1 Enter the Dragon

The internationalisation of China’s higher education system

Anthony Welch and Hongxing Cai

The internationalisation of China’s higher education system is part of a wider phenomenon, whereby China is resuming a key role in world affairs. Indeed, China’s rise, at the end of the twentieth century and the onset of the new millennium, can be seen as one arc in a much longer series of oscillations, from a point where it was one of centres of the world (captured in the term Zhongguo or middle kingdom), to a time of national humiliation, associated with the decline and death of the Qing Dynasty, to its spectacular resurgence less than a century later. The process of internationalisation of China’s universities also has its own complex and fascinating history: although it has certainly accelerated hugely in the past decade or more, it was given great impetus by the Opening Up era, after the end of the Cultural Revolution during which China and its universities were largely cut off from external relations.

In this sense, it could be argued that internationalisation in China is relatively recent. This would be a major mistake, however. While it is true that many major achievements of Chinese internationalisation are relatively recent, internationalisation has a much longer lineage, going back (as so many things in China do) to the time of Confucius. The ‘Great Sage’ himself, somewhat like the Greek Sophists of much the same era, was one of the first and finest peripatetic teachers, travelling around parts of what were effectively different states in the period before China’s unification (at the end of the period of the Warring States, around 221 BCE). Confucius (551–479 BCE) lived in Lu Guó, now part of modern China, but travelled with his students to the countries of Song, Wei, Chen, Cai, Qi and Chu to seek a role in ministering government elsewhere (Encyclopedia of China 1992, Welch and Denman 1997).

Confucius also provides us with an inspiring affirmation of the principle of internationalisation in Book One of the famous Analects, where we read the following: ‘To have schoolfellows come from distant states – is it not a pleasure?’ (Confucius 1997: 47). And this was certainly the case, as monks from Korea and Confucian scholars from what is now Vietnam, travelled to centres of scholarship in the Chinese empire, at various times (Welch 2005, 2009), part of a wider and not uncontested set of relations with China’s near neighbours. Japan too, was strongly influenced by the ideas and institutions of the later Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE).
In the case of Korea, according to some sources, 105 students returned from China to Xin Luó (the Chinese term for Korea), as early as 840 CE, resulting in the patterning of its civil service exam and educational system after the Chinese (Encyclopedia of China 1992, Volume 1, Welch 2005). At the same time, it must be remembered that much of the history of internationalisation was largely an imposed one, including via occupation, and hence actively resisted by Koreans, as part of their longstanding struggle for independence. Arguably therefore, and notwithstanding a longstanding legacy of Confucianism in Korea, a degree of tension in respect to internationalisation from China is built into Korean history.

To some extent, Vietnam’s history of relations with its giant and at times troubling northern neighbour parallels the Korean example. Vietnamese society has been profoundly influenced by the legacy of Confucianism, including arguably elements of the modern Vietnamese higher education system. Examples of Chinese influence on the history of Vietnamese higher learning are clear, as any visitor to Ha Noi’s ancient and beautiful Temple of Literature (Figure 1.1) can discern. At the same time, this influence was not uncontested.

When Emperor Qin Shi Huang (259–210 BCE) unified China around 221 BCE, at the end of the Period of the Warring States, its territory extended to the Red River delta, in current Vietnam. Later, Emperor Han Wudi reclaimed territory that was lost after Qin’s death, including the north of current Vietnam. Han Wudi revived Confucianism, including as a means to careers in the civil service. Han Chinese fostered poetry, astronomy, arithmetic and medicine, as well as the Chinese script, which spread over time to Vietnam, where works were composed in both Chinese and Nom, the local language. Numbers of Han Chinese migrated to the northern regions of current Vietnam (Annam and Tonkin), and settled there, in a context in which Chinese and civilisation were considered but two sides of the same coin. During the Tang Dynasty, (618–907 CE), Chinese moves to incorporate southern territory included parts of modern Vietnam. Somewhat like the Korean case, however, it has been argued that there were elements of reciprocity in this relationship: on the one hand, China’s responsibility entailed that the ‘Son of Heaven’ (the Emperor) should act benevolently towards his neighbours, who ‘gained stature, and received concessions and help’ (Gelber 2007: 47). On the other hand, such groups were deemed barbarians, and were expected to pay obeisance, and tribute, to the Tang emperors.

Confucianism has long exercised a significant influence on Vietnamese society, both in terms of social structure and learning. While Confucianism reached Vietnam about 2,000 years ago (around the same time it reached Korea), it was during the Tang era that strong government was established, the civil service examination was strengthened, and court officials began to replace the traditional aristocracy. The Tang legal code proved influential in Vietnam, and a Confucian revival ensued, with the rise of some great Vietnamese scholars, and interpreters, of the revered Four Books and Five Classics, which so influenced Vietnamese culture and learning. Some Vietnamese scholars travelled to centres of Chinese learning at this time (Welch 2009). Significant Vietnamese scholars of Confucianism arose over the millennium from the tenth century CE, including Chu Văn An, Nguyễn
Trải, Nguyên Binh Khiembre, Phùng Khắc Khoan, Lê Quí Đôn, Phạm Quí Thích and Phan Huy Chú. Reaching its apogee in the early Ly Dynasty (from when the Temple of Literature in Ha Noi dates), the influence of Confucianism spread through:

every area of society, from government institutions and political activities, to economy, military affairs, literature, architecture, morality, education and the system of civil service examinations. Confucianism touched people from different social strata … influenced their habits, and became part of their customs.

