relationship between public attitudes and elite policy choices is a complicated one, particularly where there is diversity of opinion at both levels. Elites do

not faithfully represent public attitudes, nor does the public respond uniformly to changing elite sentiment.

A final values-based explanation of the transatlantic climate divide is contained in the idea that Europeans are more willing to tolerate scientific uncertainty and have embraced the precautionary principle more than Americans. Evidence on this question appears to be mixed, in part because it is hard to ask people about a philosophical idea few of them have probably heard of. As the 2001 Eurobarometer poll found, 61.4% of Europeans admitted to being poorly informed about science and technology and 52% said they “were not very interested” in the subject.⁵¹

Surveys do pick up, though, on some closely aligned concepts. As noted before, some polls find Europeans have a greater willingness to take action on climate change. Other polls are better at getting at the precautionary principle. One American survey found in January 2000 that 70% of Americans agreed with the view that “protection of the environment should be given priority, even at the risk of curbing economic growth.” By March 2002, however, this percentage had fallen to 54%.⁵² At once, this suggests that Americans, like the Europeans, share the view that precautions to protect the environment may be necessary despite the costs. On the other hand, declining support for this view suggests American attitudes are less culturally determined, but rather are more volatile and dependent upon economic conditions and political cues from elites. Again, like the discussion of policy tools, the public is not likely to have an established view about scientific uncertainty and the standards of proof necessary to warrant policy intervention. If elites hold a certain view, this may be as much a reflection of dominant interests thrown up by the political system as an indication of deep-seated cultural values. We explore this question more fully in the following section.

We do not suggest that Americans and Europeans think exactly alike on these issues. There is sufficient interest in environmental protection more generally and sufficient concern about climate change specifically in both regions that values, were they the only consideration, would seem to have enabled some sort of faltering half-measure to have been implemented by now.

Institutional Difference and Distance

A better lens through which to view the depth of the dispute is the domestic political process in America and internal European Union dynamics.⁵³ In both cases, certain groups and influences have dominated the policy process and discourse over the last ten plus years, with an anti-Kyoto orientation predominating in the US and a pro-Kyoto, anti-flexibility mechanisms view prevailing in Europe. Which groups dominate the policy process—we argue—is largely a function of internal political institutions. Political institutions—such as the separation of powers, voting rules, and campaign finance systems—aggregate the plurality of interests in democracies and shape which material interests and cultural values matter.

This third argument also emphasizes the interaction between actors of different political systems. In 1988, Robert Putnam wrote a seminal article on “two-level games.”⁵⁴ In that piece, he suggested that negotiations at the international level are not just between governments. Leaders, in turn, have to also bargain with domestic actors, both inside and outside of government. Putnam’s main conclusion was that actors who have strong domestic constraints may have enhanced bargaining leverage internationally. Because they have less room to make concessions at home, the argument goes, leaders have more freedom to extract better bargains from their counterparts abroad.

However, what happens when both actors are so constrained? What happens if neither side understands each other’s constraints?⁵⁵ In these instances, the scope for compromise narrows considerably and may even foreclose options that are acceptable both internationally and domestically. Negotiations have a higher probability of failure if the parties do not understand these domestic constraints. In our view, climate policies between the US and Europe suffer from these kinds of problems. The clearest instance of these dynamics was evinced at the 6th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in The Hague. To understand how The Hague summit unfolded, we first need to understand the nature of policy-making in the US and Europe.

In the United States, multiple actors hold veto power over policy.⁵⁶ Unless an issue emerges to achieve overwhelming bipartisan support, America’s sustained commitment to pursue given policies is often

undermined, particularly if the proposed policies antagonize powerful interests.⁵⁷ The political system in the US guarantees both houses of Congress important rights of co-determination. The Senate can block international treaties. Furthermore, both chambers—through the powerful committee chairs—can block national policy implementation plans, such things as carbon taxes, investment in renewables, energy efficiency standards, etc.

In Europe, the situation is also one of multiple veto powers of a different sort. The number and diversity of European states complicates EU-wide policy agreement, particularly because of the tradition in the European Council of consensus decision-making.⁵⁸ While EU members effectively have veto power over policies they strongly dislike, European governments face fewer domestic constraints than US negotiators. In Germany, for example, when the Chancellor has a majority of the members of Parliament supporting him, treaty ratification is more of a formality. In the UK, the Prime Minister does not even need to go to Parliament to ratify an international treaty.⁵⁹

In the American system, aside from the constitutional veto powers within government, there are societal actors with the capability of exercising leverage on legislators. Campaign finance becomes important here. Until (and probably despite) recent legislation to reform the system of campaign finance, political candidates in the US were (and are) more dependent upon private sources of campaign financing than legislators in Europe. This, we suggest, means that American politicians are more dependent upon sources of finance that are hostile to climate change mitigation efforts. In theory, environmental plutocrats could have similar influence in the American political process if they were willing to invest, but given the combination of high stakes and resources, energy interests are the most motivated to lobby on this issue.

Though European elections are not immune to campaign finance scandals, businesses—perhaps with the exception of Italy—exercise less dominance over policy. While influential, European political campaigns are less expensive and media intensive and more supported by the public purse. While most European countries and the US both have some form of direct public funding and disclosure laws on campaign donations, Europe, unlike the United States, tends to provide free TV time to candidates and/or parties. Of 14 current EU members

for which there is data on campaign finance, all provide free TV time and eight have bans on paid political advertising on television.⁶⁰

Nassmacher has estimated that the percentage of total campaign expenditures from public subsidies ranges from a low of 2 to 3% in the US and UK to a high of 65% in Sweden. In between, most European countries tend towards higher levels of public support. Though Italy was estimated to provide only 4% of campaign funds from the public purse, other European countries provide much higher levels of subsidy: the Netherlands (16%), Spain (43%), Germany (54%), and France (56%).⁶¹ Even the low UK calculation does not include indirect subsidies in free TV time from the BBC, which were estimated to be worth \$98 million in 2001. Total UK state support for candidates in the 2001 general election totaled \$160.1 million, of which only \$13.65 million was in direct subsidies.⁶²

While European governments typically have had more freedom of maneuver to pursue external commitments without as much parliamentary or societal influence, this has not been the case when it comes to domestic implementation of environmental legislation. Domestic interests have been less charitable when European governments have sought to enact such measures as carbon or gas taxes. Business opposition to carbon taxes in Germany in the mid 1990s, for example, ultimately led to a series of voluntary agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.⁶³ Indeed, this consensual approach to environmental policy-making—an outgrowth of corporatist institutions—is often cited as a distinctive European contribution to environmental policy that is superior to the American confrontational system that pits regulators against the private sector.⁶⁴

