

Much Ado About Something?

Regime Change in Cuba

Eusebio Mujal-León and Joshua W. Busby

The Castro regime has survived numerous difficulties and predictions of its imminent collapse, but its greatest challenge will be the inevitable loss of Fidel himself.

THE contemporary Cuban regime is difficult to locate in traditional regime categories. It is a personalistic and charismatic dictatorship with an idiosyncratic mix of national-military, egalitarian, anti-American, anti-capitalist, and communist elements. Although the regime has gone through several distinct phases in the past forty years, there has been one constant: the overriding presence of its founder and leader, Fidel Castro. Other institutional actors respond to him directly. Although Castro's government is often said to be one of the last communist regimes, it is more accurately described as one of the newest. The Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) did not hold its first congress until 1975, no less than sixteen years after the triumph of the revolution. It remains institutionally weak, and none of its leading figures has a social or political base independent of Fidel Castro. Moreover, the Cuban regime has a strong military component. The Party ostensibly controls the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), but there are questions about the effectiveness of its supervision. The FAR's leading members have been either incorporated into the highest government and Party bodies, purged, or bought off with access to the lucrative realms of mixed enterprises, joint ventures, and tourism.

This article seeks to ascertain the nature of the contemporary Cuban regime. This is not merely a retrospective or academic exercise. The regime (then and now), is the starting place for whatever is to come and will condition the possibilities and direction of the country's political evolution.

EUSEBIO MUJAL-LEÓN is a professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. JOSHUA W. BUSBY is a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University.

The Dilemma of Classification

The Castro regime is now more than forty years old. It has survived many difficulties and many predictions of its imminent collapse. The regime has survived by adapting to events, although these dynamic changes have been masked by the continuous presence of Castro. The bigger adjustment may not be to the loss of Cuba's patrons in Moscow, but to the loss of Fidel himself either through death or disability.

Between 1971 and 1985, the Cuban regime achieved a far-reaching accommodation with its Soviet counterpart. As Havana shouldered its assigned role in the "socialist division of labor," it began, in effect, to experience a transition toward post-totalitarianism. The new partnership involved active collaboration between Cuba and the Soviet Union in the international sphere, including the deployment of Cuban troops to various parts of the third world. The two sides negotiated guidelines for subsidizing the Cuban economy and institutionalizing socialist planning mechanisms in Cuba. In a more political vein, the Cuban leadership moved toward the institutionalization of the role and structure of the Communist Party (PCC) as well as the ratification of a new constitution that closely paralleled the Soviet one. Accompanying these initiatives were newly created farmers' markets and other reforms that, coupled with the favorable terms of trade and other forms of support, lifted Cuba from its failed 1961–70 mobilization campaigns. Carmelo Mesa-Lago refers to the 1971–85 period as one of "moderate Soviet [pre-Gorbachev] economic reform."² For Pérez-Stable the 1970s and early 1980s were a period "when the leadership implemented some market reforms . . . [and] the political system gain[ed] the normal trappings of state socialism."³ Jorge Domínguez sees this as a period when the regime sought allies to counterbalance the American embargo, copied the institutional framework of its Soviet mentors, and took on a distinctly "bureaucratic socialist" character.

These authors generally agree as to the most important events of the years 1971–85, but not in their characterizations of the regime during this period. Domínguez argues that, as the institutions of a "bureaucratic socialist" regime were consolidated during 1971–85, this new regime succeeded its totalitarian predecessor from the 1960s and became the antecedent of the "authoritarian" one in the 1990s.⁴ In contrast, Mesa-Lago argues that the Cuban regime had become totalitarian after 1961 and did not change qualitatively during these years. For him, any changes that took place through the 1980s were within the same regime type.⁵

Marifeli Pérez-Stable presents yet a third perspective, advancing the notion of "mobilizational authoritarianism" to describe the Cuban regime. Framing her analysis in the literature on the institutional dynamics of state socialism and, more particularly, on the oscillation between the imperatives of "normalization" and the politics of mobilization, she concludes that "institutionalization never reached an irreversible momentum. . . . At the crucial crossroads of the mid-1980s when Cuba confronted a downturn in the economy and prospects of diminishing Soviet aid, [Fidel] Castro . . . called for cutting back market reforms and renewing mobilizational politics."⁶

Each of these interpretations has valid points. The institutionalization of the late 1970s and early 1980s was indeed tenuous. The failure to implement political and economic normalization not only enhanced the mobilizational style of governance associated with Fidel Castro, but also significantly narrowed the opportunities to create structures and centers of power outside party-state institutions. However, Domínguez's argument that the events of the 1971–85 phase laid the foundations for the subsequent emergence of an authoritarian regime in the 1990s seems questionable.

While this article draws on some of the ideas expressed by these authors, it is grounded in the literature on post-totalitarian regimes. The state-society focus of this literature provides greater analytical leverage for understanding the dynamics of the 1971–85 period, its termination in the late 1980s, and the trends of more recent years.

According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, regimes are identified by four characteristics: leadership, ideology, mobilization, and pluralism. Under post-totalitarianism, politics takes on a more institutionalized form within the organizations of the state in contrast to the unpredictable exercise of power in the totalitarian order. The ruling party still exercises leadership, but governance begins to demonstrate more bureaucratic tendencies and is less subject to the whims of the leader. Ideologically, there is a growing disjunction between the regime's desires and capability. Ideology suffers from a much lower commitment, and it becomes more of a perfunctory ritual. Rather than actively mobilizing popular support for the regime, post-totalitarian leaders begin to view the absence of open opposition as tacit approval. Social and economic pluralism is mostly tolerated, while political pluralism remains largely prohibited.⁷

There are three types of post-totalitarian regimes: early, frozen, and mature. In early post-totalitarian re-

gimes, social reform is just beginning, while in frozen regimes reform is stalled. Under mature post-totalitarianism, modest changes in the social and economic spheres have occurred, but political diversity has not yet had sufficient time and space to become established. In mature post-totalitarian regimes, enough social actors may emerge to serve potentially as an opposition-in-waiting with which would-be reformers can ally.

