Moral Movements and Foreign Policy by Joshua W. Busby
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When do states adopt the moral frames promoted by transnational advocacy organizations? Joshua W. Busby examines the success and failure of advocacy campaigns for debt relief, climate change, HIV/AIDS treatment, and membership in the International Criminal Court in the G7 countries to show that states adopt normative commitments based on key gatekeepers, and their perceptions of national interest. *Moral Movements and Foreign Policy* argues that material interests of states and of individual politicians are insufficient explanatory variables for making sense of foreign policy choices. Moral language, religious motivations, the desire to live up to a virtuous self-image all shape highly consequential foreign policy decisions that impact everything from foreign aid budgets to the voluntary ceding of state sovereignty over armed forces.

Busby rightfully points out that our understanding of social movement outcomes remains rudimentary. Using a comparative approach across states for each issue area allows him to examine instances where the same advocacy campaign succeeds in some countries but fails in others. For all four issue areas, the United States is one of the states examined in some detail and compared to one or two other country cases. Each chapter sets out predictions based on the hypothesis, uses process tracing of issue development in each state and refines the hypothesis by specifying the mechanisms by which moral language moves foreign policy. Thanks to its compelling research design, this book advances our understanding of success and failure for transnational advocacy movements.

The argument of the book is set up in opposition to rational choice accounts that stress realist understandings of state interest and politicians’ desire for reelection at the individual level as the primary drivers of foreign policy decision making within political science. Busby also tries to differentiate his account from resource mobilization accounts of social movements and to place it within the framing school. Because the book is primarily targeted at scholars of international relations, the debate between rational choice accounts and constructivist approaches receives a comprehensive treatment. The opposition between resource mobilization and framing is one that has been largely bypassed within the social movement literature, where proponents of each school recognize the importance of both ideas and resources and unite them by seeing frames as a type of resource themselves.

Busby brings three distinct literatures into conversation with one another: social movement theories from sociology, veto player arguments from political science and messenger effects from psychology. The mar-
riage of the first two leads to the key insight that social movement advocates need to convince gatekeepers or veto players within political systems in order to succeed. The more veto players in a state (people with the ability to derail a policy initiative) the harder the task. This insight goes a long way toward explaining why the United States frequently lags behind in endorsing international initiatives; it has more institutional veto players than most other political systems do.

The attempt to use the psychology literature on messenger effects to argue that certain types of advocates are more likely to persuade is less impressive. The argument seems obvious—we are more easily convinced by people we trust than those we don’t. To explain why we trust some people, instead of pointing to existing social networks and shared values that would be sufficient, Busby adds a discussion suggesting that men are more easily moved by men, whites by whites, heterosexuals by heterosexuals and so on. This adds little to the argument.

This book makes a major contribution to the comparative study of advocacy movements by introducing the literature on gatekeepers/veto players. It is a variation on the political opportunity structure approach with special relevance to stable, democratic systems. The model provides a means by which to identify the individuals and agencies within a state that either prevent or promote moral action.

The author is very disciplined and focused on advancing the main argument of the book. Some unexpected findings of this study deserve greater attention than they can receive within the framework of this argument. The first is that given the distribution of power between the political parties and the branches of government within the United States, the greatest likelihood of success for moral movements grows out of convincing those on the far right of the political spectrum by using Christian frames. If transnational advocates can convince the evangelical community of the moral value of a policy, the odds of adoption are good. Busby shows how a religiously motivated set of politicians is able to hold American foreign policy making hostage.

Another striking finding is that some countries are more susceptible to moral coercion than others as a result of their self-image as virtuous states. Japan’s self-image of itself as a responsible member of the international community drives it to adopt moral policies even when there is little domestic support for them. France and Britain adopt moral policies both in order to avoid being perceived as hypocrites and because they assume that the ethical superiority of their judicial systems will keep them out of the ICC docket. The image diplomats have of themselves and of their states are clearly drivers of foreign policy and the genealogies of those images would make for a fascinating study. As the WikiLeaks’s trove of state department cables is absorbed, a picture of the United States emerges as a state that sees itself as the guardian of stability, frustrated by the petty concerns of minor politicians, and striving to translate its liberal ethics into policy in a messy world. Busby would suggest that principled
advocates consider how to convert this self-image into a tool for moral action.


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The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all people have the rights “to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,” and equal access to their countries’ public services (www.un.org/en/documents/udhr). Increasingly, scholars of development and human rights are interpreting basic goods as human rights under these criteria. This shift is taking place in the context of neoliberal international economic policies, which since the 1980s have encouraged developing countries to reduce their public sectors via privatization. In Limiting Resources, LaDawn Haglund compares and contrasts the privatization of water and electricity in El Salvador and Costa Rica with historical efforts at state-led development. She addresses two puzzles. “Why was the effort to promote privatization so widespread throughout Latin America, regardless of institutional and political context, and regardless of evidence of its shortcomings? Was it because ‘there is no alternative’ as Margaret Thatcher famously argued, or a natural outcome of state failure and the effectiveness of markets, as IFIs [international financial institutions] implied?” and “If privatization and marketization provided better solutions, as proponents claimed, why was there so much resistance? Was it because collective action problems and coordination failures among potential beneficiaries prevented them from overcoming entrenched interests?” (pp. 12–13).

Haglund chose energy and water because these are natural monopolies. Start-up costs and barriers to entry are high, so there is little or no competition (the thing that supposedly makes markets superior to public ownership). Water and energy are central to livelihoods and economic development. It is widely agreed that states should assure their supply; failure to do so results in suffering and public unrest. Furthermore, the privatization of public utilities directly involves not only workers and their unions; it affects groups and communities that may not be organized as claimants of social and economic rights.

Based on mountains of archival data going back to 1980 and nearly 100 interviews with informants from international NGOs, the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, USAID, national and local governments, and civil society organizations, Haglund argues that privatization was not the result of state institutions doing a bad job. Rather, it