

# CICC

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## 3-3 Physical Design Strategies for Mitigating Fine-Grained Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks

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# Outline

- Side-channel Attacks (SCA)
- Fine-grained EM SCA simulation
- Proposed physical design strategies
- Fine-grained EM measurement
  - Die photo and setup
  - EM measurement
  - SCA results
- Conclusion
- Acknowledgements


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# Side-channel Attacks (SCA)

- Leaked side-channel info:  
Power, EM emissions
- Able to Break an algorithmically robust crypto engine
- Easy physical access
- High successful rate




# Side-channel Attacks: Fine-grained EM

- Fine-grained EM measurement provide rich spatial content, increasing SCA successful rate

Coarse-grained EM measurement


10mm probe



M. Wang, et al. CICC, 2021

Fine-grained EM measurement

1mm probe




V. V. Iyer, et al. WMCS, 2019



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
# Fine-grained EM SCA Simulation: Flow



- Step 1: ASIC implementation and extract parasitic parameters of the power grid

Source: A. Kumar et al., ICCAD 2017

# Fine-grained EM SCA Simulation: Flow




- Step 2: Simulate encryption and obtain transient current trace on each parasitic resistor

Source: A. Kumar et al., ICCAD 2017





# Fine-grained EM SCA Simulation: Flow




- Step 3: Feed parasitic parameters and spatial-temporal current information to the customized EM simulator

Source: A. Kumar et al., ICCAD 2017



# Fine-grained EM SCA Simulation: Flow




- Step 4: Apply differential/correlation EM analysis (DEMA/CEMA) against the simulated EM radiation

Source: A. Kumar et al., ICCAD 2017

# Fine-grained EM SCA Simulation



- Implement a 128b Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) design using 40nm technology
- Run EM simulation with probe diameter of  $50\mu\text{m}$  and  $75\mu\text{m}$  above the circuit

AES Core Layout



# Fine-grained EM SCA Simulation


- Implement a 128b Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) design using 40nm technology
- Run EM simulation with probe diameter of 50 $\mu$ m and 75 $\mu$ m above the circuit




# Fine-grained EM SCA Simulation

- Simulate 1000 encryptions and monitor EM waveforms at 3 locations on the layout
- EM waveforms of the last encryption round used for CEMA attacking window

AES Core Layout




Simulated EM Waveforms




# Fine-grained EM SCA Simulation: SCA Results

- Run correlation attack using 1000 traces at each location
- At location 1: Key Byte 4 is revealed using about 250 traces

AES Core Layout





Correlation EM Attack



# Fine-grained EM SCA Simulation: SCA Results

- Run correlation attack using 1000 traces at each location
- At location 1: Key Byte 4 is revealed using about 250 traces
- All 16 key bytes can be revealed within the 1000 traces collected at 3 locations




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# Physical Design strategies: Design 1, Design 2

- Exploring different power grid strategies for improving fine-grained EM SCA resilience
- Design 1: (Baseline) A 128 bit AES Computing core using metal M1 ~ M6



Design 1



Decap



Via7




M8




M7

# Physical Design strategies: Design 1, Design 2

- Exploring different power grid strategies for improving fine-grained EM SCA resilience
- Design 1: (Baseline) A 128 bit AES Computing core using metal M1 ~ M6
- Design 2 = Design 1 + Dense power grid on M7 M8



Design 1




Design 2




# Physical Design strategies: Design 3

- Design 3 = Design 1 + Twisted power grid along Y axis on M7 and M8



Twisted power grid shown in 3-D illustration



\*Only one twist is shown as an illustration



Decap



Via7




M8




M7

## Physical Design strategies: Design 3, Design 4

- Design 3 = Design 1 + Twisted power grid along Y axis on M7 and M8
- Design 4 = Design 1 + Extra wide VSS shield on M7 and M8



Design 3




Design 4



## Physical Design strategies: Design 5, Design 6

- Exploring Decap cells and VSS shield for improving fine-grained EM resilience
- Design 5: Baseline #2 using M1~M6 with extra Decap with 20% area increase