The foregoing typology may be applied to the Cuban regime as follows. A transition to post-totalitarianism began between 1971 and 1985. This process reflected a strategic convergence between the leaders of Cuba and the Soviet Union and pulled Cuba out of its relative isolation. Cuba's integration into the Soviet bloc impelled and reinforced the domestic institutional and economic changes outlined above. By the early 1980s, as Reagan's foreign policy became more assertive and the Brezhnev succession played out in Moscow, Fidel Castro increasingly (and with good reason) began to doubt the reliability of the Soviet commitment. Once Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the signals became unmistakable. Moscow began to shift from grant to loan mechanisms, reduced the above-market prices paid for sugar and other products, and eliminated other concessions.⁸ Alarmed by these measures, Castro announced the process of *rectificación*, a hard-line response to perestroika in which the reforms of the previous era were steadily undone and reformists like Planning Minister Humberto Pérez were ousted. Cuban peasant markets were shut down in May 1986, an announcement accompanied by scathing invective about the noxious growth of individualism and market forces.⁹ This rhetoric signaled the end of the transition to post-totalitarianism and launched an uneven return to the mobilizational radicalism of the late 1960s. Any earlier overtures to the market were replaced by appeals to national conscience, resistance, and revolutionary spirit. After setting aside the Soviet-inspired planning models of the earlier era, Castro set ambitious national goals for self-sufficiency in food production, housing construction, and other social needs through the use of voluntary work brigades.¹⁰

Three factors explain the truncated transition to post-totalitarianism in Cuba during the 1980s. The first is Fidel himself. By the time Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and announced his program of perestroika and glasnost, he may well have anticipated how those reforms would debilitate and undermine his own system of rule. Others within the Soviet orbit may have thought the same thing, but Fidel's legitimacy was much less dependent on Moscow. Not only had the Soviet-Cuban

relationship never been one simply of patron to client (Castro had, after all, won power on his own), but the autonomy of the Cuban regime was enhanced by the presence and permanence of its founder. Unlike any potential successor, he had an authority and prestige that gave him the leeway to define and redefine the regime. In these respects, even as the Cuban regime entered a transition toward post-totalitarianism in the years 1971–85, its leadership situation was very different from its East European or even Soviet counterparts.

Second, the Cuban ideology, with its mix of nationalism, anti-Americanism, and anti-capitalism, remained robust and relevant. Even by the late 1970s and early 1980s, the regime had not lost its ideological moorings. Although the 1980 Mariel exodus shook the regime and demonstrated just how many people would leave the island if given the opportunity, there was still cohesion among the elite and in important sectors of society. Ideology may also have been reinforced by the activist and nationalist foreign policy that turned Cuba into a major player in the non-aligned movement and a (partial) surrogate for the Soviet Union in places like Angola and Nicaragua. Moreover, the Castro regime had lost neither its mobilizational nor its repressive capacity in these years, and the low level of economic and social pluralism in Cuba made it easier to truncate the transition to post-totalitarianism. The introduction of market-type reforms had been very limited, and there were few, if any, independent economic or social actors beyond the farmers' markets.

Finally, the institutional weakness of the Communist Party and the corresponding strength of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) also help explain the interrupted transition in this period. The conventional logic of totalitarian and post-totalitarian consolidation gives a central role to the Party. Under totalitarianism, the Party establishes its hegemony over the armed forces and security services. Under post-totalitarianism, it retains a central role, but increasingly takes on a caretaker, managerial function in the state apparatus.

Neither of these developments occurred in Cuba. The regime was born out of military struggle, and the military organization and its relationship to the regime predated the formal establishment of the Communist Party. Both organizations were under the command and authority of Fidel Castro. Even with the institutionalization of the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was little doubt that PCC cadres served at the pleasure of the "maximum leader." He was not constrained by its routines or bureaucracy, and he answered to no one else in the Party leadership.¹¹

Further compounding the problem for a weakly institutionalized Communist Party was the FAR. Cuba watchers have advanced the notion of the “civic soldier”—a person who, steeped in revolutionary idealism, performs whatever tasks the regime asks of him, whether this involves defending the fatherland or doing administrative work in state-run enterprises or governmental bureaucracies.¹² In this interpretation, civil-military relations are in equilibrium.

However, other scholars point to the institutional weakness of the PCC as compared to the military. Domingo Amuchástegui, for example, argues that the civil-military distinction has little validity in the Cuban case.¹³ The issue goes far beyond the anecdotal but symbolic example of the military uniforms Fidel Castro almost invariably wears when in Cuba.¹⁴ Fidel Castro is not simply a charismatic exemplar, but a commander-in-chief whose policies, whether dispatching the FAR on internationalist missions or opting for a return to mobilization tactics, are implemented through the chain of command.

While it may be true that Castro prevents institutionalization in the traditional sense, it is also evident that he employs institutions to execute his strategic shifts. In an earlier era, analysts emphasized the proto-military character of all communist parties. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and the managerial transformation of the few communist parties that remain in power rendered this scheme anachronistic. The notion needs to be resurrected with respect to Cuba, but not in the traditional Leninist sense where the Party is dominant and other organizations serve as its transmission belt. In the Cuban case, it is the Communist Party that has been infused by the hierarchical and military spirit of the revolution, and Fidel Castro is commander-in-chief first and PCC chief second.

Where we do part company with Amuchástegui is with respect to his insistence on “unicellular” civil-military unity. Around the time the Cuban-Soviet partnership began to congeal in the early and mid-1970s, a division of labor was established between the FAR and the PCC. While the Party monopolized the domestic political arena and, particularly, the economic and planning agencies, the armed forces concentrated on the international sector with a proficiency that enhanced both their own and Cuba’s prestige and legitimacy. This division stood until the mid- and late 1980s, when the “experts” in the PCC were purged, and the Party increasingly became an ideological watchdog and tribune. At the same time, the FAR received a new set of orders. As the cold war withered, the Cuban role in Angola and

other third world trouble spots came to an end. A redeployed FAR came home to new duties and a transformed role.

During the 1970s and into the mid-1980s, the FAR had been a privileged but externally focused institution whose service as the praetorian guard of the international revolutionary movement brought it accolades,

Fidel Castro is not simply a charismatic exemplar, but a commander-in-chief whose policies, whether dispatching the FAR on internationalist missions or opting for a return to mobilization tactics, are implemented through the chain of command.

recognition, and influence.¹⁵ Its preeminence may have intensified concerns about its loyalty, or at least some authors so believe. One perceptive student of Cuba’s politics and military forces argues that Castro’s *Guerra de todo el Pueblo* (“war of all the people”) concept was more than simply a device to mobilize the population to resist a possible invasion by the United States. It was also intended to dilute the influence of the FAR by creating “several redundant layers of the ‘people’ in uniform.”¹⁶ Fears of disloyalty may have been compounded by reports of widespread desertions—an estimated 56,000 soldiers between 1983 and 1987.¹⁷

The execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa in June 1989¹⁸ and the subsequent purges of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT)¹⁹ as well as the Western Army²⁰ highlight the tensions associated with the return of Soviet-trained, combat-weary veterans. Whether Ochoa had contacts with Gorbachev or other Soviet reformers or had decided to challenge Fidel Castro is unknown and perhaps unknowable. But it is doubtful that the drug and corruption charges against him were the exclusive or even the primary reason for his arrest. Whatever the precise combination of reasons for his elimination, there is little doubt that through his execution (and that of Antonio de la Guardia), Castro sent a clear signal to anyone else who might harbor thoughts of disloyalty. This *coup de main* allowed Castro to reassert his ultimate authority, and also enabled the faction of military officers around Raúl Castro (the so-called Raulista group) to consolidate and extend its control over both the armed forces and the security services.