(Confucianism 2007: 3)

Traditionally revered in Vietnam as the ‘Teacher of Ten Thousand Sovereigns’, some scholars hold the Confucian doctrine of ‘managing state affairs and bringing peace to all under heaven’ (Confucianism 2007: 3) still to be of particular significance for Vietnam:

As for the recruitment of officials, examinations based on Confucianism, as applied in China, were organized … for more than eight centuries (from 1075 to 1919 AD in Viet Nam) … South Viet Nam (before the reunification of the country) remained particularly faithful to his thought, especially in the domain of moral education.

(Yang, H.-Y. 1993: 6)
The influence of this doctrine, including its emphasis on harmony, dignity and morality, in both family and the wider society, is said to still permeate contemporary Vietnamese society, although perhaps in a more syncretic fashion than in China. In Vietnam, Confucianism had to compete historically, not merely with Daoism and Buddhism, but was also ‘assimilated into the Vietnamese culture, through the dictates of indigenous thought’ (Confucianism 2007: 1).

If the earlier periods were largely ones of the projection of Chinese models, ideas and soft power abroad, later periods were more marked by importation of foreign models into China. Much of this was a result of European colonialism and the Opium Wars, and defeat at the hands of the Japanese, in 1895, leading to an overall sense of national humiliation that is still spoken of with feeling by Chinese citizens today. At the same time, however, motivated by a growing acknowledgement that traditional (Confucian) practices of Chinese higher learning, which continued to produce a ‘conservative, backward looking intelligentsia’ (Yang, R. 2002: 30) were no longer adequate to support China’s growing need to engage in the modern world of science and industry, a number of late Qing Dynasty scholars argued that Western knowledge and technology, including models of higher education, should be used to assist China gain the strength of Western powers. Partly this appealed to China’s traditional orientation to the outside – ‘Learn the techniques of the Barbarians in order to control the Barbarians’ (Yang, R. 2002: 30) – but it was also partly an expression of the desire to preserve Chinese values, even if it was now necessary to learn aspects of Western science and technology. The Chinese aphorism, popularised by, among others, Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909) was Zhongxue Weiti, Xixue Weiyong (Chinese knowledge for norms, Western knowledge for use).

During the later years of the Qing Dynasty, and republican era, transnational flows involved both the inflow of ideas and institutions, for example through Protestant and Catholic missionaries, anxious to spread their ideas, and the sending of Chinese students abroad, to the US, Europe and Japan (Huang, T. C. 1881; Hayhoe 1996). Hayhoe cites a figure of over 7,000 Chinese students registered in Japan in 1906. Interestingly, a small proportion were women, although they were still precluded from enrolment in China. The flow of ideas, and literature from returnees to China formed an important conduit, notably through the work of Yan Fu, who translated key social science texts, from English and French. Cai Yuanpei, who spent two periods of five years each (1906–10 and 1912–17) in Germany and France was also influential, including during his brief stint as Minister of Education, and later service as Chancellor of Peking University. Institutional models were largely Japanese at the time, although the latter had in turn been strongly influenced by German models. US influences came to be more important in the 1920s, including via the visit of John Dewey and Paul Monroe. The British philosopher Bertrand Russell also lectured at Peking University in 1920, during a period of considerable openness and experimentation (analogous, perhaps, to the fertile decade or so after the Bolshevik revolution in the USSR [Fitzpatrick 1970]). At the same time, the Republican era (1911–49) saw a balance achieved in higher
education between foreign influences and indigenous development (Hayhoe 1996, Yang, R. 2002).

The predominant influence after the 1949 revolution in China came, understandably perhaps, from the USSR, encapsulated in the phrase *Xuexi Sulian Laodage* (Learn from Big Brother, the Soviet Union), used until the break with that country in the mid 1950s. Higher education was reorganised under technical principles, with the aim of underpinning industrialisation; wholesale importation of Soviet curricula, textbooks and hundreds of experts supported this radical transition. The subsequent period of the Great Leap Forward (1958–66) and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76) represented the triumph of Red over Expert principles, with the latter period in particular being characterised by a much more hermetic, autarchic stance: a ‘passionate rejection of foreign implants’ (Yang 2002: 36). Mao’s ultimate successor Deng Xiaoping, set China on a more outward looking and pro-scientific path of modernisation, including in higher education. Many Chinese students and scholars were sent abroad to learn, foreign experts came to work with Chinese colleagues in a variety of fields, and Chinese universities established partnerships with international counterparts. The US continues to be the model most commonly used as a benchmark for Chinese educational reforms, although there is growing awareness, among some, of reforms in other parts of the world.