In the international arena while European legislators have scope to pursue pro-environmental policies by negotiation, they are not able to make many concessions that might be deemed anti-environmental. Because of voting systems based on proportional representation, many European governments have coalitions of different parties.⁶⁵ In the last two decades, new social movements—primarily the Greens—have been able to consolidate their influence and become swing coalition allies in a number of governments. This has given them the capability to block policy changes, particularly when their representatives have been given the environment portfolio as part of power-sharing agreements. Of the fifteen EU members at the time of The Hague

meeting in 2000, five—France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, and Finland—had coalition governments with Green partners.⁶⁶ With left-of-center governments ascendant in Europe in the 1990s, governing parties were loath to compromise on these new issue areas for fear of triggering coalition defections.⁶⁷

At the same time, the European Union has increasingly tried to speak with a common voice to harmonize its internal standards and to maximize its external bargaining leverage. This has often given the country that holds the rotating Presidency of the EU greater influence when it comes to international negotiations. However, as the EU has accreted responsibilities and centralized authority, countervailing pressures—the addition of new members and democratization of decision-making processes—render the EU more like the United States. Making decisions is perhaps becoming more unwieldy, given a stronger tradition of rule by consensus in Brussels. As many observers have noted, intra-European negotiations to forge a common position at the Conference of Parties meetings take up as much or more time than negotiations with the rest of the world.⁶⁸

In our view, while domestic institutions may privilege certain interests, they do not mechanistically lead to the dominance of those positions. There is room for agency. Because we are dealing with democratic polities, actors must ultimately defend their positions before a wider public that must at least acquiesce, if not agree, with the arguments advanced by decision-makers. For politicians, these reasons have to be compelling enough to guarantee survival at election time, however the systems are configured. At the very least, the arguments cannot be so counter to voter's sensibilities that an attentive public throws them out of office.

Actors, in their use of rhetoric, try to connect their policy positions to widely shared material interests and cultural values. While policy entrepreneurs may invent new rhetoric, they typically find there is a repertoire of arguments and ongoing discussions in the broader public arena that they can appropriate.⁶⁹ Arguments have a higher probability of success when they meet most or all of the following conditions:

1. *Cultural match*—arguments are consistent with existing cultural traditions.

2. *Credible information*—third-party information supports the conclusions of advocates.
3. *Crisis/focusing event*—events reinforce the advocates' definition of a problem.
4. *Low concentrated/low national costs*—the positions being advocated are not linked to policy choices with high costs for particular actors or for the country as a whole.⁷⁰

Opponents can do any or all of the following:

1. Reject the problem or promote countervailing interests or values (“global warming isn’t a problem. Other things are more important”).
2. Reject the reasons (“it’s not clear that greenhouse gases lead to warming”).
3. Attack the evidence offered (“the earth is not warming, it is cooling”).
4. Dispute the favored solution (“Kyoto isn’t the right solution”).⁷¹


How are these dynamics manifested in climate change politics in the US and Europe? We find that, again, business plays a key role. Carbon-intensive producers of energy—including coal and other fossil fuels producers—have historically been the lead actors in the US against American participation in the climate change regime.⁷² Their primary political patrons are Republicans, though some Democrats have supported their views.⁷³ While firms and industry associations have other interests in mind when making campaign contributions, given the potential costs and loss of market power post-reform, global warming concerns rank fairly high for them as grounds for supporting political campaigns and parties. Political contributions, however, do not translate automatically into support from elected officials. Politicians still have to justify to pro-environmental polities reasons for their hostility to climate change mitigation.⁷⁴

What arguments have advocates (what we call the view from Venus) and opponents (or the view from Mars) of climate change mitigation offered? When the issue first arose, advocates linked climate change to both the emerging science and the hot summer of 1988. They argued that the potential threat of climate change warranted preventive

action. Opponents responded by disputing the evidence of global warming. The US energy industry backed prominent climate science skeptics and organizations like the Greening Earth Society and the industry lobbying group, the Global Climate Coalition, to suggest the science was faulty.⁷⁵ This argument ultimately lost credibility as the science, as represented by the overwhelming consensus in the IPCC reports, only confirmed that the problem was real. Even so, the US system allowed members of Congress to continue to hold hearings in which climate skeptics figured prominently, as if there were more of a scientific debate.

When the faulty science argument proved insufficient to win political battles, opponents of mitigation shifted to costs arguments. Increasingly, they admitted the problem was real, but maintained that the proposed policy solutions would be too costly. At the same time, they attacked the emerging institutional architecture for its exclusion of developing countries, suggesting it was unfair for the United States to accept climate change burdens without the inclusion of fast developing countries like China and India. These two concerns—costs and equity—became the primary arguments in the run up to Kyoto, as represented in the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which passed the US Senate by a vote of 95-0. In recent years, even as opponents have recognized that the problem is real, they have suggested that technological fixes—such as carbon sequestration—are likely to obviate the need for wrenching adjustments in transportation and energy production. The rhetorical timeline of opponents of mitigation—what we call the view from Mars—is diagrammed below in Figure 1.

Figure 1 The View from Mars—Opponents Rhetorical Timeline




The influence of anti-Kyoto interests in American politics shows up in differences between mass publics and elite attitudes. In the 2002 Chicago Council poll, 48% of the public thought that global warming represents a “threat to the country’s critical interests over the next ten years,” but only 28% of the leaders agreed with this assessment. While 66% of the public thought that “improving the global environment” should be a “very important” goal of foreign policy, only 43% of the leaders agreed with this statement.⁷⁶ Because environmental issues tend to be less salient at election time than other issues, American voters have not punished politicians for their divergent views on climate policy.⁷⁷ Whether this will always be the case remains an open question.

Environmental advocates in the US never had an effective counter-argument to their opponents (see Lane, in this volume). While some studies showed that climate change mitigation might be less costly because of emissions trading and the emergence of a green technology industry, enough economic studies suggested the costs of Kyoto would be sufficiently high that this argument was not easily dismissed. At the same time, hostility by European officials to flexibility mechanisms undermined the counter-argument by the US environmental community. They could not credibly maintain that trading would contain costs if the trading regime looked likely to be a non-starter. The equity argument also proved difficult to dislodge, as it became enmeshed with larger concerns about China as a potential rival to the United States. Given Republican control of Congress, the arguments, “we were the ones that caused the problem” and, “the US must lead,” did not have enough support to convince decision-makers that they would not be punished at election time for being “soft on China.” China did not do environmental advocates any favors by vigorously opposing participation in the climate regime.

