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The US government’s embrace of technology, even technology the government itself developed (see: ARPANET), often lags well behind its private-sector counterparts. Part of this is attributable to the glacial pace of large bureaucracy – but as more nations begin to embrace the internet as a weapon to be used in defense of government, the inadequacies of how slowly the US is embracing its own creation are laid bare.

I want to propose a digital identity policy framework that adapts the strategic elements of a strategy released by the Obama administration and integrates modern technology into the many functions of the US government. First, however, I want to briefly discuss the shortcomings of the past two administrations’ approaches to digital identity, then segue into how we might close the gap with governments around the world which are innovating more rapidly than in the US.

As a quick disclaimer, I am focusing this proposal on the federal government; many state, county, and municipal governments in the US have taken to the digital age with fervor and have actively begun implementing many of the same policies that I propose here. A few examples, that might lead to further research into how we might integrate the internet and digital technology into bureaucratic operations are the Wyoming state government’s work in cryptocurrency regulation and blockchain, the Kansas City government’s embrace of universal internet access and smart city innovations, and the San Diego government for its cybersecurity strategies.

One of the critical building blocks of this proposal is the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC). The Obama administration’s strategy outlines a move toward more robust cyber infrastructure catered to individuals. The proposed strategy is broad and far-reaching (the administration cites eight principles to improve in their Identity Ecosystem: privacy protections, convenience, efficiency, ease-of-use, security, confidence, innovation, and choice) but contains few concrete programs that facilitate these goals. The strategy is effective, however, at communicating the pressing nature of digital identity programs and the need for greater protection of democracy, individual rights, and trust in the internet age.

Unfortunately, the policy was only revisited once, with a $3.7 million commitment in 2015, and has received little  acknowledgement from the Trump administration for the past four years. In fact, the web page for the digital identity initiative, found on the NIST site, throws up an error message if you try to navigate for more information.

As such, I recommend we build on the NSTIC with a significant reinvestment in the program. An investment somewhere in the vicinity of $250 million would match similarly scaled private sector networks and would provide a significant basis for a digital program that could expand and improve the efficiency and efficacy of existing government programs, as I will show. This recommendation follows three phases: immediate, near-term, and long-term.

Step one – We centralize identification factors including government issued IDs, passports, and drivers’ licenses in a secure digital platform that encrypts user da

ta but allows instant access to forms of identification for all US citizens and residents.

Step two – We build out a platform and digital infrastructure to connect government assistance programs, taxation, and other services to those who are eligible – a process that has begun but is not well-known or widely-used. The programs this might benefit (including SNAP, the ACA, affordable housing assistance, Medicaid, and the CARES Act) are widely available, although often unwieldy and susceptible to fraud due to inadequate verification processes.

Step three – We begin work to integrate digital systems into new policy, including digital wallets, census counting, and voter registration.

This proposal will increase the US. government’s capacity for verifying the identity of citizens, decreasing the incidence and claims of fraud. It will also make the programs the US government implements more efficient in allocating funds and more effective at providing aid to individuals in need, potentially recouping the original investment if applied strategically. It will make our governance functions more accurate and targeted and will enable the potential expansion into other digital programs. And, an effective digital identity program might mark the reemergence of the United States as a leader and an innovator in cutting edge technologies and bureaucratic innovation.

It’s late, and you’re watching TV. 

Let’s say you just finished watching a movie, and you’re flipping through the channels because you’re just not quite ready to go to sleep. After flipping through a few channels, you stop. It’s another UNICEF commercial. You know the one. The commercial with the famine-stricken African children who also don’t have access to clean water. The one that makes you shift uncomfortably in your seat, but you’re too guilty to change the channel. Then the digits roll across the screen, asking you to donate just to “save one child.” You think about dialing the number because you want to help. But, do you ever just stop and think? 

Why do I always see these commercials? Why is there never enough food? Where are we going wrong?

Our methods of addressing hunger are all wrong.

In the early 2000s, Africa became a target for food aid due to the series of droughts in Southeast Africa. The international response was to send food, and many countries including the U.S. followed through, sending grains such as wheat and barley to Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia. On the outside looking in, this seemed like the perfect solution. A nation is starving: send grains. Yet, this solution failed to solve the tedious issue of hunger. 

Under Title II of Public Law 480, the U.S. sends the surplus of American crops to developing states crippled by famine. This section prompts food aid mostly in cases of emergency, which alleviates the issues of hunger in the short term. Sending surplus only solves the issue of food availability but not food insecurity. 

Food insecurity is concerned with access to food or a nation’s ability to provide food. This comes from efficient, healthy farming practices and technologies. In drought and famine, the U.S. has the best resources so we can still produce the same amount of food despite the downturn. African nations are not only more susceptible to famine due to lack of arable land, but many don’t have access to these resources. So, when famine comes we see sharp downticks in food availability. Food aid might feed a hungry mouth for the next couple years, but when famine comes again, we run into the same problems. You see the same commercial on your TV screen or on your Twitter feed, and you donate money to UNICEF. This keeps many African nations dependent. 