The new relationship between the military and security forces resulted in a substantial purge of the intelli-

gence apparatus. It also gave rise to fresh opportunities for those who accepted the changed arrangements. A purged and more docile military was allowed to extend its domestic reach beyond institutional borders and into the realm of mixed enterprises, tourism, and exports. Hence, a dual process was under way in Cuba in the late 1980s and into the 1990s. As the political leader-

The emergency economic package included new laws that allowed greater foreign investment, encouraged joint ventures, and established free trade zones.

ship reaffirmed its hierarchical and political control over the military, it also opened the doors to greater financial opportunities and rewards for some high-ranking officers. Many other officers and former bureaucrats gained access to employment opportunities in joint venture companies and in the informal sector. As will be discussed below, these economic outlets increased the possibilities for corruption and illicit activity.

The late 1980s saw the end of the first Cuban transition to post-totalitarianism. The reassertion of Fidel Castro's foundational and personalistic authority trumped the incipient institutionalization of regime structures. The continued vitality of regime ideology, its sustained capacity for mobilization, the institutional weakness of the PCC, and the absence of significant social or economic pluralism contributed to the return to the totalitarian schemes and mobilization politics of the past. In addition to these domestic elements, changes in the Soviet-Cuban relationship and then the collapse of the Soviet Union generated a profound crisis for Havana.

The Crises of the 1990s

The Cuban regime confronted an economic and political crisis of unprecedented proportions in the early 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the loss of \$4 billion in annual subsidies—nearly 30 percent of Cuba's GDP. Exports crashed by 70 percent, imports by 75 percent. From 1989 to 1993, Cuba's real GDP dropped nearly 35 percent, a contraction in national income second only to that experienced during the Great Depression. By one estimate, this translated into a 37 percent average decline in personal income over 1989 levels.²¹ Open unemployment and underemployment accounted for only 40 percent of the economically active

population in 1994, even as the official unemployment statistics showed unemployment at less than 10 percent.²² Sugar output dropped by 39 percent, equaling \$700 million in lost exports. There were also sustained declines in the output of non-sugar agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, growing fuel shortages that caused blackouts, transportation problems, and factory stoppages, and a growing budget deficit that was aggravated by the black market. The peso traded illegally for up to fifty times the official exchange rate. As social problems and unemployment increased, so did the number of people who risked their lives by leaving on boats and rafts. An estimated 30,000 people tried to flee on rafts in 1993 alone.

This economic free-fall could have had disastrous political consequences for the regime. Such events as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the execution of Nicolae Ceausescu, the collapse of the East European regimes, and the demonstration and subsequent crackdown at Tiananmen demonstrated just how perilous were the waters surrounding Cuba.²³ Riots and disturbances involving would-be rafters in the port cities of Cojimar and Regla in July and September 1993 sent a clear message to the Cuban leadership.²⁴

In August 1993, Fidel Castro finally responded by announcing a broad package of measures that included legalizing the possession and use of dollars (including remittances), certain types of self-employment, the conversion of state farms into cooperatives, and the establishment of agricultural (now called "artisan") markets. The government also implemented monetary and fiscal reform measures that would sharply cut the budget deficit and reduced the subsidies to state enterprises that were losing money. The emergency economic package included new laws that allowed greater foreign investment, encouraged joint ventures, and established free trade zones.²⁵

There is a lively debate in academic circles over just what these changes have meant for the Cuban regime. One line of interpretation affirms that the current regime is an exemplar of mobilizational authoritarianism whose weak institutionalization bodes ill for a peaceful transition. Another line of arguments insists the changes made during the 1990s have created an incipient authoritarian regime. A third approach insists that the present regime is a mixture of "sultanism" and frozen post-totalitarianism. In this view, although the regime has permitted limited market reforms, it allows no space for political alternatives and quickly marginalizes any emerging reformers. Focusing on the free hand Fidel Castro has to manipulate the body politic, Juan López also ascribes sultanistic qualities to the Cuban leader. If

López is correct, then there is no possibility of reform. Thus the only transition possible in Cuba is through a bottom-up rebellion aided by “latent soft-liners,” similar to what occurred in Romania under Ceaușescu. To support his argument, López makes the case that the number of dissidents in Cuba today equals or exceeds the levels in Romania, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia before 1989.²⁶ While there may, indeed, be similarities in how Fidel Castro exercises his authority and the patterns evidenced by Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania and Kim Il Sung in North Korea, the sultanistic comparison ends there. Ultimately, however, we would not call the Cuban regime “sultanistic,” not least because of its reliance on ideology and mobilization.

These events opened the way to the most recent phase of the Cuban regime, a charismatic, early post-totalitarian incarnation. This phase is characterized by a profound tension. The revolutionary founder still has the capacity to limit change, mobilize the population, and affirm the validity of his egalitarian ideology to elites and society alike. The state stymies human rights groups and the Catholic Church at every turn and for every bit of space in society. The opposition is weak, disorganized, and intimidated—for good reason. However, there is growing evidence that regime ideology has become hollow, and there are signs of an embryonic economic and social pluralism in an increasingly stratified society.

But it is not simply a matter of eroded capability or the transformation of society that complicates a full return to the models of the past. There are other factors that the regime and Fidel Castro cannot control. External factors, such as globalization and the obvious difficulty of finding an international partner willing to subsidize the Cuban economic experiment, make a return to full totalitarianism quite problematic. There is also the looming succession crisis. Much as in Spain in the twilight of the Franco era, in Cuba the emerging question is “After Castro, what?” The answer is by no means clear, but the countdown has begun, both within and outside the regime. This process is irreversible, although paradoxically it reinforces the role played by Fidel Castro in the short term.

We turn now to examine the nature of the charismatic early post-totalitarian Cuban regime in the 1990s from the perspective of such regime components as leadership, ideology, mobilization, and pluralism.