Design 5



Decap



Via7




M8



M7


## Physical Design strategies: Design 5, Design 6

- Exploring Decap cells and VSS shield for improving fine-grained EM resilience
- Design 5: Baseline #2 using M1~M6 with extra Decap with 20% area increase
- Design 6 = Design 5 + Thin and dense VSS shield on M7 and M8




## Physical Design strategies: Design 7, Design 8

- Exploring Decap cells and VSS shield for improving fine-grained EM resilience
- Design 7 = Design 5 + Extra wide VSS shield on M7 and M8



## Physical Design strategies: Design 7, Design 8


- Exploring Decap cells and VSS shield for improving fine-grained EM resilience
- Design 7 = Design 5 + Extra wide VSS shield on M7 and M8
- Design 8 = Design 5 + Extra wide VSS shield on M7 and M8, no intermediate connection





# Physical Design strategies: Design 9

- Design-9: Isolated S-Box placement using M1~M6 with no extra Decap nor VSS shield
  - AES core layout showing S-Box (S\*), MixColumn (MX\*), and Key Schedule (KS\*) module locations



(120 μm)

Design 9


# Physical Design strategies: Design 9

- Design-9: Isolated S-Box placement with no extra Decap nor VSS shield
  - AES core layout showing S-Box ( $S^*$ ), MixColumn ( $MX^*$ ), and Key Schedule ( $KS^*$ ) module locations




(120μm)  
Design 9

## AES encryption flowchart



## SubByte illustration




- S-Box isolation reduces current path within S-box modules and mitigate EM signatures

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

# Die photos

- Chip-1: Design 1 to Design 4: Different power grid strategies






# Die photos

- Chip-1: Design 1 to Design 4: Different power grid strategies
- Chip-2: Design 5 to Design 8: Decap cells and VSS shield strategies



# Die photos




- Chip-1: Design 1 to Design 4: Different power grid strategies
- Chip-2: Design 5 to Design 8: Decap cells and VSS shield strategies
- Chip-3: Design 9: Isolated S-Box placement



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
- Chip-1: Design 1 to Design 4: Different power grid strategies
- Chip-2: Design 5 to Design 8: Decap cells and VS
- Chip-3: Design 9: Isolated S-Box placement

Each design is operated individually to reduce EM noise from other AES cores



# Measurement Setup

- Riscure EM probe station
- 1mm diameter EM probe








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
- Riscure EM probe station
- 1mm diameter EM probe

Closeup photo of the EM probe with the packaged and de-packaged chip




# Measurement Setup

- Riscure EM probe station
- 1mm diameter EM probe



All scans are automated using a python script

## Measurement flow



# Measurement Summary

- Design 1: Baseline design
- Design 2: Dense power grid
- Design 3: Twisted power grid
- Design 4: Extra wide VSS shield
- Design 5: Extra Decaps
- Design 6: Thin and dense VSS shield
- Design 7: Extra wide VSS shield
- Design 8: Extra wide VSS shield, without Via7
- Design 9: Isolated S-Box placement


<b>Technology</b>	40nm CMOS
<b>Operating Voltage</b>	1.1V
<b>Package</b>	QFN56
<b>Clock Frequency</b>	75MHz~37.5MHz
<b>AES Core Area</b>	15,625 $\mu\text{m}^2$
<b>Throughput</b>	128b/10 clock
<b>S-Box Algorithm</b>	Composite Arithmetic
<b>Power @ 75MHz</b>	(mW)
<b>Design 1</b>	2.60
<b>Design 4</b>	2.53
<b>Design 5</b>	2.51
<b>Design 8</b>	2.46

# Outline


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# EM Measurement: Adaptive scan approach

- Measurements are performed in 2 phases
  - Phase I: scan entire chip surface for initial successful acquisition
  - Phase II: perform localized scans to optimize acquisition
- Probe scan across the package in zig zag pattern



