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It is the mission of *Planning Forum* to serve as a medium for the multi-disciplinary exchange of ideas related to the study of human communities and the interplay of social, political, and economic policy and action with built and natural environments. This nontraditional, cross-disciplinary forum seeks participation and representation from students, faculty members, and field practitioners.

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Letter from the Editors

In a unique twist of fate, the contributors to Volume 9 of *Planning Forum* all have ties to the University of Texas at Austin, although their studies cross the United States and the globe. The research presented here comprises three case studies and one large-scale analytical project.

The domestic case study concerns housing in downtown Los Angeles. Ryan Fennell, a recent graduate in Geography, presents the many factors involved in reintroducing housing and increasing densification in the downtown of a city synonymous with sprawl. There are public and private costs as well as public and private benefits to these types of projects. Fennell analyzes successful and unsuccessful projects to expose the difference between theory and practice when it comes to adaptive-reuse housing projects. An explicit goal of the downtown housing project is the preservation of historic downtown buildings.

While Fennell's work concentrates on the uses of preserved buildings, Peter Siegenthaler turns his attention to the larger scale preservation of a town in Japan. Siegenthaler, a doctoral candidate in Asian Studies, analyzes the images promoted by the various forces involved in the preservation of Tsumago post-town in Japan. Results of his analysis indicate that different groups have different interpretations of the preservation project, and this is revealed through their different publications.

In sharp contrast to preservation, Patricia Wilson, a long-time faculty member in Community and Regional Planning, and Christina Lowery, a current student, provide a look at the seeds of democracy in post-apartheid South Africa. They focus on the issue of housing. This was an area where the federal government promised more than it could deliver in the time frame expected by those in need. Telling the tale of grassroots democratic efforts through the eyes of two participants, they reveal the foundations of deep democracy.

The final article presented in this volume, in contrast to the three others, looks at a national situation. Up Lim, a doctoral candidate in Community and Regional Planning, investigates the spatial patterns of income growth in order to provide more accurate information for economic development and planning officials. Traditionally evaluated at the state level, Lim argues that these are artificial boundaries when it comes to the forces influencing this phenomena. He evaluates data from the forty-eight contiguous states, using the more logical subunit of Economic Areas (as defined by the federal government). He finds that income and growth are spatially dependent, and analysis at this finer level is more likely to reveal patterns and meaning.

Continuing our connection to the University of Texas at Austin, this volume includes a book review on the newest publication from Dean Frederick Steiner of the School of Architecture, *Human Ecology: Following Nature's Lead.*

We've enjoyed putting this issue together and we hope you enjoy reading it.

Sincerely,

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Better Downtown Living Through Adaptive Reuse?

An Assessment of Housing Conversion-driven Redevelopment in the Historic Core, Los Angeles

RYAN FENNELL

This paper examines the Historic Core district of Downtown Los Angeles as a case study in the role adaptive reuse plays in creating favorable conditions for redevelopment. The project is based on a preliminary investigation of derelict commercial and industrial buildings slated for conversion to housing as well as single room occupancy hotels targeted for rehabilitation. This paper shows that the development of housing for a niche market has the potential to displace thousands of impoverished residential hotel dwellers. The recommendations for urban revitalization are that public policies take existing residents in project areas into account by preserving low-income housing and services while creating new housing and economic development opportunities for other classes.

Many downtowns across the United States are experiencing a revival through the conversion of commercial and industrial buildings to housing. One city where adaptive reuse-driven revitalization has taken on considerable momentum is Los Angeles, where developers have completed and planned several projects involving the conversion of office buildings into residential apartments. None of the projects underway there are more ambitious than those in the Historic Core, an area renowned for the architectural significance of its buildings and decried for the derelict state of its urban fabric.

This paper presents the Historic Core as a case study to examine how housing conversion developments affect existing central city low-income populations. The project investigates an ongoing housing conversion program placed within larger revitalization initiatives intended to generate redevelopment in Downtown Los Angeles. The conclusions of this study suggest that revitalization policies reliant on the establishment of upper- and middle-income housing may not benefit the classes they aim to serve, and may harm existing downtown residential communities in the process. Implications for downtown revitalization policies include the importance of provisions to establish housing for all classes that will improve existing communities, not just their historic building stock.

The primary unit of analysis for this study is the Historic Core District, located in the center of Downtown Los Angeles. The study's subunits are properties that have been or may be converted to housing and stakeholders in the housing conversion-based revitalization program. The latter subunit is further broken down into institutional groups, including the City of Los Angeles, the Community Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles (CRA), and the Los Angeles Conservancy; and individuals, consisting of developers, "urban pioneers," and "hotel dwellers." In recent years the City and the CRA (the City's redevelopment arm) have adopted a passive approach to revitalization through housing conversion in the Historic Core. Therefore municipal institutions are given a peripheral role in this study to the Conservancy and developers, those seen as effecting redevelopment in the district, and the urban pioneers and the hotel dwellers, those affected by the housing conversions.