In Figure 2, we have diagrammed the rhetorical timeline of advocates (the view from Venus). They argued the problem was real and then sought to counter the later claims of opponents. While in Europe these rhetorical claims have been nearly universally accepted (for reasons explored below), such arguments have not been successful in the United States, where advocates have failed to develop winning rhetorical strategies. We have identified five potential rhetorical winners: a broad material argument (“it’s going to get worse”); a geo-

strategic argument (“carbon economy→terrorism”); an ethical argument (“it’s immoral to drive SUVs”); an economic nationalist argument (“those foreigners are taking our jobs”); and, finally, an Atlanticist diplomatic argument (“let’s stay friends”).

Figure 2 The View from Venus—Advocates Rhetorical Timeline



While a combination of these or other rhetorical strategies are likely to be required, we believe that those arguments which connect to cultural traditions, minimize cost concerns, and find support in both current events and science will have a higher probability of success. This being said, the geo-strategic and ethical arguments may prove more potent than the others. As long as terrorism looms large in the American consciousness, the geo-strategic argument will likely command a wider public than the environmental community. Should concern shift away from security, the ethical argument (“poor countries have been buffeted by poverty, AIDS, and now the weather, it is our moral obligation to help them”) is more likely than the lure of jobs to be persuasive. Direct appeals to the conscience of religious conservatives have been successful of late, as evinced by the campaigns for developing country debt relief and AIDS. Finally, any rhetorical strategy has to convince the public that solutions to this problem *can* be found.

In Europe, business interests have not been able to exercise as much influence over decision-makers. Corporatist political traditions have historically given labor a seat in negotiations, leveling the playing

field somewhat and leaving state governments with some autonomy with respect to both. In any polity, the business sector looks to government for signals of regulatory intent to make investment decisions. The permeability of the American system has meant that anti-mitigation forces have been able to forestall a coherent and credible signal from the US government. In Europe, the issue has never become a source of partisan division. As a result, there is a clear signal from the EU and European governments that some form of regulation is forthcoming. European business has made the calculation that planning for the inevitable is preferable, as resistance to international commitments is futile. European businesses, however, are both prepared to vigorously contest implementation plans and also position themselves as "eco-friendly" to profit from environmental technologies and trading. Implementation of EU climate policy provides for more national level discretion. The allocation of permits in the new emissions trading regime is a case in point. Businesses know this area is more contestable because national politicians are often less committed to specific policies than they are to giving the impression internationally of "doing the right thing" on climate.

The reasons why the issue has not become a source of partisan division in Europe may result in part from historical circumstance, from conservative governments being in power in Germany and the UK when the issue emerged. Scientists and advocates in Europe argued that the worst-case scenarios warranted precautionary action. The dash for gas in England, the potential for Wall-fall profits in Germany, and a desire to save the nuclear industry muted the validity of cost arguments.⁷⁸ At the same time, the rising power of the environmental movement and the Greens provided politically potent values around which publics could rally. Both the science and the summer of 1988 supported the claims of advocates. Thatcher and Kohl thus found it in their interest to lead on climate. Because they embraced the issue, a cross-party consensus has since characterized climate politics. Moreover, the burden-sharing agreement leavened the costs for other European states, de-legitimizing the cost argument, at least in the medium-run. Policy-makers, however, have largely shied away from costly domestic implementation programs like carbon taxes and higher fuel taxes, for fear of giving opponents an issue that can be used to hurt them. Subsequent governments found not only cross-party support, but also constraints from Green constituencies in coali-

tion governments. Even if there is not a broad cultural predilection against flexibility mechanisms, arguments against market mechanisms resonate with Green coalition partners who typically did not support trading and the inclusion of sinks in the Kyoto Protocol. For them and their constituencies, the argument “we must make a deal” was not convincing. No deal was better than any deal.

Internationally, COP 6 in the Hague is perhaps the best instance in which a potential deal between the US and Europe went awry as a result of these constraints. On the American side, Clinton faced insuperable domestic constraints. First, the Republicans held a majority in both houses and thus had agenda-setting power. Given that they preferred the status quo policy of doing nothing, there was limited incentive for them to support the initiative. Moreover, Republican lawmakers were unduly skeptical of the science of global warming.⁷⁹ Their views, perhaps reflecting the enormous amount of campaign contributions from the energy sector, largely mirrored the concerns of firms likely to find adjustment to emissions reductions quite costly. In the absence of an agreement that explicitly included developing countries, Republicans would not support a measure to control global warming. Even if developing countries had been included in the Protocol, the potential costs to the American economy would have violated the second criteria of the Byrd-Hagel resolution. Thus, to the Republican agenda setters, no agreement was better than Kyoto. Second, the US Constitution in Article 5 stipulates that the Senate must pass a treaty by a two-thirds majority. Whereas the median Senate position might have been closer to the US public median position, which was generally pro-environment, the two-thirds majority would probably be closer to the Republican agenda-setter than the US public median, making Kyoto much harder to pass.⁸⁰

What happened to European decision-makers' views in the interim years between Kyoto's negotiation in 1997 and America's exit from the Protocol in 2001? There were a number of new developments that hardened some positions and upended the positions of others.⁸¹ First, even though few countries actually began to independently implement emissions reductions, international action was increasingly seen by Europeans as inevitable.⁸² As a result, European decision-makers internalized Kyoto as their point of reference. Moreover, the additional scientific information that global warming was as serious as

imagined, led to a hardening of the Europeans' commitment to Kyoto. In addition, the emergence of the five Green parties in coalition governments resulted in their views becoming more prominent.⁸³

European leaders, as a result, found themselves constrained to renegotiate Kyoto on terms more favorable to the US. The possibility of the entire framework unraveling never fully registered in Europe until after the failure at The Hague and the Bush Administration repudiation of the Protocol. While it is conceivable that European leaders might have been more willing to strike a deal that would make Kyoto's ultimate implementation more likely by bringing in the US, societal actors in Europe acted as agenda-setters and vetoed compromises that would weaken the Kyoto Protocol.⁸⁴ Talk of market mechanisms, emissions trading, and carbon sinks for US forests struck many in Europe as permitting the US to weasel out of having to bear the costs of responding to global warming.⁸⁵ Europeans thought that success would require that Americans feel the pain of high gasoline prices, something that Europe had long known.⁸⁶ Lower emissions reductions would not be tolerated.