**Contemporary contours of internationalisation**

Although the term had been used before by generations of social and educational reformers, *Jiaoyu Jiuguo* (Saving the Country through Education) was perhaps never more apt than after the ravages that the Cultural Revolution had wrought on Chinese society, notably in education. Universities, many of which had been closed for years, opened their doors again, including tentatively to the outside world. Despite the earlier break with the USSR, one of the main bridges to the external world remained via Comintern countries; it was still the case that most Chinese students and faculty who studied abroad, did so in one or other of the Comintern member states. For some time, too, Hong Kong’s higher education system functioned as something of a bridge to China, at least until mainland universities themselves forged their own international partnerships directly (Yang, R. 2002). At the same time, it must be admitted that some Hong Kong institutions were more active in forging relations with their mainland cousins than others.

As China and its universities opened channels of communication with the rest of the world again, a number of issues had to be confronted. One, of particular relevance to internationalisation, was how to develop a modern, competitive university system, which, while preserving the best aspects of Chinese intellectual tradition, also drew on specialist knowledge from around the world. A successful resolution to this dilemma, broadly similar to that confronted by Meiji Japan as it deliberately sought knowledge from around the world as part of its modernising project from 1868, and Taiwan almost a century later, had much to offer, but was
not easily achieved. However, its potential to offer more localised responses to the regional debate over internationalisation versus indigenisation (Zhang and Xu 2000; Yang, S. K. 1999) was important, amid oft-expressed concerns by Chinese academics that internationalisation often represented little more than Westernisation.

The picture of internationalisation at Chinese universities over the past 30 years is complex, fascinating and diverse. In an effort to do this complexity justice, two key elements have been selected for closer treatment: brain drain/brain circulation and regionalism (particularly in relation to Southeast Asia).

**Brain drain and knowledge networks**

A longstanding element affecting internationalisation of Chinese higher education is that of brain drain, where, for example, it has been estimated that of the total of 1.3915 million Chinese students who have travelled abroad to study since 1978 (many sent and subsidised by the state), only about 390,000 have returned (Cao 2004; People’s Daily Online 2009; Zweig 2005; Welch and Zhang 2005, 2008; Zhang and Li 2002). By 2010, the number of Chinese studying abroad is forecast to reach 200,000 but the return-rate is rising, as more opportunities open up in a dynamic and economically rejuvenated China (Zweig 2006, 2008). Figure 1.2 shows the pattern of returnees over the last decade.

Most of these students are now self-financing: Zhang cites figures showing that of a purported 40,000 plus Chinese students studying abroad in 2000, 2,800 were supported by the government, 3,900 by their Danwei or work unit, and some 32,000

![Figure 1.2 Number of Chinese students and scholar returnees, 1997–2007. Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2008).](image)
were self-supported (Zhang, F. 2002: 187). Certainly, return rates are higher than
that existed even a decade ago, in the context of China’s spectacular economic rise
(averaging ten per cent GDP growth since around 1990, at least until the worldwide
economic crisis of 2008–9). After a period when non-returnees were deemed to
be traitors, the Chinese government is now actively interested in deploying its
sizable knowledge diaspora, and non-Chinese experts, in the service of national
scientific and economic development (Cao 2004, 2006; Zweig 1995, 2005, 2006,
2008; Welch 2007a; Welch and Zhang 2005, 2008).

It is important to recognise, however, that Chinese statistics have not always
been collected in a consistent manner, across different agencies and ministries,
or over time. This problem, while not unique to China, is particularly relevant
to Ministry of Education (MOE) statistics on study abroad, which, for a time,
failed to include the growing number of self-supported (private) students abroad.
Nonetheless, the following table reveals something of the numbers and return rates
of Chinese students studying abroad, although the figures, based on data drawn
from the MOE, are incomplete (Table 1.1).

More recent figures (based on visas, rather than MOE statistics) in Table 1.2
reveal self-financed students now form a much larger proportion of the total
number of Chinese students studying abroad than in years past.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. studying abroad</th>
<th>No. returning</th>
<th>% Returning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4,888</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>4,703</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>10,742</td>
<td>5,128</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>20,905</td>
<td>6,570</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>23,749</td>
<td>7,748</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>23,749</td>
<td>7,748</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Zhang and Li 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government supported</th>
<th>Danwei supported</th>
<th>Self supported (and % of total)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,906</td>
<td>2,442</td>
<td>30,731 (87.6)</td>
<td>35,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>50,000 (90.9)</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>80,000 (94.1)</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>2,724</td>
<td>80,000 (94.1)</td>
<td>85,002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Zhang and Li 2002
Overall, the pattern of overseas study by Chinese students over the past decade is in Figure 1.3.

Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show that, of the total of 140,000 Chinese students studying abroad in 2007, 44,000 returned (a return rate of 31.4 per cent).

Importantly, the flow of educational services is also expanding rapidly in the reverse direction. The significant and rising tide of international students, with a record 85,829 international enrolments from 175 countries¹ at Chinese universities in 2002, brought both an increase in direct cross-cultural exchange and a welcome and much-needed boost to numerous institutions’ bottom lines. This total rose to 110,844 enrolments from a total of 178 countries in 2004, and in 2008, 223,000 students from 189 countries came to study in China, an increase of 27,996 compared with 2007. In the 60 years since 1949, China has received a total of 1.46 million foreign students (People’s Daily Online 2009). Based on assumed average annual tuition fees of US$2,000 per student, plus at least a further US$1,000 for accommodation, this yields a total of US$600 million, without allowing for associated additional expenses. At the same time, source countries and income are very unequally distributed, with perhaps 60 per cent or more of students sourced from East Asia (South Korea and Japan), and most of the enrolments concentrated in larger and more well-known institutions and regions. Beijing enrolled the most foreign students, followed by the municipalities of Shanghai and Tianjin; other significant provinces included Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, Jilin, Guangdong and Heilongjiang. Of all international enrolments, 93 per cent (or almost 80,000) were self-supporting. China has introduced a Green Card scheme, and the Ministry of Education is reportedly developing regulations to help provide work-study opportunities, such as part-time jobs.