Leadership. The Cuban version of post-totalitarianism does not entirely fit within the ideal-type mold. First and most important, Fidel Castro retains broad power and influence. No one within the elite questions either

his role or, ultimately, his decisions. Even regime reformers have been known to repeat the mantra, “With Fidel everything, against Fidel nothing.” Castro derives his authority from several sources. Not only is he the founder of the regime, but he has shaped and set its ideology. He has successfully guided Cuba through many crises over the past four decades. His charisma is

Castro directed the regime to reenergize its ideology by appealing to other core elements of its platform, including nationalism, social justice, and regional solidarity.

prototypical, its importance to the regime increased by the scope of the crisis in the 1990s. Castro also continues to exercise a military-like authority over regime institutions, especially the PCC and FAR. He has used both to mobilize the population and to transmit ideological directives. In more traditional party-state systems, it is the Communist Party that generates and transmits ideology, but in the Cuban context, the Party and the military are themselves transmission belts for charismatic rule.

If the Cuban regime is characterized by stability at the top, the lower rungs have been in flux, especially since the late 1980s. Some leaders have been purged, and many older leaders have retired, voluntarily or not. Politburo member Carlos Aldana was ousted in 1994, as was Politburo member and foreign minister Roberto Robaina in 1999. Younger Party leaders have been installed in virtually every province, as well as in key state administrative posts. As Marifeli Pérez-Stable has noted, some of the younger cadres who took up leadership positions in the economic ministries are “presumably more reform-oriented” than their predecessors.²⁷ Even if this were so, however, we can well suppose that, while Fidel Castro is an active presence in Cuban politics, they will be careful in expressing their views and preferences.

The FAR, and the security services under its supervision, again provide an exception to the pattern of flux that normally characterizes the leadership of regime institutions. The execution of General Ochoa and the resulting purge of the Ministry of the Interior consolidated the influence of the Raulista faction in the FAR. Over the past decade the military has been distinguished not only by its cohesion, but also by the way the regime relies on it to lead in the economic and administrative



Vladimir Putin and Fidel Castro embrace, with Raúl Castro looking on, during the Russian president's state visit to Cuba in December 2000. (AP Photo/José Goitia)

arenas. In their dual function of guarding security and improving administrative efficiency, the diverse elements of the FAR are virtually assured of playing an important role not only as a source of expertise in economic reform and management but in shaping the transition to the post-Castro future.

Ideology. Why has reform—economic, political, and social—been so half-hearted in contemporary Cuba? Why has Cuba not followed the example of China or Vietnam in enacting more thoroughgoing market reforms that could galvanize its economy?²⁸ The enduring vitality of ideology provides an important part of the answer to these questions. Fidel Castro is, after all, the ideologue of the Cuban regime. A keen observer of the debates among the international intelligentsia and their potential impact on Cuba, Castro has consistently developed rhetorical strategies for both domestic and international consumption with an eye toward defending the ideals and accomplishments of the national project.

The demise of the Soviet Union and its allies deprived the Cuban regime of an important ideological plank. In response, Castro directed the regime to reenergize its ideology by appealing to other core elements of its platform, including nationalism, social justice, and regional solidarity. For example, in July 1992 the Cuban National Assembly unanimously approved amendments stripping the constitution of its Soviet-era references to “the community of socialist countries,” “proletarian internationalism,” “the leading role of the working class,” and “scientific materialism.” Replacing these and other phrases were references to Latin America and the Caribbean, José Martí, the Cuban nation, and patriotic education.²⁹ Although not every ref-

erence to Marxism-Leninism was excised, the amended constitution had now been “Cubanized.”

The regime has also taken great pains to defend its accomplishments in health care and education. This too makes sense, because these sectors are key sources of domestic and international legitimacy. To defend its social project, the Communist Party recently severely restricted soup kitchens, day care centers, free pharmacies, and other social projects organized by the Catholic Church. As he did in the 1970s with the non-aligned movement, Fidel Castro has tried to position himself and Cuba in the vanguard of the struggle against globalization and to employ this dimension as a vehicle for regime relegitimation.

Castro's continuing presence and his constant exhortations to revolutionary struggle and ideology place strict, if formally undefined, limits on how far government and Party functionaries can deviate from the official canon of nationalism, anti-capitalism, and anti-Americanism.³⁰ As Edward González has argued, the pursuit of deeper reform would have “high political and ideological costs for the regime. They [would] undermine [its] control over society . . . [and would] tend to demoralize the regime's cadres.”³¹ This last point is worth emphasizing. While reformist sectors exist in the state administration and economic ministries, Castro is probably not alone in his preference for a distinctly Cuban ideological identity. Linz similarly argued that mid-level government functionaries tend to resist a reinterpretation of regime ideology because to do so would undermine the system in which they have invested their lives.³²

Even though Castro tries to keep ideological change within narrow limits, there are visible signs of erosion in Cuban society. The daily accommodations that ordinary Cubans have had to make over the past decade to resolve day-to-day economic problems have undoubtedly taken a sharp toll. To survive in contemporary Cuba is constantly to break the law and its normative (or ideological) underpinnings. As ideology ceases to capture the popular imagination, a regime loses its credibility and legitimacy in terms of both the process and the outcomes.³³ If a regime is able to deliver legitimate outcomes (such as health care or education), the perceived legitimacy of process becomes less important.³⁴ Cubans might have been willing to accept restrictions on civil liberties so long as the outcomes were perceived as fair and desirable. If, however, the regime is unable to guarantee the basic necessities of life as well as the “[social] gains of the Revolution” over an extended period, a serious legitimacy crisis looms. Regimes that assume

complete responsibility for economic and social well-being are especially vulnerable on this score.³⁵

On balance, then, the Cuban regime's ideological vigor has declined since the fall of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Fidel Castro and a significant number of cadres remain committed to the utopian vision, far more than expected in a consolidated post-totalitarian regime.

Mobilization. Under post-totalitarianism, the regime's willingness and capacity to mobilize the population declines. The 1991–2001 period conforms, at least in part, to this characterization. Mobilization is an instrument that can be employed to affirm legitimacy and to generate enthusiasm around a national project. It is also an instrument to intimidate and control the population, and, as such, it functions in tandem with repression. Both mobilization and repression reflect the absolutist and state-centered vision of the Cuban totalitarian syndrome and its variants, but it is important (analytically and politically) to understand, as Pérez-Stable has noted, that the regime “cannot be understood exclusively in terms of its repressive component.”³⁶ Although it is predictably very difficult and risky to ascertain just what public opinion and attitudes really are under conditions of dictatorship, important sectors of the population may indeed view an autocratic regime as legitimate or as having some right to rule. Obviously, such sentiments may vary both in breadth and over time.

One cannot easily ascertain whether there is a progressive loss of interest in organizing mobilization or whether boredom and withdrawal are part of day-to-day life in contemporary Cuba. Given the (still) dire economic situation, most Cubans are probably more concerned with finding food and earning a living (the so-called *sociolismo*) than with ideological principles or mobilization. There is ample anecdotal evidence for this, ranging from jokes to movies and folk songs.