This discussion has allowed us to answer the question of why Europe has been more committed than the United States both to sustaining the overall process and to keeping an emphasis on binding emissions reductions with limited room for flexibility mechanisms. Viewed in terms of the domestic structural argument, ongoing disputes over climate change make much more sense.

Conclusion

Over the past decade, the US and Europe have continuously engaged in a tug of war over the instruments of climate policy. This has affected the nature of the emerging institutional architecture. Some of the choices—for binding emissions reductions and flexibility mechanisms—ultimately have run into political realities on both sides of the Atlantic. However, Europeans remain firmly committed to the Kyoto process, while the US remains outside.

During the Bush Administration, US climate change policy has come to symbolize American unilateralism. While US intransigence on this and other issues has reinforced Europeans' political commitment to Kyoto, the non-participation of the United States ultimately

is unsustainable if climate mitigation is to happen. Given the current disarray in European-American climate relations, one might envisage a different institutional design that would have ultimately been self-reinforcing and less likely to unravel. For example, a massive public investment program in clean technology akin to those made after the Second World War in the space program, arms, and highways might have muted business opposition to policy change and led to technological innovation.⁸⁷

However, the contest of wills between the US and Europe produced a patchwork of rules and norms that made concessions to both sides without making anyone happy or necessarily being the optimal policy for mitigating climate change. While binding emissions reductions were the core of what Europe wanted, American influence ultimately allowed historic emitters to be grand-fathered and won the inclusion of flexibility mechanisms as a way to limit the impact on business. The process took on a weight of its own, as few actors wished to give up on a decade of work. George W. Bush's repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol was a rude wake-up call. While Europe's perseverance has kept the process alive, the absence of the US is a constant reminder that the problem will get worse unless the world's largest emitter rejoins. With Russia's long and as yet continuing delay in ratifying Kyoto, the future of the Protocol is unclear.

In thinking about how to escape from the current predicament, we have to keep in mind that both the US and Europe have difficulty making promises they can faithfully carry out, a problem of credible commitments.⁸⁸ While President Clinton supported the Kyoto Protocol, everyone knew that ratification was extremely unlikely. From the US perspective, though Europe may pledge an ambitious set of policy reforms, the Americans may not trust them to be implemented or effective. Based on Europe's past failed efforts to harmonize energy prices through carbon taxes, US officials know that consensus decision-making in the EU can very easily doom a policy if there is sustained opposition.⁸⁹ However, Europe's previous success in overcoming similar obstacles suggests this may be less worrisome than the US at times claims.

What then is to be done? In terms of the broader institutional architecture, the second commitment period looms large. This offers a fresh opportunity to figure out how to get the Americans back to the

table. However, it is not immediately obvious that Kyoto is the venue in the foreseeable future where the Americans will show up. That said, there may be scope for alternative bilateral and multilateral engagement that, bit by bit, pulls the Americans into a more accommodating position. Whichever process emerges, it must ultimately stimulate the innovation of next generation clean energy and transport technology (see Edmonds and Stokes, and Jaeger, in this volume).

To return to normalcy, at a bare minimum, both sides have to back away from the heated rhetoric that has infused the climate change debate as a result of broader concerns about US unilateralism. While this has been helpful for European unity, attempting to shame the United States into action on climate change is not likely to succeed. If the transatlantic partnership is to mean anything in the climate arena, we must look for tangible areas in which cooperation is possible. This is beginning to happen—but clearly much more has to be done—in research into new technologies, and also in attempts to better understand the impacts of climate change, what constitutes best practice in climate mitigation, and the costs of different strategies.

If the Americans are ever to rejoin the process, the hardest part for both parties will be selling concessions at home. The US is probably going to have to receive a bye in the first commitment period in exchange for deeper long-term commitments. Perhaps Europe can negotiate with the Americans to invest more in technology transfer, agree to long-run cuts, and define a “dangerous” threshold concentration of greenhouse gases. Unfortunately, given the way the policy process has unfolded over the past decade, potential material and ideological gaps are becoming a larger problem. With policy-makers reluctant to disappoint core political constituencies, they seldom exercise the leadership necessary to challenge their own citizens to adjust their thinking and face critical problems. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush did and have done very little, for instance, to prepare American citizens for changes in the transportation sector, allowing gas-guzzling SUVs to glut the marketplace. Europeans have similar problems in the transport sector. Moreover, European governments, for fear of enraging coalition allies, fought against emissions trading even when the evidence suggested potential cost savings. Fortunately, the failure at The Hague and Bush’s intransigence have encouraged new thinking and a redoubled commitment in Europe.

Our analysis suggests that “the Mars and Venus thesis” overstates material and values gaps between us.⁹⁰ Certain structural qualities of the US and European political systems hinder cooperation and thereby reinforce differences in both material conditions and values, however small. The challenge before us is as much internal as external, as our respective domestic publics need to be reminded of the values we share and the interests we have in common. If the transatlantic relationship is to survive an uncertain security and global economic environment, the arrival of a united Europe, and the messiness of democratic politics, American and European policy-makers must forge common policies that they are prepared to defend before their constituents. Should they accept this responsibility, we may enjoy another half-century of spirited cooperation and some progress in the climate arena. Perhaps when we get down to Earth, cooler heads will prevail.