![Figure 1.3 Chinese students studying overseas, 1997–2007.](image-url)
The Dragon and the Tiger Cubs: Regionalisation in China’s internationalisation

China’s opening up era proceeded unevenly, with some universities more eager to take advantage of the new opportunities than others. One arena that was arguably a natural one to pursue was regional, yet a persistent view among many of China’s leaders, institutional and national, that the US was the highest priority to pursue, impeded fuller growth of closer regional ties. Although often based on limited information, it remains the unshakeable conviction of most university administrators, and students, that the US system represents the sole source of institutional reforms, and quality higher education.

Two further general elements that frame internationalisation of Chinese universities are also relevant to forms of regionalism. The fact that internationalisation is still controlled by organs of the state can act as a brake on institutional autonomy; it is still ultimately the relevant ministries (often the Ministry of Education, sometimes the Ministry of Science and Technology), and the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs who formally invite ‘foreign experts’ to Chinese universities, although in practice, they would liaise with and take advice from the universities themselves. Recent reforms, however, now allow the top tier of universities to themselves select students and faculty for study abroad (Mohrmann 2008). Equally, the China Scholarship Council (CSC), who in 2007, for example, implemented a scheme to send 5,000 postgraduate students abroad each year for research or to gain doctoral degrees is the major organ responsible for sending scholars abroad; but again on the advice of institutions themselves.

While regionalism remains a relatively neglected element of research on internationalisation of higher education, it is particularly pertinent to China. Seventy-seven per cent of all international enrolments in Chinese universities in 2002 were from Asia (especially Japan and South Korea), ten per cent each from the Americas and Europe, two per cent from Africa and one per cent from Oceania. South Korea, Japan, the US, Indonesia and Vietnam were the top five sending nations, accounting for more than half of all overseas students in China.

While it is not possible to draw long-term inferences from a relatively short time series, Table 1.3 reveals that regional enrolments in Chinese universities, including from Malaysia, Singapore and especially Vietnam, rose appreciably over the period 2000–6.

China is also generous with scholarships, providing 5,362 scholarships to overseas students from 148 countries to study at its universities in 2000, and 5,841 from 155 countries in 2001 (China Education Yearbook 2002). Asia and three-country data for 2003–4 and 2004–5 in Table 1.4 reveal a strong bias towards less-developed nations.

Other pertinent developments include the mandating of foreign language instruction (mostly English) for something like ten per cent of subjects at major Chinese universities, including use of imported foreign language textbooks. This even extends to some subjects like law and the social sciences, and was
Table 1.3 ASEAN students in Chinese Universities, 2000–6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASEAN students</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1,947</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>4,616</td>
<td>5,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>&lt;500</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>1,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>&lt;500</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>1,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1,737</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>3,594</td>
<td>5,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>3,487</td>
<td>4,382</td>
<td>5,842</td>
<td>7,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>1,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Total</td>
<td>4,610</td>
<td>4,854</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total International</td>
<td>52,150</td>
<td>61,869</td>
<td>85,829</td>
<td>87,715</td>
<td>110,844</td>
<td>141,087</td>
<td>162,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN % of total</td>
<td>8.84%</td>
<td>7.85%</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: China Education Yearbook 2001–7
Note: For statistical purposes a number of 495 was assigned for instances of <500.

Table 1.4 University scholarships offered by China, 2003–4 and 2004–5

| Source: China Scholarship Council 2004 (private communication). |
| Note: * projected |

(no doubt with some difficulties) even to be extended to provincial universities (Huang 2003: 234). Once again, however, it is the weightier and better resourced universities in China’s east that have proved better able to implement such strategies – Fudan, for example, runs a successful MBA programme in English.

Incentive schemes, offering special salaries, assistance with housing and help with schooling for children, have also been introduced, to entice Chinese (and sometimes non-Chinese) scholars from overseas – again however, largely by wealthier and elite institutions. These operate at both national and institutional level, and include an array of sponsoring agencies. The major schemes, agencies, disciplinary range, and eligibility criteria are summarised in Table 1.5.