The Historic Core district is a twenty-two-block area with boundaries corresponding roughly to the Business Improvement District (BID) of the same name (Figure 1). Though its name is of recent vintage, the district is the cradle of post-Mexican era Los Angeles. Major commercial development commenced there between 1880 and 1930. Many of the structures built during that period exist today, several of which have been slated for conversion to housing. The City, through the City Council and its affiliated departments, and the CRA sought to revitalize Downtown Los Angeles first through slum clearance, and then through housing conversion programs experiencing limited success. In their wake came the developers, who marketed and leased successful housing conversions, and the Conservancy, a preservation organization that sees housing as an ideal revitalization vehicle. These two groups look to draw the urban pioneers, a middle- and upper-income earning niche market with a taste for eclectic living spaces, to the Historic Core. The arrival of the urban pioneers holds the potential to displace the low-income hotel dwellers, as the housing conversion-driven revitalization progresses and the residential hotels attract developer interest.

The first part of this essay reviews three redevelopment episodes in Downtown Los Angeles beginning in the 1960s. A brief history of these initiatives provides an overview of the evolution of the Historic Core's population and downtown revitalization attempts. First, a presentation of the Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project offers background into the municipal mission to redevelop Downtown Los Angeles. Then two major City-sponsored Historic Core housing conversion projects that fell short of expectations both in occupancy and in impact are examined.

Figure 1. Downtown Los Angeles



Cartographer: Ryan Fennell

Following investigation of past redevelopment policies in the Historic Core, the second part of this essay analyzes the present housing conversion-driven revitalization program. A discussion of developer strategies and the public and private initiatives that facilitated projects will illustrate the city's adoption of a free enterprise solution to their redevelopment problem. The building stock of completed and planned conversions is then examined using direct observation and quantitative analysis to provide material and spatial context to the study. Next interviews and contemporary accounts are employed to investigate the developers' tenancy, collectively referred to as "urban pioneers," and the community networks they have created. Finally the problems the urban pioneers have encountered during the establishment of their community are addressed.

The third part of this essay examines the residential hotels as a variable in the revitalization equation. Using interviews and contemporary accounts, an investigation of hotel owner and manager attitudes toward the housing conversion phenomenon will show their ambivalence toward their residents' plight. These methods are also employed to investigate the residential hotel occupants, collectively referred to as "hotel dwellers," and the community networks upon which they depend. This is preceded by a review of the

residential hotel building stock using direct observation and quantitative analysis to establish comparisons with the housing conversions. Finally, the issues the hotel dwellers face in maintaining their community are examined.

One conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the City and the CRA have packaged historic preservation as a commodity to be bought by developers and sold to a target demographic. Another shows the objective of the housing conversion-driven revitalization program running counter to effective redevelopment, since the majority of the new housing units are intended for a niche market that excludes the district's existing low-income community. Furthermore, this essay will reveal that the municipal attitude toward developers has the potential to decimate the Historic Core's low-income housing stock through conversion to loft apartments. The analysis concludes that policy change is necessary to retain low-income housing in the district while generating new housing development.

The LA Story: Razing and Rehabilitation

Los Angeles, the nation's second largest city, is a relative latecomer to the national housing conversion trend. Though housing conversions were developed and marketed in the city as early as the 1970s, they did not catch on with the general public. The success of recent projects and the interest those currently under development have generated appear to have changed this attitude. However, the current scenario in Downtown Los Angeles proves ironic. For much of the city's history developers beckoned Angelenos to leave the city for their suburban tracts–today they seek to lure disenchanted suburbanites back to the heart of the city.

Los Angeles has a long tradition of downtown living. This legacy is unknown to most Angelenos, however, since downtown has historically housed a transient population, the hotel dwellers. Too poor to afford traditional accommodations, many hotel dwellers have resided downtown for several years while never holding a permanent address. This population persists in limbo in the Historic Core due to hotel rules that force most to seek new accommodation on a monthly basis. Most hotel dwellers do not legally qualify as residents and are not even afforded the rights of renters. As a shadow population this group is denied the awareness given most communities. Because the hotel dwellers possess little political power, their needs have not been considered in past redevelopment projects.

The first episode in which the City used redevelopment to introduce middle- and upper-class populations into a traditionally low-income neighborhood took place in the Bunker Hill district, a quarter of Victorian rooming houses adjacent to the Historic Core. One of many slum clearance programs transforming American cities during the 1960s, the Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project was a costly experiment in urban renewal that leveled an existing transient community to make way for a modernist development. The City gave little regard to the resident population, as official reports described the district as a crime-ridden quarter of substandard structures. Contemporary accounts of the hotel dwellers are mostly negative and in line with an academic study identifying Bunker Hill's population as ignorant degenerates who occupied their time between welfare checks with alcohol and interracial copulation (Cohen 1951). The district's social and physical conditions led the newly created CRA to declare it blighted. The agency then commenced the appropriation and demolition of Bunker Hill's structures. Their intention was to resurrect Bunker Hill as a district of high-density commercial and residential developments. The juxtaposition of office and residential space was expected to draw Angelenos back from the suburbs to the central city. In the process a community was destroyed, as the razing of Bunker Hill's building stock forced its population to take flight to other districts, including the Historic Core.