Notes

1. "U.S. Angers Allies Over Climate Pact, Europeans Will Ask Bush to Reconsider," *Washington Post*, 29 March 2001, p A1.
2. This paper draws on our earlier work including Josh Busby, "Climate Change Blues: Why the US and Europe Just Can't Get Along," *Current History* (March 2003); Alexander Ochs, *Global Challenge, National Resistance: Explaining Patterns of US Behavior in International Climate Policy* [Globale Aufgabe, nationaler Widerstand. Erklarungsmuster fuer das Verhalten der USA in der internationalen Klimapolitik] (Munich: M.A.-Thesis, Ludwig-Maximilian-University, Semester 2001/2002); Josh Busby, "Vested Interests, First Movers and Hot Air: The Political Economy of Global Warming," Working Paper 2001, [<http://www.georgetown.edu/users/busbyj/IPECPAPER.pdf>]; Alexander Ochs, "Reviving Transatlantic Cooperation towards a Global Threat," Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, 2003, at [http://www.intactclimate.org/publications/IntactReport_030227.pdf].
3. "German parliament ratifies Kyoto protocol," *Reuters*, 25 March 2002, [<http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/15178/news-Date/25-Mar-2002/story.htm>].
4. In a 2002 poll conducted for the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, 91% of Americans viewed international terrorism as "extremely important" to the country's vital interest. In Germany 63% responded that way, 60% of French, 74% of British, and 67% of Italians (p. 18). The same survey found that 56% of European respondents gave the Bush Administration either fair (42%) or poor (14%) marks for overall foreign policy, with a higher percentage favorable on the response to international terrorism compared to issues like climate change and the Arab-Israeli peace process (p. 24). See *Worldviews 2002: European Report*, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002, [<http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/europeanreport.pdf>]. We should be careful of these results, as another 2002 Pew Center poll found somewhat different levels of threat perception, with Canada and the UK less worried about terrorism than the US, Germany, France, Japan or Italy (p. 32). This same poll found a decline in favorable opinion of America between 1999/2000 and 2002 in Germany (-17%), Great Britain (-8%) and Italy (-6%). France, surprisingly, had a slightly higher opinion of the US in 2002 (p. 4). Germans and French overwhelmingly opposed removal of Saddam Hussein (71% and 64% respectively) compared to 62% in support in the US (p. 4). See *What the World Thinks in 2002*, The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2002, [http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/vf_pew_global_attitudes.pdf].
5. "20,000 join anti-war protest," *The Guardian*, 13 October 2001, [<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4276735,00.html>];

Josh Chavetz, "Online Dispatch: Oxford Appeasement," *The New Republic*, 21 November 2001, [<http://www.thenewrepublic.com/online/chafetz112101.html>]; "The drumbeat of European dissatisfaction....," *Irish Times*, 1 December 2001; "Europe rallies for peace." *CNN*, 14 October 2001; [<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/14/gen.peace.marches/index.html>]. Though pre-dating the attacks of September 11th, polls in four European countries found high levels of distrust for Bush's early steps in contrast to widespread European support for Bill Clinton's policies. See "Results of a Multinational Poll in France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy: Bush Unpopular In Europe, Seen As Unilateralist," *The Pew Center for the People and the Press*, 15 August 2001, [<http://www.people-press.org/bush01rpt.htm>]; Steven Erlanger, "Bush's Move On ABM Pact Gives Pause To Europeans," *Washington Post*, 13 December 2001, p. A19; Philip Stephens, "A solo performer by nature," *Financial Times*, 23 November 2001, p. 21.

5. *The Economist* lambastes Bush for this maneuver on the Chemical Weapons Convention, "Bush's hang-ups," *The Economist*, 13 December 2001. For a contrarian position, see Amity Shlaes, "Fighting terrorism first, multilateralism second: While Europe fusses about biological weapons treaties and the rights of terrorists, America is acting," *Financial Times*, 27 November 2001.
7. Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, no. 113 (June/July 2002), p. 3, [<http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html>].
8. Kagan, "Power and Weakness." See also Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).
9. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
10. Joseph Lepgold was developing such arguments before his untimely death. Joseph Lepgold, "Reassessing the Roots of American Ambivalence Toward Multilateralism," (paper presented at the 97th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Meeting, San Francisco, California, August-September 2001).
11. About half of German emissions reductions were the result of so-called "Wall-fall profits" that resulted from the closure of inefficient, dirty companies in the former East Germany after unification. Similarly, about 46% of British emissions reductions were the result of the country's "dash for gas" after Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher crushed the coal unions and the UK discovered natural gas deposits in the North Sea. Climate specific policies and measures were responsible for the other half, according to a 2001 study. In both cases, more than 40% of these policy measure reductions were the result of two policy measures: (1) the capture of

methane from waste dumps, and (2) the capture of dinitrogen oxide in the production of adipic acid. See “Greenhouse gas reductions in Germany and the UK—Coincidence or policy induced?” (study on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of the Environment, July 2001), [<http://www.isi.fhg.de/e/publikation/wallfall/co2report-isi-e-final.pdf>].

12. Americans, long able to move freely between US states, are as a result more reliant on cars and trucks for transport. Europe, by contrast, has only recently adopted policies facilitating greater freedom of movement and has heretofore been more focused on domestic transport systems which, coupled with high population density, made mass transit options more affordable.
13. IPCC, *Climate Change 2001: Mitigation*. Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. B. Metz et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
14. In 1999, US emissions were 1,840 MMTCE (million metric tons of carbon equivalent), up from 1,647 MMTCE in 1990. John Blodgett and Larry Parker, “Global Climate Change: U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions—Status, Trends, and Projections,” Congressional Research Service (12 March 2002), p. 5, [<http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/climate/clim-13.pdf>].
15. To meet its Kyoto reduction target of 7% below 1990 base levels, the US would have to reduce its emissions to 1,535 MMTCE on average per year for the period 2008–2012. In the report, the EPA estimated US business-as-usual aggregate gross greenhouse emissions in 2010 would be 2,213 MMTCE. See Blodgett and Parker, “Global Climate Change,” pp. 5–7.
16. Emissions in both countries went up in 2000 by 1.2% and 1.3%. Bernd Gugele et. al, *Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2001 and inventory report 2003* (Brussels: European Environment Agency, 2003), p. 8, [http://reports.eea.eu.int/technical_report_2003_95/en/tech_95.pdf].
17. Calculations by the authors from p. 32 in European Environment Agency, *Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory*.
18. Margot Wallström, EU Commissioner for the Environment, “Implementing the Kyoto Protocol: Where do we stand today?” (speech presented at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 1st Brussels Climate Change Conference, Brussels, 20 May 2003), [http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/03/26010|AGED&lg=EN&display]; European Environment Agency, *Greenhouse gas emission projections for Europe* (Brussels: European