Food aid harms local economies. Foreign grain saturates the market making it easily accessible and much cheaper than buying local produced food. In turn, self-sufficiency is compromised. In cases of monetization, the U.S. donates its own grain to charities who sell it to communities and corporations, funding their own anti-poverty programs. Farmers are unable to compete with this, and we find many burning their crops and abandoning their jobs. 

We need long term development strategies.

We cannot continue to give more food while local grain rots and communities grow poorer. Long-term development invests in the nations by providing the tools necessary for self-sufficiency. This may be possible under Title III of Public Law 480 (Food for Development). 

Inactive since 2005, P.L.480 Title III focused more on providing agriculture commodities to support the least developed countries. Title III will provide local farmers with the means of buying better fertilizers, irrigation systems, and windmills. Funding also provides opportunities to learn effective farming techniques that would not be used otherwise. In situations of emergency, the U.S. may continue using short-term aid to alleviate the issue but also it’s imperative that they provide the means for farmers to sustain themselves. 

The goal of reactivating Title III is to reframe food aid in hopes of sustaining long-term development. Rather than using short and sympathetic approaches to alleviating food aid, the U.S should invest in community development starting from the grassroots.

 

By Jonah Isaac and Sophie Dunn

The pictures above, flagging disinformation on social media, have become an all-too-common sight for many Americans. Social media usership is rising rapidly in tandem with the increasing proportion of adults who get their news from the various social media platforms. As a result, the prevalence and threat of information operations online has become undeniably clear.

But, the response to this issue has been anything but clear. 

The confusing response to online information operations begins with the overlapping roles of various good actors, including social media companies, security-oriented government agencies, non-profit organizations, academia, and journalists. All of these different types of organizations have made impressive but insufficient strides to defeat the spread and threat of information operations online. Often, the objectives and responsibilities of these types of organizations overlap, as the different types of organizations take slightly different approaches to the same issue. The consequence of this overlap is an uncoordinated and inefficient approach to information operations mitigation governed by multiple protocols, ethical standards, and priorities.

The theme of an uncoordinated response to IO extends within the different classifications of actors. 

Just as there is a lack of coordination between the different types of actors, similar issues pervade each individual type of actor. For one, the federal government has no well-defined, official protocol for responding to information operations nor a specific government agency designated as the counter-IO leader. In the federal government different agencies work to address the same problem, agencies including the Department of Justice, Defense Department, Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security. Yet there is no unifying body that ensures the organizations do not have overlapping tasks and responsibilities. With regard to the private social media corporations, each of the large platforms has their own standards and responses for disinformation and other problematic content. Journalists and media organizations do not tell the disinformation story in the same way, leading to conflicting narratives that confuse American news consumers.

If this weren’t bad enough, there is even inconsistency within the various units within the organizations responding to disinformation.

For example, in Facebook alone, there are at least six departments that deal with information operations.  In the public sector, the Army’s Combatant Command has multiple directorates all also dealing with information operations, including the J2, J5, and J39. Examples like these go on and on.

Given all the different levels of obfuscated, uncoordinated, and redundant responses, what should be done? 

The first step of mitigating the threat of IO will require two things: coordination and collaboration between both public and private actors. A coordinated mitigation effort should incorporate the main actors that are involved in both media and national security: social media companies, relevant government agencies, non-profit organizations, academia, and journalists. Coordination would ensure that the actors are not wasting their resources on rendant efforts and would also standardize the various principles that govern content moderation. Collaboration would allow for each entity to better execute their role by leveraging different strengths and resources by working together. Utilizing both coordination and collaboration simultaneously would establish the much-needed platform from which to establish protocols, ethical standards, and priorities.

This proposal begs the question of how to organize such an array of actors. 

One way to do so would be to create a Media and Information Liaison Office (MILO), which could be housed in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) or the NSA’s Cyber Command. MILO would act as the platform from which public and private entities would jointly counter IO. One of the most central functions of MILO would be to establish a thorough and repeatable procedure that identifies disinformation, shares data across organizations, flags disinformation, and raises awareness of the threat in public discourse.

Incorporating academia, non-profit organizations, and journalists augments the sustainability and strength of this effort. Academics would bring a forward-thinking perspective that would provide the partnership with proactive capabilities as well as a well-researched understanding of IO. Non-profit organizations would be able to use their versatile positions to spread awareness and offer resources to increase cyberspace resiliency among vulnerable populations. Finally, journalists would provide the crucial connection between the public and the partnership, providing verified facts when reporting on an issue.

Opposition to similar partnerships is often based on the idea that the group would attempt to become an arbiter of truth. However, the basis of MILO is collaborative verification. Through such large-scale collaboration the body avoids leaning towards subjectivity. Therefore, the partnership would not only enhance the national security effort to counter IO, it would maintain and secure the foundational right of freedom of speech.

In all, the various actors above will need to increase their collaboration and coordination if they wish to truly defeat the threat of IO and this might just be the best way for them to do so.