Multilateral War Bargaining

Colin Krainin: “Multilateral War Bagaining.” ¬†Quaterly Journal of Political Science¬†(9, 4: 407-39).

Abstract: I build a static, complete information, three-player bargaining model of war. Without dynamics or incomplete information, war is always avoided. However, the threat of war determines the nature of alliances. The model uses a notion of cooperative stability to predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior in alliance formation. Given the assumptions of the model, a stable state always exists. Stronger allies increase the potential for war threats against a non-allied player. However, stronger allies also demand larger shares of an alliance’s total payoff. Balancing (bandwagoning) alliances form when the within alliance utility of a player is uniformly decreasing (increasing) in the resources of an alliance partner.

Colin Krainin received his Ph.D. in Economics, but Government professors Pat McDonald and Terry Chapman served on his dissertation committee and helped him land his current post-doc at the University of Mannheim.