- Environment Agency, 2003), [http://reports.eea.eu.int/technical_report_2003_77/en/Technical_report_No_77.pdf].
19. The countries in question are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Calculations of collective projected emissions are made by the authors from European Environment Agency, *Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory* and *Greenhouse gas emission projections for Europe*. If we include France in this calculation (whose emissions are predicted to increase by 9% by 2010), greenhouse gas emissions will be 24% higher than 1990 levels for those eleven EU countries.
 20. European Environment Agency, *Greenhouse gas emission projections for Europe*.
 21. While it makes less sense to look at the other EU countries besides the big emitters—France, Germany, and the UK, the emissions profile of the ten EU laggards is more like the US. The laggards are likely to have emissions 29% higher than in 1990, not entirely dissimilar to the US, where emissions will be 34% higher.
 22. Two models predicted higher GDP losses in OECD-Europe. A third was roughly similar for both the US and Europe. Estimated GDP losses for the US range from 0.42% to 1.96%, with an average GDP loss of 1.3%. OECD-Europe projected GDP losses range from 0.31% to 2.08%, with an average of 0.98%. See Jean-Charles Hourcade and Priyadarshi Shukla et al., "Global, Regional, and National Costs and Ancillary Benefits of Mitigation," in *Climate Change 2001: Mitigation*. Contribution of Working Group III to be the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. B. Metz et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Average model predictions calculated by the authors.
 23. IPCC, *Climate Change 2001: Mitigation*.
 24. World Bank, *Data by Topic*, [<http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/GDP.pdf>]. Calculations of GDP loss by the authors.
 25. Ross DeVol of the Milken Institute estimated that, as a result of 9/11, US GDP fell by \$150 billion, with concomitant job losses of 1.3 million. "What \$87 Billion Buys," *Wall Street Journal*, 11 September 2003. This is a lower estimate than the original study DeVol conducted which estimated job losses of 1.6 million and a decline in GDP of \$175 billion. Ross DeVol, *The Impact of September 11th on US Metropolitan Economies*, Milken Institute (January 2000), [http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/National_Metro_Impact_Report.pdf].

26. These are the 36 industrialized countries and economies in transition listed in Annex 1 of the UNFCCC.
27. IPCC, *Climate Change 2001: Mitigation*. Calculations of average GDP losses by the authors.
28. *European Union Fact Sheet*, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003, [<http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/eu.pdf>].
29. A more meaningful calculation would have some estimates of the size of the American economy in 2010, scaled to current dollars to account for inflation, with the future costs of climate change mitigation discounted.
30. One facet of the argument we haven't taken up is the perceived vulnerability to climate change. It is possible, in light of events such as the 2002 floods in Germany and the 2003 heat wave in Europe, that Europeans feel more vulnerable to the possibility of climate change. This should be manifested in public opinion, but as we suggest, the evidence on this question is mixed.
31. "When asked whether Europeans and Americans have different social and cultural values, majorities on both sides of the Atlantic overwhelmingly agreed (83% of US and 79% of European respondents). Each side perceives a values gap, although it is not clear what this perception is rooted in." (p. 4). See *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, German Marshall Fund, 2003, [<http://www.transatlantictrends.org/>].
32. The June 2003 poll revealed that while majorities in all European countries answered "no," (from 51% in Great Britain to 81% in Germany and 84% in France), a majority of American respondents (55%) answered "yes" (p. 4). 55% of Americans agree strongly with the view "Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice" while only 18% of Europeans strongly agreed with that statement (p. 14). See *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, [[http://www.transatlantictrends.org/apps/gmf/ttweb.nsf/0/A550833A2BCE6CE85256D96007F118B/\\$file/Transatlantic+Trends+Final+Report.pdf](http://www.transatlantictrends.org/apps/gmf/ttweb.nsf/0/A550833A2BCE6CE85256D96007F118B/$file/Transatlantic+Trends+Final+Report.pdf)].
33. By the same token, US cooperation with UK, Spain, and other European countries in Iraq has not prevented there being differences on climate policy.
34. Lucas Assuncao, "Turning its Back to the World? The United States and Climate Change Policy," in *Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, eds. David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003). Harold K. Jacobson, "Climate Change: Unilateralism, Realism, and Two-Level Games," in *Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy*, eds. Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

35. Benjamin I. Page and Dukhong Kim, "Go it Alone' Won't Go with the American Public," (paper prepared for presentation at the 100th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 28-31 August, 2003), [http://archive.allacademic.com/publication/docs/apsa_proceeding/2003-07-31/2058/apsa_proceeding_2058.PDF].
36. When asked whether US unilateralism is a possible international threat in the next 10 years, 78% of Europeans and 67% of Americans listed it as an extremely important or important threat (p. 10), *Transatlantic Trends 2003*.
37. *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, p. 14.
38. Whereas 57% of Americans agreed, 53% of Europeans disagreed, *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, p. 15.
39. Page and Kim, "Go It Alone' Won't Go," cite a number of additional details to support the view that Americans are multilateralists:
 - In 2002, Americans, by 61% to 31%, rejected the idea that the US should act alone if it does not have the support of its allies (p. 5).
 - In 2002, 70% agreed that the US and the EU should be more willing to make decisions jointly, "even if this means that the US, as well as Europe, will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice." (p. 6).
 - The eight Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys dating back to 1974 have found that about half of the US public said "strengthening the United Nations" should be "a very important goal of US foreign policy; 57% said so in 2002." (p. 21).
 - In 2002, 77% of the US public said the UN should be strengthened, even when the question was slanted against the idea, suggesting the UN was a bloated bureaucracy (p. 22).
40. Page and Kim, "Go It Alone' Won't Go," p. 7. Terms for "strong Republican," "strong Democrat," "liberal," and "conservative" are self-identifications by those polled.
41. Page and Kim, "Go It Alone' Won't Go," p. 24.
42. Mikael Skou Andersen and Duncan Liefferink, eds., *European Environmental Policy: The Pioneers* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1997).
43. Is there a common European view if only 24% of Poles respond favorably when asked if global warming is an "extremely important" threat to their

country's vital interests while 47% of Germans, 52% of French and English, 64% of Italians, and 42% of Dutch respond that way? See *European Report*, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Figure 3-1, [<http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/europeanreport/html/images/figures/fig31.html>].