Efforts to mobilize and repress the population dropped noticeably between 1993 and 1996.³⁷ This decline undoubtedly reflected a tactical adjustment to the economic crisis and the decision to focus on stabilizing the economy. But by 1996, the regime began to set clear limits on political liberalization. The downing of the Brothers to the Rescue plane, the arrest of the members of the Concilio Cubano who had organized to meet in Havana that very weekend, and Raúl Castro's blistering April 1996 speech at the PCC Central Committee plenum lambasting reformist intellectuals and their foreign connections sent clear and unmistakable signals. The sharper political tone had an economic counterpart, whereby the regime tightened controls on the informal

economic actors who had emerged after dollarization in 1993 and introduced modern managerial techniques (*perfeccionamiento*) into enterprises in an effort to improve their efficiency while reinforcing their socialist character.

Efforts to intensify mobilization have increased sharply over the past two years. The Elián González affair provided a major opportunity in this regard. In what was almost a rebuff to the “lost” generation that had come to political maturity in the 1980s and early 1990s, Fidel Castro now concentrated his attention on the “new” and younger generation. The exercises in mobilization were less intense than in decades past, but the capacity to assemble thousands of people, whether to demand the return of Elián or to protest the U.S. embargo, suggests an enduring capacity ascribed to Fidel himself, not any formal office.

Pluralism. Pluralism in its various dimensions remains underdeveloped and very vulnerable in Cuba, another fact supporting the characterization of the regime as early post-totalitarian. Economic pluralism has certainly increased since the early 1990s, as has self-employment. Between 1989 and 1999 the share of non-state jobs (mostly in agricultural cooperatives and family businesses) increased from 5 to almost 25 percent of the work force. The agricultural sector also experienced dramatic changes.³⁸ While in 1992 state farms controlled approximately 75 percent of the land under cultivation, three years later, only 27 percent remained in state hands.³⁹ The economic reforms of the 1990s opened up important spaces for “enclave capitalism” in such sectors as agriculture, biotechnology, and tourism. Dollarization also helped Cubans who received remittances from relatives outside the country or who ran small businesses catering to foreign tourists. The significance of these economic changes should not be underestimated. These measures opened space for new actors in the economic arena and correspond to the expected steps during a transition to post-totalitarianism in which economic pluralism precedes political pluralism. There were, nonetheless, important limits to the reforms. The state retained control over larger enterprises and placed strict controls on the activities of private micro-enterprises.⁴⁰

No discussion of economic pluralism in contemporary Cuba is complete without a discussion of the substantial economic role of the FAR. For the military, the collapse of the Soviet bloc hastened a budgetary decline already in progress. As Cuban soldiers returned from international expeditions, defense spending fell:

from 9.6 percent of GDP in 1985 to a mere 2.8 percent in 1995.⁴¹ As budgets and active-duty levels dropped, the regime opened new economic opportunities for loyal members of the FAR, extending the role of the civic-soldier from traditional agricultural production to managing joint ventures with foreign investors. A prime example of this strategy involved the creation of the

No political party other than the Communist Party is legal, and the regime alternates between outright repression and more subtle intimidation of dissidents.

Gaviota group, an entity that has since diversified into numerous other sectors, including restaurants, resorts, and even information technology and department stores.⁴²

There are three categories of entrepreneur-soldiers. The first involves former high-ranking officers (and their families) who hold jobs because of their special links to Raúl Castro and the regime. The second includes military personnel who have been assigned to state enterprises to improve the management of state resources and production. The third category is made up of lower-ranking retired army personnel and former Ministry of the Interior officials who are self-employed or work for foreign companies and make a living further outside the formal state-controlled system. Although all of the above may be said to be developing entrepreneurial talents, it will most probably be those in the latter two categories who will create the opening wedge for an emerging capitalist class in Cuba. The military's entry into the economic arena has obvious benefits, for by offering military men a privileged lifestyle through participation in the dollar economy, it presumably assures their loyalty to the regime.⁴³ However, this economic role may also generate greater opportunities for corruption as well as increased resentment of the economic gap separating the privileged military officers from the rest of the armed forces as well as from the populace at large.⁴⁴

What may be of more immediate political relevance, however, is the emerging cadre of technocrats and management experts in the military establishment. In post-totalitarian contexts, such experts typically are found in the Party apparatus.⁴⁵ One of the peculiarities of the Cuban case may be that this pattern does not hold and, indeed, could be inverted. The primary source of "red"

influence could eventually come from the PCC, and the experts from the military. The emergence of such tensions may be one key to understanding the dynamics of the post-Castro era.

Economic pluralism is fragile in contemporary Cuba, but it is far more vigorous than social pluralism. Totalitarianism has had a profoundly adverse impact on Cuban society. State organizations monopolize and direct the citizenry, while civil society is still relatively weak and disorganized. The Catholic Church is undoubtedly the country's most important civil society organization. Its international support network, well-defined ideology and belief structure, and permanent cadre organization differentiate it from other social actors. Even so, the Cuban Catholic Church is but a pale shadow of what its Polish and Hungarian (and even Chilean) counterparts were under communism.⁴⁶ Despite hopes to the contrary, the church has not experienced a dramatic expansion in its social presence in the wake of Pope John Paul II's January 1998 visit to Cuba.

There is, however, evidence that the Catholic Church has been revitalized and has begun to develop a stronger presence in Cuban society. There are reports of increased attendance at mass (particularly among young people), though levels ebbed soon after the pope's visit. Yet the new members who continue to participate in church activities have a visibly more intense commitment. The papal visit infused the church hierarchy and clergy with a new sense of energy and self-confidence. Moreover, magazines like *Vitral* and *Palabra Nueva* press the outer edges of toleration, and as mentioned earlier, Caritas and other church-related organizations have become more active in providing food, medicine, and other social services.⁴⁷ The Cuban state has reacted sharply and negatively, throwing up bureaucratic roadblocks to these efforts.⁴⁸ Most recently, an internal PCC document took the church to task for its efforts to provide such social services and urged Party cadres to combat any erosion of the state's presence in this arena.