Last but not least, China announced plans to introduce a ‘Green Card’ system in 2004 that was to offer highly skilled foreign workers long-term residence permits (Japan Times 2004). This was of course, of specific interest to the growing number of foreign appointees who now occupy senior posts at some of China’s major universities. (As an example, Professor Gavriel Salvendy was recently appointed as the first foreign Chair Professor and Head of Department – of Industrial Engineering – since 1949 at Tsing Hua University, at a purported salary of US$100,000 p.a. His contract specified that he work there some months each year, while retaining
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Responsible authority</th>
<th>Origin of programme</th>
<th>Date of inception</th>
<th>Who is eligible?</th>
<th>How many recruits?</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>How does it work?</th>
<th>Disciplinary range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 The Hundred Talents Programme</td>
<td>China Academy of Sciences (CAS)</td>
<td>Introducing 100–200 talents from overseas as trans-century academic leaders. ‘Hundred Talents Programme’ is a general term for the programme of introducing excellent talents to CAS. Since 1997, the Hundred Talents Programme has been expanded to be two programmes: ‘Bring in Outstanding Talents from Abroad’ (for the long-term) and ‘Domestic Hundred Talents Programme’. Since 2001, ‘Overseas Celebrated Scholars Programme’ (for the short-term) has been established. It now consists of ‘Bring in Outstanding Talents from Abroad’, ‘Domestic Hundred Talents Programme’, ‘Project Hundred Talents Programme’, and ‘Introduction of the Winner of the National Outstanding Youth Foundation to the Hundred Talents Programme’. <a href="http://www.caspe.ac.cn/html/policy/003/2007/1023/1510.asp">http://www.caspe.ac.cn/html/policy/003/2007/1023/1510.asp</a></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Not older than 40 years old for those recruited from overseas. For domestic scholars, those recruited from overseas who have already been assistant professors can be less than 45.</td>
<td>Through the Hundred Talents Programme, CAS has attracted 1,122 overseas scholars including 178 in 2008. <a href="http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-02/13/content_1230686.htm">http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-02/13/content_1230686.htm</a></td>
<td>It aims to attract and cultivate young academic leaders for CAS and introduce outstanding talents from home and abroad</td>
<td>1998–2000 first phase of the Knowledge Innovation Project of the CAS. 2001–5 second phase, 2006–10 third phase in which CAS plans to introduce 500 scholars from overseas</td>
<td>Mathematics and physics, chemistry, life sciences, medical sciences, earth sciences, information technological sciences, technological sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Changjiang Scholars Programme (Cheung Kong/ YangTze River Scheme)</td>
<td>Ministry of Education (MOE)</td>
<td>Jointly set up by the MOE and the Li Ka Shing Foundation</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Specially appointed professors should have doctorates and are not older than 45 in natural sciences and 50 in humanities</td>
<td>From 1998 to 2007, 1,308 scholars (of whom 90 per cent have over one year of foreign education</td>
<td>It aims to attract scholars from home and abroad to be academic leaders in the universities and There are 100 specially appointed professors and 100 Chair professors every</td>
<td>Almost all disciplines, including humanities and social sciences</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Responsible authority</th>
<th>Origin of programme</th>
<th>Date of inception</th>
<th>Who is eligible?</th>
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<th>How does it work?</th>
<th>Disciplinary range</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and social sciences. Overseas applicants are normally assistant professors or above, and domestic applicants should be professors and are able to work in China for nine months per year. Chair professors are normally associate professors in foreign universities and are able to work in China for three months per year. It is not restricted to overseas Chinese. http://www.cksp.edu.cn/news/12/12-20070317-103.htm

experience and 98 per cent have doctorates) have become leaders in key research fields in 115 Chinese HEIs. 38 of them became academicians of the CAS and the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and 81 became chief scientists of the 973 Project, China’s government sponsored hi-tech project. 259 scholars are recruited directly from overseas or within 3 years after they form a group of innovation teams year and the term is three years.

It aims to recruit 1,000 to 3,000 high-end talent in the next 5 to 10 years. By June 2010, 825 overseas experts have been recruited http://www.1000plan.org/qjhl/article/1870

It aims to boost China’s innovation capability, make key technology breakthroughs, develop hi-tech industry, initiate new disciplines and promote the integration of industry and research. In the next 5–10 years (from 2008) recruits will work for national key innovation projects, key disciplines, key labs, state-owned enterprises, state-owned business and financial organisations and hi-tech industry development zones.

Mainly in science and technology, but also in finance and economy.

Experts not older than 55 who obtained PhD from overseas institutions and are able to work in China for not less than six months a year. They should include but are not limited to professors or the equivalent in famous foreign universities and research institutions; technical and management personnel with senior position in international businesses and financial organizations; entrepreneurs with full intellectual property rights and key technique, and familiar with international rules; other high-level innovative talent urgently needed by the state.