44. Humphrey Taylor, "Large Majority Of Public Now Believes In Global Warming And Supports International Agreements To Limit Greenhouse Gases," *The Harris Poll* #45 (12 September 2001), [http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=256]. The poll also found sharp partisan differences between Republicans and Democrats on the question, with fewer Republicans (though still a majority) believing that warming was real (61%). Sharper were the differences in attitudes over the Bush Administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol.
45. "Global Warming," from *Seeking a New Balance: A Study of American and European Attitudes on Transatlantic Issues*, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), 5 November 1998, [<http://pipa.org/OnlineReports/NewBalance/NB6.html>].
46. *Worldviews 2002: American and European Public Opinion & Foreign Policy*, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002, [<http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/compreport/html/ch1s3.html>].
47. *The attitudes of Europeans towards the environment*, The European Opinion Research Group (EORG), December 2002, Table 19, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/ebs_180_en.pdf].
48. A 1997 poll found something similar. See *Global warming*, PIPA, [http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/global_warming/gw6.cfm].
49. Page and Kim, "'Go It Alone' Won't Go," p. 31.
50. Page and Kim, "'Go It Alone' Won't Go," p. 32.
51. *The attitudes of Europeans towards the environment*, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/ebs_154_en.pdf].
52. *Global warming*, PIPA, [http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/global_warming/gw1.cfm].
53. A number of studies discuss the relationship between international relations and domestic politics. See e.g., Miranda Schreurs and Elizabeth Economy, "Domestic and International Linkages in Environmental Politics," in *The Internationalization of Environmental Protection*, eds. Schreurs and Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Helen Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*

- (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). A similar view to ours is developed by Detlef F. Sprinz and Martin Weiß, "Domestic Politics and Global Climate Policy," in *International Relations and Global Climate Change*, eds. Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), pp. 67-94.
54. Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988), pp. 427-460. See also I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
 55. Even if they understand the basis of decision-making in their respective polities, it may be difficult for leaders, as a result of domestic political considerations, to make policy compromises to accommodate their negotiating partners.
 56. The political science literature has dubbed this "multiple veto players." George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 1 (1995), pp. 289-325.
 57. Leggold made a similar argument.
 58. Of all Council decisions in the EU, 81% were made by consensus without voting between 1996 and 2002. Dorothee Heisenberg, "The Institution of 'Consensus' in the EU: Formal Versus Informal Decisionmaking in the Council," Working Paper Series from the BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, June 2003, [http://georgetown.edu/sfs/cges/docs/Working_Paper_Heisenberg.pdf].
 59. Peter Hennessey, *The Prime Minister* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), pp. 89-90.
 60. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, "Financing Politics: A Global View," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 4 (October 2002), pp. 69-86. The eight include Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK.
 61. Cited in Pinto-Duschinsky, "Financing Politics," p.78. See also Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, "Die Kosten der Parteitätigkeit in westlichen Demokratien," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 31 (2002), [http://www.oetzp.at/oetzp/aktuell/2002_1_nassmacher.htm]. For a similar discussion in English of party financing, see Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, *Handbook on Funding of Parties and Election Campaigns* (Stockholm: International Idea, forthcoming).

62. UK Electoral Commission, *The funding of political parties* (London: UK Electoral Commission, May 2003), p. 16, [http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/files/dms/Funding_BackgroundPaper_edited_9766-7955_E_N_S_W_.pdf]. Dollar amounts calculated by authors using the average pound-dollar exchange rate in 2001.
63. Michael T. Hatch, "The Politics of Global Warming in Germany," *Environmental Politics* 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 415-440; Loren Cass, "The Dilemmas of International Climate Commitments and Energy Reform in Germany, the UK, and the US," (paper presented at annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 24-27 March 2002), [http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/Cass_2002_ISAPaper_Final.pdf].
64. Lyle A. Scruggs, "Institutions and Environmental Performance in Seventeen Western Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 29, no. 1 (1999), pp. 1-31. Lofton makes a similar argument, though he contends it is a cultural argument rather than an institutional one in James A. Lofton, "Environmental Enforcement: The Impact of Cultural Values and Attitudes on Social Regulation," *Environmental Law Reporter*, (August 2001).
65. Of the 15 current EU members, 12 have systems of proportional representation, with one (Italy) having a mixed system, and only France and the UK having single member districts. Despite not having proportional representation, the French Prime Minister often depends on a coalition government with a parliamentary majority. See *Voting in Major Democracies*, Center for Voting and Democracy, 2000, available at [<http://www.fairvote.org/pr/nations.htm>]; *Electoral Systems in Europe: An Overview*, European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD), 2000, available at [http://www.ecprd.org/Doc/publica/OTH/elect_system.html].
66. Website of the European Greens, [<http://www.europeangreens.org/>].
67. For example, without the Greens, the Social Democrats would not have had a majority in the German Parliament. In 1998, German Greens won 6.7% of the vote and 47 seats in the Bundestag. The SPD won 41% of the vote and had 298 seats of the 669 member Bundestag. See "Schröder and Greens to negotiate coalition," BBC News, 28 September 1998, [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/181758.stm>].
68. For a view on how enlargement will affect EU policy-making, see Louise Van Shaik and Christian Egenhofer, "Reform Of The EU Institutions: Implications For The EU's Performance In Climate Negotiations," Policy Brief no. 40, Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2003.
69. Patrick Jackson and Ronald Krebs, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric," (paper presented at the 100th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadel-

phia, 27 August 2003). See also John Kingdon's classic formulation of the agenda-setting process when three streams of the policy process—entrepreneurs, political climate, and windows of opportunity—come together to allow an issue to capture the attention of decision-makers. John Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1995).

70. See Josh Busby, "Listen! Pay Attention! Transnational Social Movements and the Diffusion of International Norms," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 27 August 2003), [http://archive.allacademic.com/publication/docs/apsa_proceeding/2003-08-08/380/apsa_proceeding_380.PDF].
71. This is similar to criteria employed by Frank Schimmelfennig in his discussion of rhetorical action. He discusses "claims" and "warrants" and "grounds", which correspond more or less to items 1, 2, and 3 in the list above. See Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
72. Between 1990 and October 2001, coal mining interests donated \$9.7 million dollars to federal candidates, 76% of the total to Republicans. Nominal contributions increased in every electoral cycle, and the donations shifted almost entirely to Republican candidates, up from 57% in 1990 to 88% in 2000 (consistent with the idea that Democrats are increasingly seen as too favorable to global warming reform). Of this, \$3.6m was from individuals, \$2.9m from PAC's, and \$3.1m in soft money donations. Data from the Center for Responsive Politics, "Coal Mining." In the three electoral cycles 1990-1994, the National Coal Association—until it merged with the National Mining Association (NMA) in 1995—was the top donor among coal interests, contributing overwhelmingly to Republicans. See the website of Open Secrets.org. [<http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?ind=E1210>]. The NMA remains largely hostile to global warming efforts, continuing to dispute the claim, even as the industry seeks to promote cleaner coal technologies, that anthropogenic CO₂ is leading to warming or adverse consequences. See Legal Affairs Committee, National Mining Association, "CO₂: A Pollutant?" Report to the NMA Board of Directors, 12 October 1998, [<http://www.nma.org/CO2%20-%20Pollutant.htm>].
73. Oil and gas interests donated \$131 million from 1990 through October 2001. Oil and gas interests donated more money (in nominal terms) in each successive presidential electoral cycle; \$45m of the total came from individuals, \$38m from PAC's, and nearly \$47m from soft money sources. Mid-term election contributions were lower in 1994 and 1996 than the previous cycle. The proportion of contributions to Republicans increased here as well, up from 60% in 1990 to 78% in 2000. Similar trends are evi-

dent for electric utilities. See Center for Responsive Politics, [<http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?ind=E01>].