Since the 1980s, there has been a perceptible expansion in the space the Catholic Church and other civil society organizations occupy, even though they still operate under very difficult conditions. The roster goes far beyond traditional human rights groups, although a commitment to any of them still often entails loss of a job, harassment, and possibly jail. The alternative groups include literary and cultural circles, gay and transvestite networks, as well as Afro-Cuban cultural and religious organizations. The vast majority of these groups are not explicitly interested in politics, but their very presence and efforts to affirm a distinct identity sug-

gest the growing fragmentation of the monolithic version of "Cuban-ness" that the state regime successfully imposed over the past forty years.⁴⁹ There can be little doubt that Castro takes very seriously this threat to hegemony in the social sphere. The regime has sponsored its own set of civil society organizations (the so-called GONGOS, governmental non-governmental organizations), and its leaders and intellectuals take pains to insist that there is no contradiction between state predominance and the existence of civil-society organizations.⁵⁰

If there is some scope to social pluralism in contemporary Cuba, political pluralism remains anathema. No political party other than the Communist Party is legal, and the regime alternates between outright repression and more subtle intimidation of dissidents. There is some evidence of bolder activity during the 1990s. Independent trade unions, peasant organizations, press associations, and even political parties have made an appearance on the Cuban scene, but they still operate under very strict limits.⁵¹ At best these are fledgling organizations that are kept under constant surveillance and harassment by the police and the ubiquitous Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs).⁵²

Contemporary Cuban society exhibits signs of pluralism unimaginable in earlier phases of the revolution. An influential article categorized the various stages in the development of civil society as defensive, emergent, mobilizational, and institutional.⁵³ Juan Carlos Espinosa made a persuasive argument that contemporary Cuba is in either the first or second stage and manifests either a defensive or emergent civil society.⁵⁴ Non-state actors (non-governmental organizations, church groups, artist networks, farmers, the self-employed, etc.) are trying to defend their autonomy against a state whose impulse is to control every aspect of their behavior. What has changed over the past fifteen years is the state's capacity to control non-state actors. On one level, the state acknowledged this incapacity in the early 1990s and enacted reforms that allowed such groups to widen their scope of activities. More recently, moderate economic stabilization has allowed the regime to recover much of its former capacity. Crackdowns on dissidents and greater restrictions on the self-employed attest to its willingness and capability to circumscribe civil society activities.

The Post-Castro Era

The transition to the post-Castro era has begun. Change is inevitable, and the only question is what direction it will take. As elaborated above, the current regime is in the charismatic early post-totalitarian stage. Several el-

ements should be emphasized. First, Fidel Castro's personal authority is crucial. The Cuban regime has always been his in a very special way, but the crisis spawned by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the impending post-Castro era have made him even more indispensable. Second, the Cuban economy displays lowered state capacity, very limited and weakly institutionalized eco-

History clearly shows that autocratic regimes are at their most vulnerable during succession crises.

nomie reforms, a larger number of economic actors, and growing social and economic stratification. Third, the extensive military participation in the economy may have two consequences. At the societal level, serving and former officers could develop into a proto-capitalist class. At the elite level, the military could spawn a technocratic class of experts who, unlike the reds in the Communist Party, might press for a deeper economic reform agenda in the post-Castro era. Finally, the Catholic Church has gained space and self-confidence in the past few years, and there has been a marked increase in the number of formal and informal cultural, religious, and social organizations. Although the number of human rights groups and activists increased during the 1990s, the regime continues to harass and intimidate them, with the pressure intensifying over the past two years.⁵⁵

What implications does this characterization have for analyzing the direction of change in Cuba? It is impossible to anticipate all or even many of the contingencies that may affect the succession and transition. However, history clearly shows that autocratic regimes are at their most vulnerable during succession crises. This window of vulnerability has now opened for Cuba. Many aspects of the succession crisis will play themselves out behind closed doors and may never be widely known. Perhaps not much will happen (or at least manifest itself) in the early phase of the post-Castro era. Raúl Castro has been his brother's formally designated successor since 1997.

Although we are uncertain about the specific trajectory of change in Cuba, we wish to be clear about some of our basic assumptions. Fidel Castro's charismatic authority and leadership skills have enabled the regime to retain its capacity for mobilization and to forestall a complete loss of ideological vigor. After Fidel Castro dies or becomes incapacitated, there will be a pronounced

leadership vacuum and a potentially disorderly succession process. Raúl may be more skilled than people suppose, but even so, charisma is not something that can be inherited. Moreover, while Raúl has evident political and managerial skills (not least in terms of patronage), this is not the same as possessing his brother's dexterity in anticipating and addressing international and domestic challenges.

Without Fidel Castro's authority and resourcefulness, cleavages between Party and military leaders could constitute one of the most destabilizing forces of the post-Castro order.

The Cuban regime may take one of four paths in the wake of Fidel Castro's departure. One would return Cuba to the totalitarian past. This would entail a reaffirmation of ideology, a return to mobilization, an end to market reforms and incentives, restrictions on social and economic pluralism, and a crackdown on dissident activity. A second path is a collapse scenario involving a transition from below and a popular revolt that would spread to sectors of the military. The third path would lead Cuba toward the stabilization of a post-totalitarian regime. Post-totalitarianism would be the staging area for the fourth path, but under this scheme the regime would then evolve toward the adoption of deeper and more significant economic and institutional reforms that, in turn, could produce a transition to democracy.

Of these options, the return to totalitarianism and the collapse scenario are the least likely. With Fidel Castro gone, exercises in mobilization and ideological vigor would not be easily sustainable, either among the elite or in society at large. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine any contemporary international actor that would be willing to finance an autarkic totalitarian project. The primary political game in post-Castro Cuba will play out in the post-totalitarian arena, pitting those who favor a more institutionalized version of the status quo against those who favor liberalization and deeper reforms.

The collapse scenario would probably require both a sharp rupture of the regime elite and a breakdown in the regime's repressive capacity. Neither development seems likely. Moreover, as the Cuban experience of the early 1990s demonstrated, social and economic crisis is not a sufficient condition for mass protest to emerge and regime transformation to occur.⁵⁶ That said, an exogenous shock, such as an economic crisis, a natural

disaster, or an immigration crisis, that led to rapidly deteriorating living conditions or social instability could still foment mass protests, at which point the military and security apparatus would have to choose between repression and disobeying orders.⁵⁷ Although this Romanian-type situation could conceivably occur, the regime has been careful to tamp down protest to avoid such tests of loyalty. In the post-Fidel Castro era, such spontaneous protests may take on a new significance if fissures in the elite should emerge.

In all probability, the immediate post-Castro era will feature some variation on post-totalitarianism in which elite politics dominates. Saying this does not minimize either the importance or long-term significance of structural economic changes, but the nature of the Cuban regime (and the "anthropological lesions"⁵⁸ it has inflicted on society) reinforces the need to focus on the elite. Cuban civil society is weak and disorganized, and for a variety of reasons, has not yet been able to articulate a credible alternative national project around which either mass publics or elites could mobilize. Civil society will not be easily resurrected and, at least in the short term, may not play as important a role as some transition analysts suggest.⁵⁹ There are several groups within the regime and others outside it that will play crucial roles in the two most likely scenarios. On the regime side are the military, the Communist Party, and technocrats in the bureaucracy. On the other side are the Catholic Church, human rights groups, and the exile community.