2008

Mainly in science and technology, but also in finance and economy.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Responsible authority</th>
<th>Origin of programme</th>
<th>Date of inception</th>
<th>Who is eligible?</th>
<th>How many recruits?</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>How does it work?</th>
<th>Disciplinary range</th>
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<tr>
<td>4 Chunhui Jihua (Spring Light Programme)</td>
<td>Ministry of Education (MOE)</td>
<td>It supports short-term returnees, and offers short-term (6-12 months) support for overseas Chinese with doctorates to work in China during their vacation</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Chinese scholars who have doctorates and have accomplished outstanding achievements, including those who have obtained long-term or permanent residency in foreign countries. It is restricted to overseas Chinese</td>
<td>Since the programme’s establishment in 1996, approximately 200 groups and 12,000 scholars have received grants. <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2006-09/05/content_5048736.htm">http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2006-09/05/content_5048736.htm</a></td>
<td>It aims to support Chinese scholars to make a contribution to China in various ways. Especially for those who would like to do research and lecture in Chinese universities during their sabbatical leave.</td>
<td>Awarded receive a generous salary, free housing, round-trip airfare and insurance during their short-term work in China.</td>
<td>Science and technology, agriculture, medical sciences, life sciences.</td>
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<td>5 National Outstanding Youth Foundation</td>
<td>National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Not older than 45 years. Applicants are PhDs or associate professors or above. It is not restricted to overseas Chinese. Most awardees are Chinese citizens</td>
<td>From 1994 to 2004, this foundation supported 1,174 young scholars among whom 366 have foreign doctorates, taking 32.8%. <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2006-09/05/content_5048736.htm">Guangming Daily</a> 20 October 2004.</td>
<td>It aims to promote the growth of young talented people, encourage overseas scholars to return to China and accelerate the cultivation of leading scientists in China. It also supports young scholars who live overseas but will return to China in a short time.</td>
<td>Natural science and applied basic research.</td>
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<td><strong>6</strong> International Partnership Programme for Creative Research Teams</td>
<td>China Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (SAFEA)</td>
<td>It is part of the knowledge innovation project of CAS, and most overseas scholars are introduced through the ‘Overseas Celebrated Scholars Programme’ (for short-term visits)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Associate professors or professors in famous foreign universities who can work in the CAS for no less than three months a year and have no concurrent position in other institutions. Those of Chinese origin should account for no less than 2/3 of all the overseas scholars recruited. It is not restricted to overseas Chinese and non-Chinese scholars are also participants. By the end of 2005, 35 creative research teams were formed and 224 overseas scholars and 362 domestic scholars worked for the programme. <a href="http://www.chisa.edu">www.chisa.edu</a>, vol. 204 No. 2 2007 Aims to promote the development of key disciplines, interaction among different disciplines, cultivate and retain a cohort of high-level talent and enhance status and competitive capacity. Each overseas scholar will receive 1 million RMB as research funding and each team will receive maximum support of 6 million RMB (1.5 million Australian dollars)</td>
<td>6.1 Mathematics and physics, chemistry, life sciences, medical sciences, earth sciences, information technological sciences, technological sciences</td>
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<td><strong>7</strong> The Programme of Introducing Talents of Discipline to Universities (the 111 Project)</td>
<td>Ministry of Education (MOE) and the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (SAFEA)</td>
<td>It is part of the endeavour to build some Chinese universities into world-class universities</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Overseas scholars from the top 100 universities and research institutes worldwide. It is not restricted to overseas Chinese and non-Chinese scholars are also participants. Over 1,000 foreign scholars were recruited. In 2007 alone, there were two Nobel Prize winners, 40 academicians from 10 countries, and 400 scholars with professorial titles from 29 countries. Aims to bring in about 1,000 overseas talents from the top 100 universities and research institutes worldwide. These experts will team up with domestic faculty members to</td>
<td>6.2 Almost all in science and technology, some are in medical sciences, life sciences, botany, agriculture, and engineering</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>More than 500 domestic scholars and experts, including 17 academicians and 72 Changjiang scholars, worked in 77 bases in the first two years of the 111 Project. <a href="http://www.chsi.com.cn/jyzx/200703/20070329/765902.html">http://www.chsi.com.cn/jyzx/200703/20070329/765902.html</a></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>establish 100 innovation research bases in Chinese universities. It aims to enhance the disciplinary international competitive power and comprehensive level and status of Chinese universities in the world</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>‘HOME’ Programme (Help Our Motherland through Elite Intellectual Resources from Overseas)</td>
<td>China Association for Science and Technology</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>It is restricted to overseas Chinese</td>
<td>By 2008, 64 overseas scientific organisations participated in the programme. 375 overseas scholars returned to China and participated in 156 projects in IT, agriculture, education, biomedicine, etc. <a href="http://www.cast.org.cn/n35081/n35096/n10225918/11073737.html">http://www.cast.org.cn/n35081/n35096/n10225918/11073737.html</a></td>
<td>Promote the cooperation and exchanges between non-governmental scientific organisations, provide a platform for overseas science and technology personnel to return through seminars, short-term part-time work, technical training and consulting for the domestic organisations</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Program Name</td>
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his post at Purdue University.) Nonetheless, restrictions on transnational education persist – notably limits to the teaching of humanities and social sciences and a ban on the teaching of religion (Huang, F. 2003a and b).