74. In an influential memo leaked to the *New York Times*, GOP strategist Frank Luntz tells Republicans to use terms like “balance” and “common sense” when talking about the environment, an issue that he calls “the single biggest vulnerability for the Republicans and especially for George Bush.” On the topic of climate change, Luntz suggests emphasizing a lack of scientific certainty on the issue. He also advises GOP politicians to present themselves as enthusiastic backers of national parks, since it is important to show that “Republicans can be for something positive in the environment.” Jennifer S. Lee, “A Call for Softer, Greener Language,” *New York Times*, 2 March 2003, Section 1 Page 24.
75. The Greening Earth Society was founded by the Western Fuels Association in 1997. The Western Fuels Association, a large coal cooperative, financed a video in 1992, *The Greening of Planet Earth*. The video, shown to many members of Congress, included commentary by a number of climate skeptics and discussed the potential boon to the earth provided by a more carbon dioxide rich world. See “Wall Street Journal Writer Errs In Assertion Of ‘Not Much Scientific Support’ For ‘Greening’,” Western Fuels Association, 16 April 1998, [<http://www.westernfuels.org/news/041698.htm>]. The Greening Earth Society (GES) webpage is [<http://www.greeningearthsociety.org/>].
76. *Worldviews 2002: U.S. Report*, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002, [<http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/usreport/index.htm>].
77. When asked in 2002 an open-ended question, “What do you feel are the two or three biggest foreign policy problems facing the United States today?” only 2% cited the environment while 21% cited terrorism. When asked, “What do you feel are the two or three biggest problems facing the country today?,” only 4% cited the environment compared to 36% citing terrorism. This is more than Europe, where no more than 2% in any of the countries surveyed cited the environment as a top concern. See *American and European Public Opinion on Foreign Policy*, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2002, [http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/europe/report/transatlantic_questionnaire.pdf].
78. See the works cited by Cass, “Dilemmas of International Climate Commitments,” and Hatch, “The Politics of Global Warming in Germany.”
79. This skepticism was evident in the public statements even by Republican Presidential candidates. The *Boston Globe* reported that Republican Presidential Candidate Bob Dole “believes evidence that carbon dioxide emissions are causing global warming is inconclusive.” See Michelle Gahee, “Presidential candidates: Where they stand on some of the

issues," *Boston Globe*, 4 November 1996, p. A14. See also David M. Shribman, "Clinton-Dole outcome may be felt many ways," *Boston Globe*, 4 November 1996, p. A1; Scott Allen, "President stakes a claim on ecology," *Boston Globe*, 23 October 1996, p. A1.

80. Herman Ott discusses some of these constitutional issues in "Climate Change: An Important Foreign Policy Issue," *International Affairs* 77, 2 (2001), p. 286. Jacoby and Reiner discuss these issues in more detail in Henry D. Jacoby and David M. Reiner, "Getting climate policy on track after The Hague" *International Affairs* 77, no. 2 (2001), pp. 301-304.
81. Michael Grubb and Farhana Yamin discuss this process of position hardening in "Climate Collapse at The Hague: What Happened, Why and Where Do We Go from Here?" *International Affairs* 77, no. 2 (2001), pp. 261-276.
82. David L. Levy, "Business and Climate Change: Privatizing Environmental Regulation?" *Dollars and Sense* (Jan/Feb 2001).
83. France and Germany proved especially influential. France held the rotating presidency of the EU at the time of The Hague meeting. France's Green environment minister, Dominique Voynet, chaired the negotiations. Developments in Germany also reinforced the influence of the Greens. The victory in September 1998 of Gerhard Schroeder's coalition of Social Democrats and Greens in Germany over the Christian Democrats reinforced the position of Europeans favorable to more ambitious CO₂ reduction efforts.
84. Theoretically, one can view the domestic constraints as one of audience costs that mass publics would impose upon political leaders for failure to uphold the policy positions they had originally negotiated. James Fearon's formal work on this is the standard account. See James Fearon, "Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88 (September 1994), pp. 577-92.
85. Grubb and Yamin, "Climate Collapse at The Hague," p. 271; and Ott, "Climate Change," pp. 271-296.
86. "Oh No, Kyoto," *The Economist*, 7 April 2001.
87. Richard Benedick, "How Workable is the Kyoto Protocol? How to Salvage the Kyoto Protocol," *WeatherVane: Perspectives on Policy*, (March 1998), [<http://www.weathervane.rff.org/pop/pop5/benedick.html>].
88. William Wallace makes passing reference to this aspect of the problem in William Wallace, "Europe, the Necessary Partner," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 3 (2001), pp. 16-34.

89. These problems are discussed by several authors including Ute Collier, Axel Michelowa, Nigel Haigh, and Raymond Vernon. See Ute Collier, "The EU and Climate Change Policy: The Struggle over Policy Competences," in *Cases in Climate Change Policy: Political Reality in the European Union*, eds. Ute Collier and Ragnar Löfstedt (London: Earthscan Publications, 1996), pp. 43-85; Axel Michelowa, "Impact of Interest Groups on EU Climate Policy," *European Environment* 8 (1998), pp. 152-160; Raymond Vernon, "How Policymaking in the European Community, Japan and the United States Affects Global Negotiations," *Environment* 35, no. 5 (1993), pp. 13-20, 35-43; Nigel Haigh, "Climate Change Politics in the European Community," in *Politics of Climate Change*, eds. Tim O'Riordan and Jill Jäger (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 155-185.
90. Antony Blinken makes this argument in Antony J. Blinken, "The False Crisis Over the Atlantic," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 3 (2001), pp. 35-48. For a more pessimistic view, see Dominique Moisi, "The Real Crisis Over the Atlantic," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 4 (2001), pp. 149-153.