# EM Measurement: Scan Orientation




- Measurements are done in 2 vertical orientations
- Y-oriented probe measures current flowing in x direction
- X-oriented probe measures current flowing in y direction

# EM Measurement: Adaptive scan approach Phase I

- Phase I scans entire chip surface
- Recover every key byte for at least one orientation and one position
- Location, orientation and min. MTD corresponding to each byte will be passed on to phase II

MTD Map for Design #1 Key Byte 1




# EM Measurement: Adaptive scan approach Phase II

- Phase II performs localized scans for individual bytes
- Using info found in phase I, refine optimal location by increasingly localized scans
- Measurement cost

$$\sum_{b=1}^{16} mMTD_b^{N_{scan}^{II}}$$

MTD Map for Design #1 Key Byte 1






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

# Design 1 fine-grained EM measurement Results



Design 2 ~ 4 are powered off when Design 1 is operating

- Observe fine-grained EM emanations on Design 1 (baseline) during the last encryption cycle at  $101 \times 101$  locations across the package in x-orientation

# Design 1 fine-grained EM measurement Results




Design 2 ~ 4 are powered off when Design 1 is operating


- Observe fine-grained EM emanations on Design 1 (baseline) during the last encryption cycle at  $101 \times 101$  locations across the package in x-orientation
- Observed EM trace at the package center

# Design 1 fine-grained EM SCA Results

Fine-grained EM SCA results




Design 1 byte-wise MTD



- Correlation result showing Key Byte 1 is revealed using 2520 traces
- MTD of each key byte is in range of 1000 traces to 3000 traces

# Fine-grained EM SCA Results

- For each proposed design
  - MTD cost of recovering key for each orientation along with final MTD cost of attack
  - Peak-to-peak EM signal measured at chip center



## Fine-grained EM SCA analysis

- Improvement of fine-grained EM SCA resilience for each of the proposed physical design strategies

Design #	Design strategy	$\sum_{b=1}^{16} \text{MTD}_b^y$	$\sum_{b=1}^{16} \text{MTD}_b^x$	$\sum_{b=1}^{16} \min\{\text{MTD}_b^x, \text{MTD}_b^y\}$	Improvement compared to Design 1
<b>Design 1</b>	Baseline Design	39850	38400	34650	-
<b>Design 2</b>	Dense PG on M7/8	42650	41000	39850	1.15x
<b>Design 3</b>	Dense twisted PG on M7/8	94970	53170	52500	1.51x
<b>Design 4</b>	Wide VSS shield on M7/8	92030	89010	84750	2.45x

## Fine-grained EM SCA analysis

- Improvement of fine-grained EM SCA resilience for each of the proposed physical design strategies

Design #	Design strategy	$\sum_{b=1}^{16} \text{MTD}_b^y$	$\sum_{b=1}^{16} \text{MTD}_b^x$	$\sum_{b=1}^{16} \min\{\text{MTD}_b^x, \text{MTD}_b^y\}$	Improvement compared to Design 1
Design 1	Baseline Design	39850	38400	34650	-
Design 2	Dense PG on M7/8	42650	41000	39850	1.15x
Design 3	Dense twisted PG on M7/8	94970	53170	52500	1.51x
Design 4	Wide VSS shield on M7/8	92030	89010	84750	2.45x
Design 5	Extra DeCap cells	51250	50000	45300	1.31x
Design 6	Extra DeCap + Thin VSS shield on M7/8	47400	50100	44200	1.28x
Design 7	Extra DeCap + Wide VSS shield on M7/8	120000<	78850	76650	2.21x
Design 8	Extra DeCap + Wide VSS shield on M7/8 (no Via7)	101950	98850	92350	2.67x
Design 9	Isolated S-box placement	120000<	99800	93850	2.71x

# Conclusion

- Fine-grained EM SCA is powerful yet can be mitigated using basic physical design strategies with no power overhead
  - Adding extra DeCap
  - Adding shielding grid
- Multiple strategies can be combined to further increase SCA resilience.



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