The Chinese Ministry divides transnational higher education (Zhongwai Hezuo Banxue) into degree and non-degree categories. Regulations passed in late 2003 and aimed at encouraging partnerships between Chinese Higher Education institutions (HEIs) and foreign institutions (OECD 2003), largely echo procedures established in 1995, that insisted on reputable partners, detailed documentation, a Board comprised of at least 50 per cent Chinese citizens and a Chinese director (Huang, F. 2003a and b). While arguable not entirely consistent with the spirit of China’s WTO commitments in 2001, such regulations can also be subject to local influence and interpretation. China’s horizontal commitments specified that the establishment of wholly owned foreign enterprises and joint ventures was to be unbound, although profit making was excluded. The commitment did, however, indicate that relevant legislation was still ‘under formulation’ (WTO 2001). Educational commitments stated that the provision of educational services was unbound, and that, for example, ‘joint schools … with foreign majority ownership’ were permitted (WTO 2001). Official regulations promulgated in March 2003 voiced concerns as to quality and contained explicit procedures to deal with foreign partnership HEIs that were seen to fall short of requirements:

Where a Chinese–foreign cooperatively run school causes gross adverse impacts due to its poor management or inferior educational and teaching quality, the education administrative department or the labour administrative department shall, according to their respective functions and duties, order it to make rectification within a prescribed time limit and make an announcement; if the circumstances are serious, or no rectification is made within the time limit, or the requirements are not met after its rectification, the education administrative department or the labour administrative department shall, according to their respective functions and duties, order it to stop its enrolment of students and revoke its permit for Chinese–foreign cooperation in running the school.

(Article 56, Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Running Schools 2003)

Notwithstanding strict regulations, it has been estimated that, by the end of 2002, more than 600 Chinese HEIs had engaged in some form of transnational higher education (Huang, F. 2003a). Many partnerships were regional, with some 146 listed by the Ministry as being with Australian partners, 58 with Japan, 56 with Hong Kong, 46 with Singapore and 31 with Taiwan (OECD 2003: 43). Partnerships with regional universities, especially those more integrated into the international knowledge network, such as Hong Kong institutions, may widen access to higher education. Cost savings may also be attractive for students,
including the flexibility of not having to leave home. Distance education, often using ICTs (Information and Communication Technologies), is growing swiftly, while still providing access to new and relevant knowledge. Business and IT (Information Technology) courses are among the most common areas covered, including in China, where it has been estimated that half all such programmes lead to an MBA (Huang, F. 2003a), while significant international partnerships with major overseas HEIs are in practice limited to wealthier and more developed domestic partners – ‘Almost all joint programmes are provided in China’s most prestigious universities’ (Huang, F. 2003; Yang, R. 2002). While earlier ventures were largely with US institutions, there is an evident trend towards more regional initiatives, notably with Hong Kong and Australia.

**China–ASEAN framework agreements**

Regional and global consortia are now a notable feature of the higher education architecture. They exhibit much the same strengths and weaknesses as institutional forms of collaboration. Some are weaker, others stronger. Some persist, others disappear. Some embody limited ambitions, others are global in ambition as well as reach. ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations)–China trade in services is not well understood or sufficiently researched. Tourism by Chinese citizens in ASEAN is known to be large and growing, while Singapore is increasingly seen as ‘a destination of study and business tours’ (ASEAN 2001: 13). Further cooperative endeavours will lead to increased investment flows, including in areas such as educational services. However, there is some concern among ASEAN members, keen to take advantage of prospects for expanded service sector trade with China, that some non-tariff restrictions prevent further development of the Chinese market, including in educational services.

**Cultural relations**

The promotion of cultural ties between China and ASEAN, an element within overall ASEAN cultural policy, was inaugurated by an ASEAN+3 Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Culture and Arts (AMCA+3), in Kuala Lumpur in October 2003, and separately endorsed by the ASEAN + China Summit, which met at Bali in October 2003. The latter pledged to intensify cooperation in key areas, including education and human resource development, and exchange of relevant personnel. In this sense, it broadly functions within the expressed goals of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community: to ‘nurture talent and promote interaction among ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and media practitioners, to help preserve and promote ASEAN’s diverse cultural heritage while fostering regional identity, as well as cultivating people’s awareness of ASEAN’ (ASEAN nd), although details of the ASEAN China guidelines remain to be developed. As seen in the following section, while there is enthusiasm on both sides to strengthen relations in higher education, this is not always simple.
Trade agreements and consortia

At least one regional trade agreement includes cross-border education, while three principal higher educational consortia exist that are either targeted at promoting ties with China or that already include Chinese universities as members.

APEC

From its inception, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has included an education component. Originally formed as the APEC Education Forum in 1988, it now fits within the APEC Human Resources Development Working Group, which includes China, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, as well as a number of other countries. While APEC infrastructure to support regional initiatives in education has been modest, its aims are not. Its ambitions include, notably, the attainment of free trade and investment within the Asia Pacific region for developed countries by 2010 and for developing countries by 2020. A relevant instrument consists of an intergovernmental consultative group, the APEC Education Forum, while the Human Resource Development Working Group (HRDWG) was endowed with wider aims (lifelong learning and capacity development, but also sustainable development, and labour and social protection). University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific (UMAP), which is seen by APEC as a vehicle to promote its ‘people-to-people’ links in education, organises one and two semester study-abroad programmes for undergraduates. Members include Singapore, Malaysia (Chair for 2003–4) and Vietnam, while China’s membership, discussed again at a UMAP meeting in Japan in March 2003, has now been confirmed, notwithstanding difficulties arising from already having Taiwan as a member. Current activities consist of the further development of the existing Pilot Scheme on Credit Transfer (UCTS), while seeking to leverage the comparative advantage of member states and regional language learning are two further priorities:

Learning each other’s languages is critical because we now live in a global economy. Being able to speak others’ languages and communicate in culturally sensitive ways is necessary for trade and other forms of international exchange.