Groups from within the regime will be at the epicenter of the political dynamics of the early post-Castro period. Among these, and as befits the trajectory of the regime, the military will emerge as the linchpin. Part of its influence (the irreducible core, perhaps) will derive from its monopoly on the instruments of violence. In addition, from their position at the commanding heights of the joint-venture enterprises, current and former officers have been the primary contacts with international investors, and this will enhance both their resources and their influence. Moreover, though the final verdict is not yet in with respect to *perfeccionamiento empresarial*, the past decade has seen the military become manager of last resort for the state-socialist project in Cuba. Armed forces control of the repressive apparatus and the presence of military personnel in the economy could leave the Communist Party as the rump enforcer of ideology and the ostensible guide of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. As the ideological project of the regime moves toward redefinition, moreover, the PCC may find its legitimacy fur-

ther debilitated. This is less likely to occur with respect to the armed forces, which can more easily lay claim to the role of defender of the fatherland. In contrast to the military and the PCC, the civilian technocratic elite possesses few resources. Without Fidel Castro's authority and resourcefulness, cleavages between Party and military leaders could constitute one of the most destabilizing forces of the post-Castro order.

Once such breaches develop, non-regime elites may have a greater role to play in Cuban politics. The Catholic Church will probably not take an overt political role, but its call for national reconciliation and justice will undoubtedly help shape the political agenda and provide a bridge between regime reformers and an emerging opposition. From sectors close to the church, Christian Democratic groups are likely to emerge whose social programs may prove attractive to moderate elements within the regime. Human rights groups will also grow bolder, more numerous, and more diverse. Some of them may be transformed into political organizations. For its part, the diaspora will become an increasingly important force, not just in economic terms but also in constructing the new Cuban polity and identity. Since the death of Castro will open new opportunities for political change in Cuba, it may allow exiles to turn their attention away from winning the forty-year civil war and toward exploiting political opportunities on the island.

The end of the Castro era will signal the conclusion of one project for Cuba and the beginning of another. As its centenary of independence approaches, Cuba confronts simultaneous political, economic, social, and cultural challenges that, rhetoric notwithstanding, are far from resolution. The dilemmas of nation- and state-building remain on the agenda. They will pose a major challenge for whatever regime emerges in Cuba over the next decade.

Notes

1. For a first cut at this issue, see Eusebio Mujal-León and Jorge Saavedra, "El post-totalitarismo carismático y el cambio de régimen: Cuba en perspectiva comparada," (Charismatic Post-Totalitarianism and Regime Change: Cuba in Comparative Perspective), *Encuentro 6/7* (fall/winter 1997): 115. See also Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 55.
2. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Market, Socialist, and Mixed Economies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. 227.
3. Marifeli Pérez-Stable, "Caught in a Contradiction: Cuban Socialism Between Mobilization and Normalization," *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 1 (October 1999): 67.
4. Jorge I. Domínguez, "Comienzo una transición hacia el autoritarismo en Cuba" (The Beginning of a Transition to Authoritarianism in Cuba), *Encuentro 6/7* (fall/winter 1997): 9.
5. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "Cambio de régimen o cambios en el régimen?

Aspectos políticos y económicos" (Change of Regime or Change in Regime? Political and Economic Aspects), *Encuentro 6/7* (fall/winter 1997): 37–40.

6. Pérez-Stable, "Caught in a Contradiction," p. 67.
7. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, p. 48.
8. Mesa-Lago documents the increasingly unfavorable change in the terms of aid from the Soviet Union as it faced economic decline in 1986–90. Mesa-Lago, *Market, Socialist, and Mixed Economies*, p. 312.
9. Pérez-Stable, "Caught in a Contradiction," p. 70.
10. The production of almost all other agricultural goods declined sharply over this period. Mesa-Lago, *Market, Socialist, and Mixed Economies*, pp. 281–88.
11. Julia Preston, "The Trial That Shook Cuba," *New York Review of Books* (December 7, 1989): 24–31.
12. For the classic formulation, see Jorge I. Domínguez, "The Civic Soldier in Cuba," in *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, ed. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), p. 263.
13. Domingo Amuchástegui, "Cuba's Armed Forces: Power and Reforms" (paper presented at the conference on "Cuba in Transition," Coral Gables, FL, August 12–14, 1999), in *Proceedings of the Annual Meetings of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy*, vol. 9, p. 110.
14. The exception was during the visit of Pope John Paul II.
15. Greene Walker estimates that 300,000 Cubans served overseas during a sixteen-year period. Phyllis Greene Walker, "Challenges Facing the Cuban Military," Georgetown University *Cuba Briefing Paper Series*, no. 12 (October 1996) (www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/clas/Caribe/bp12.htm).
16. Enrique A. Baloyra, "Twelve Monkeys: Cuban National Defense and the Military," *Cuban Studies Association Occasional Paper Series* 1, no. 4 (November 15, 1996): 13. Baloyra's observations are based on interviews with Cuban military defectors.
17. Frank O. Mora, "From Fidelismo to Raulismo: Civilian Control of the Military in Cuba," *Problems of Post-Communism*, 46, no. 2 (March/April 1999): 25–38.
18. For one of the best treatments of the Ochoa affair, see Preston, "Trial That Shook Cuba," pp. 24–31.
19. Apparently many MININT officers were purged either because they had not thoroughly investigated General Ochoa's activities or, more likely, because Fidel was unsure of MININT's loyalty to the regime. Greene Walker reported, "In the reorganization . . . that followed, nearly all the officers of the formerly independent ministry were dismissed and replaced with career military personnel."
20. Millett reports that up to 70 percent of the Western Army's officers were removed in the wake of the Ochoa trial. Richard Millett, "Cuba's Armed Forces: From Triumph to Survival," Georgetown University *Cuba Briefing Paper Series*, no. 4 (September 1993) (www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/clas/Caribe/bp4.htm).
21. Marta Beatriz Roque Cabello and Manuel Sánchez Herrero, "Background: Cuba's Economic Reforms: An Overview," in *Perspectives on Cuban Economic Reforms*, ed. Jorge Pérez-López and Matias F. Travieso-Díaz (Tempe: Arizona State University Center for Latin American Studies Press, 1998), p. 9.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
23. This felicitous phrase is from Edward Gonzalez, *Cuba: Clearing Perilous Waters* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996).
24. Amuchástegui, "Cuba's Armed Forces," p. 113.
25. Mesa-Lago, *Market, Socialist, and Mixed Economies*, p. 293.
26. Juan J. López, "Implications of the U.S. Economic Embargo for a Political Transition in Cuba" (paper presented at the conference on Cuba in Transition, Miami, August 7–9, 1997), in *Papers and Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy*, vol. 7, p. 250.
27. Pérez-Stable, "Caught in a Contradiction," p. 73.
28. On balance, Cuban economic reforms have been tepid, certainly as

compared to those enacted in China and Vietnam. See González, *Cuba: Clearing Perilous Waters*, p. 9.

29. Josep Colomer, "After Fidel, What? Forecasting Institutional Changes in Cuba" (paper presented at the conference on "Constitutional Law in a Post-Castro Cuba," New York University School of Law, April 21, 1997), p. 9.

30. At the closing session of the Eighth Congress of the Federation of Latin American Journalists (FELAP), held at the University of Havana on November 12, 1999, Castro attacked the U.S. political system as a sham. "We prefer," he said, "our socialism with all its imperfections; we prefer the totalitarianism of truth, justice, sincerity, authenticity; the totalitarianism of truly humanitarian feelings; the totalitarianism of the type of multi-party system we practice." Text available at www2.ceniai.inf.cu/gobierno/discursos/1999/ing/fl21199i.html.

31. González, *Cuba: Clearing Perilous Waters*, pp. 9, 25.

32. Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 3, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 197-98.

33. Alan C. Lamborn, "Theory and Politics in World Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 193-94.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

35. Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 168.

36. Pérez-Stable, "Caught in a Contradiction," p. 64.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

38. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Cuba Country Profile, 1999-2000* (1999): 10.

39. *Economist* (April 6, 1996).

40. For coverage of the restrictions on the self-employed, see Philip Peters, "Cuba's Small Business Experiment: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back," Georgetown University *Cuba Briefing Paper Series*, no. 17 (March 1998) (www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/clas/Caribe/paper17.pdf). See also Tom Gjelten, "Entrepreneurs in Cuba," Radio report on National Public Radio (July 24, 2000).

41. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Cuba Country Profile, 1999-2000* (1999): 8.

42. The extent of the shift in focus is evident from the assessment by U.S. General Charles Wilhelm: "We have convincing evidence that as much as 70 percent of the effort of the existing force is being expended on agricultural and other self-sustaining activities." Quoted in Anthony Boodle, "Cuban Military No Threat, Turns to Farming—U.S.," Reuters (March 31, 1998). Mora and Greene Walker discuss the activities of Gaviota in more detail. See also Gaviota's web site: www.gaviota.cubaweb.cu.

43. "It is almost certainly the case that top administrators and 'selected managers' in the enterprises have access to dollar accounts, make high salaries, and receive perks as part of the job." Juan M. del Aguila, "The Cuban Armed Forces: Changing Roles, Continuing Loyalties," in *Cuban Communism*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998), p. 670.

44. The differences between those who could earn dollars and those with wages dependent upon the state were depicted humorously in the film *Guantanamo*. Somewhat more formal estimates have been produced by Philip Peters, "Where Capitalists and Socialists May Agree: Future Issues in Cuban Economic Policy" (remarks at a conference of the Georgetown University Caribbean Project Washington, DC, March 20, 2000) (www.lexingtoninstitute.org/cuba/cubaeconpol.htm).

45. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," p. 204.

46. There is little evidence to support Jorge Domínguez's contention that the Cuban Catholic Church plays a role "comparable" to that exercised by its counterparts "under authoritarian regimes in other latitudes."

Domínguez, "Comienza una transición hacia el autoritarismo en Cuba," p. 16.

47. For an unusually good treatment of the church in Cuba, see Dagoberto Valdés Hernández, ed., *Reconstruir la Sociedad Civil: Un Proyecto de Educación Cívica, Pluralismo y Participación Para Cuba* (Reconstructing Civil Society: A Civic Education Project, Pluralism and Participation in Cuba) (Caracas: Conrad Adenauer Foundation, 1997).

48. Radio Vatican E-mail (November 24-30, 2000) at www.vaticanradio.org/ispanso/isparchi/noti133.htm.

49. Vela Cecilia Bobs Leon, *Los laberintos de la imaginación: repertorio simbólico, identidades y actores del cambio social en Cuba* (The Labyrinths of the Imagination: Symbolic Repertoire, Identities, and Actors in Social Change in Cuba) (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, 2000), p. 222.

50. Rafael Rojas, "Políticos Invisibles," *Encounter*, 6/7 (fall/winter 1997): 33. For a similar view from a perspective sympathetic to the regime, see Rafael Hernández, "Hacia una Nueva sociedad socialista? Cambios, crisis y configuraciones sociales en Cuba" (Toward a New Socialist Society? Changes, Crisis, and Social Configurations in Cuba), *Nueva Sociedad* 157 (September-October 1998): 2717-18.

51. The Freedom House rankings show a steady "unfree" 7 for political rights and 7 for civil liberties ranking from 1972 to 1976, then a decline to 6.6 from 1978 to 1988, and a spike upward to 7.7 for the last decade. See www.freedomhouse.org/survey99/country/cuba.html. Various human rights organizations (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, among them) have reported on the continued harassment and prosecution of dissidents, coupled with the constant refusal to grant amnesty to hundreds of political prisoners. The last wave of repression is covered by Pedro Betancur, "Cuba: Repression by Harassment," *Economist* (March 18, 2000).

52. Josep Colomer, "Watching Neighbors: The Cuban Model of Social Control," *Cuban Studies* 31 (March 2001).

53. Marcia A. Weigle and Jim Butterfield, "Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regimes," *Comparative Politics* 25, no. 1 (October 1992): 1-23.

54. Juan Carlos Espinosa, "Civil Society in Cuba: The Logic of Emergence in Comparative Perspective" (paper presented at the conference on "Cuba in Transition," Coral Gables, FL, August 12-14, 1999), in *Proceedings of the Annual Meetings of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy*, vol. 9, pp. 346-67.

55. Betancur, "Cuba: Repression by Harassment." See also Pax Christi Netherlands, *Report on the Humanitarian and Social Work of Catholic Church Institutions in Cuba* (February 13, 2001) (www.paxchristi.nl).

56. A methodological account of Theda Skocpol's work discusses how "relative deprivation" is not a sufficient cause for revolution. James Mahoney, "Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology* 104, no. 4 (January 1999): 1160.

57. For a skeptical perspective on regime collapse, see Juan M. del Aguila, "Reflections on a Non-Transition in Cuba: Comments on Elites" (paper presented at the conference on "Cuba in Transition," Miami, August 7-9, 1997), in *Papers and Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy*, vol. 7, p. 192.

58. Archbishop Pedro Meurice, "Present and Future of the Church in Cuba" (acceptance speech upon receipt of an honorary doctoral degree from Georgetown University, Washington, DC, May 29, 1999).

59. López, "Implications of the U.S. Economic Embargo," p. 250.

To order reprints, call 1-800-352-2210;
outside the United States, call 717-632-3535.