(APEC Ministerial Meeting 2008)

An APEC publication (APEC 2001) focused specifically on identification of barriers to trade in cross-border educational services, as well as measures to promote it, and included considerations of access and equity, and the integrity of national systems. More than one country within the region voiced its concern on this latter issue, noting the necessity to ‘retain the ... sovereign right to determine ... domestic funding and regulatory policies/measures’ (OECD 2003: 51), as well as the integrity of the public system and local standards. Lack of regulatory transparency was also raised as another issue within the document, and
has been raised by some regional economies, as potential barriers to the export of services into China, despite its accession to WTO (World Trade Organization) membership.

The three regional consortia in higher education are as follows:

1. The ASEAN Universities Network (AUN), which in 2001 inaugurated the ASEAN–China Academic Cooperation and Exchange Programme. Members include University Sains Malaysia (USM), University Malaya (UM), National University of Singapore (NUS) and Nanyang Technological University (NTU). Its activities include the ASEAN–China Rectors conference, Roundtable, Joint Research and Training Grants as well as the ASEAN–China Distinguished Professors and Lecturers Exchange Programme. One of the first actions taken was an ASEAN–China Rectors meeting at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, in June 2002, where it was decided to explore current circumstances and the interests in extending relations, via a survey of members, including prospects for virtual courses. The next roundtable, scheduled for March 2004, at the Beijing Foreign Languages University, was to take further steps to advance ASEAN–China collaboration. Marine Science was selected as an initial vehicle for the implementation of Joint Research and Training Grants, on the basis of reciprocal advantage. Chinese scientists from the nation’s most eminent national university in the field, Qing Dao Maritime University, were to be afforded opportunities to conduct research in tropical and equatorial water environments, while ASEAN scientists were to be enabled to take advantage of the temperate water environment offered by Northeastern China. Ten researchers were to be selected from each side to receive three-monthly grants, for the conduct of maritime research. This framework agreement on research cooperation was confirmed at the Ha Noi meeting in March 2007, where another MoU was signed.

Another element of the Agreement included a Joint Training activity, whereby some 40 academics from ASEAN and China were to be selected for two training courses, each of a fortnight’s duration. One training course was to be held within ASEAN and another in China. The final component was the ASEAN–China Distinguished Professors and Lecturers Exchange Programme, aimed at strengthening relations between ASEAN and Chinese scholars by promoting short-term academic exchanges (two weeks to one month). Exchange activities were to embrace lectures, laboratory exercises and demonstrations, research student advisement and collaborative development of curricular and teaching–learning materials on both sides.

2. The second existing regional higher education consortium that involves member universities in China and ASEAN is the Association of Pacific Rim Universities (APRU) consisting of 36 leading research universities from Singapore (NUS), China, Malaysia (UM) as well as the US, Australia, Chile, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, Russia, Japan, Korea
and Canada. Member universities from China number among its leading research institutions: Peking University, Fudan University, Nanjing University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong University, Tsinghua University and Zhejiang University. A key APRU activity is to gather information about the extent of internationalisation activities at member universities, but at the time of writing these data were not yet available.

3. The third consortium is Universitas 21, which includes three major Chinese universities (Shanghai Jiaotong, Fudan and the University of Hong Kong), as well as major research universities from Canada, the UK, the US, Sweden, Germany, New Zealand, Singapore (NUS) and Australia. While Universitas 21 began with great fanfare and ambitions, such aspirations soon needed to be tempered, and the main legacy is now an e-learning portal. U 21 Global is an e-University, comprising 16 universities plus Thomson Learning (a large, multinational publisher and corporate training provider) – headquartered in Singapore, it offers an MBA programme, for example, and offers courses in Mandarin. A recent initiative, opened for business in May 2003, is its online MBA, which has chat rooms, threaded discussions and other such web-based tools, and advertises that an MBA can be gained at a fee level that begins from US$10,000.

All in all, the complex and variegated higher education relations between China and its ASEAN neighbours, which also draw in part on China’s Southeast Asian diaspora, said by some to number 20 million, look set to deepen and grow, albeit in a context of collaboration and competition.

Conclusion

China’s internationalisation of its higher education system – complex and longstanding – is now once more approaching a greater state of balance. Originally a dominant force in Asia, its language, culture and forms of higher learning provided a major pillar of civilisation within the region (although often contested). Now, as regional scholars increasingly flock to its universities, including some from its diverse and substantial Southeast Asian diaspora (Wang 2000, 2003), its language, culture and higher education institutions are once again becoming a magnet. Confucius Institutes are being established throughout the region, while targeted schemes and programmes are enticing both more, and more highly skilled, overseas Chinese to return – some of whom become Sea Turtles (overseas returnees) and some Seaweed (unemployed overseas returnees) (Zweig 2006) (see also Chapter 12 in this volume) – and play a part in the resurgence of the middle kingdom. Foreigners, too, are being attracted to work in the middle kingdom, in larger and larger numbers, including in its universities. Once more, it seems, China is taking its rightful place as a major centre of intellectual life, albeit now within a modern global knowledge system.
Note

1 Chinese data on international enrolments include students from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.

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