Figure 2. Hotel Rosslyn, circa 1925

From the author's personal collection

During the Bunker Hill slum clearance most of the Historic Core hotels remained intact, creating a catchment area for the displaced. As civic awareness focused on the shiny towers of Bunker Hill, a new community emerged in the hotels of the Historic Core. Originally built as palace hotels for the upper class, these Beaux Arts and Art Deco buildings lost their clientele with the completion of newer hotels to the west (Figure 2). The arrival of the Great Depression forced the hotels to cater to a lower economic class, and several went into the business of housing the poor.

The Historic Core's transient population existed largely in obscurity until the 1980s. Though omnipresent to downtown workers and business owners, the hotel dwellers were ignored by most Angelenos. Likewise, the City diverted its attention along with its redevelopment dollars to Bunker Hill, leaving the Historic Core to the city's poorest residents. Angeleno abandonment of downtown for the suburbs during the 1950s forced the Historic Core businesses to cater to lower economic classes. A positive aspect of this transition was the creation of a walking city for the poor as residents seldom had to travel far to obtain goods or services. This notion is ironic considering the City's struggles to create high-density mixed-use developments in other districts while the Historic Core thrived two blocks south of City Hall.[1]

By the 1980s the Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project began to generate financial returns, largely in the form of property taxes. Much of the revenue was diverted to the CRA, who used their new wealth to fund an adaptive reuse block development in the Historic Core, which is the second redevelopment project examined here. This included the Los Angeles Theater Center in the old Security National Bank building, the Stock Exchange nightclub in the former Pacific Stock Exchange building, and the Premiere Towers, a condominium conversion housed in the 1923 California-Canadian Bank and 1931 E. F. Hutton buildings. The CRA assumed that their central positioning of housing and entertainment venues in the Historic Core would draw retail, restaurants, and other services aimed at middle- and upper-income earners. These were expected to fill the ground floors of surrounding buildings while

generating private sector projects that would expand revitalization efforts outward from the 600 block of Spring Street. What transpired destroyed developer confidence in the district and severely damaged the CRA's credibility.

Several events adversely affected the CRA's revitalization plans, including some beyond the agency's control. The first setback came when lack of business forced the Stock Exchange nightclub to close in 1989. Soon after the Los Angeles Theater Center experienced financial problems and the CRA poured millions of dollars in subsidies into the project to keep it afloat. These episodes paled in comparison to what would consume the Premiere Towers.

Figure 3. Premiere Towers

© Ryan Fennell

The CRA placed the 121 condominium units of the Premiere Towers on the market in 1981 (Figure 3). Ranging between $70,000 and $135,000, these were marketed to young professionals working downtown. Though the CRA secured reservation deposits for all of its units within a week of its first listing, a subsequent downturn in the Los Angeles condominium market greatly depressed sales. Under pressure to pay off loans they had guaranteed for the project's construction, the CRA sold eighty-eight vacant units to a private investment group led by accountant Murray H. Neidorf. This move was made without the knowledge of the thirty-three condo owners, who became incensed when Neidorf put his units on the market as rentals. Angry that their equity had evaporated with the conversion of seventy-five percent of the building's units to rental housing, they were further infuriated when the CRA gave Neidorf $1.8 million to make up his rental units' operational deficit (Woo 1991). The condo owners argued that they deserved the subsidies, since they had bought into the CRA's redevelopment scheme. Subsequently Neidorf's association went bankrupt and his units were repossessed by the CRA, placing the agency in the position of landlord. This did little to satisfy the condo owners, however, as many insisted the agency buy them out.

Mismanagement was not the only grievance the condo owners held toward the CRA. Complaints about the slow pace of the redevelopment project were regularly aired. "For Lease" signs still hung in vacant storefronts where funky boutiques and eclectic cafes were to have appeared. Security was also a major issue, as the condo owners lamented harassment from street people and encounters with drug dealers around their building. But the greatest criticism levied toward the CRA was that they had failed to create a neighborhood-like environment on Spring Street. Officials from other city agencies criticized the CRA's unyielding vision of creating a downtown community from mixed-use development that was

widely perceived as something surburban Angelenos did not desire. Additionally the agency was admonished for its lack of attention to the gritty reality of Spring Street.

The City and the CRA directed much of the blame for Spring Street's failure at the residential hotels lying within the project area, the Alexandria in particular (Figure 4). A former palace hotel that had degenerated into a flophouse despite numerous renovations, the Alexandria was decried by then Mayor Tom Bradley as "a magnet for the parasites of this society" (Soble 1988). City officials pledged to restore order to Spring Street as police officers sensationally recounted running battles with drug dealers in the hotel to the *Los Angeles Times*. The Alexandria served as an easy scapegoat for the City and the CRA despite manager Martin Yacoobian's assertion that his parents' hotel provided much needed affordable housing to pensioners and low income families. Pushed to prove they were making progress in cleaning up Spring Street, the City attacked the Alexandria. This distracted Angelenos from the impending failure of the Los Angeles Theater Center and the problems of the Premiere Towers. However, the negative publicity exacerbated an already bad situation. Exposing the Historic Core's central role in the drug trade hardly induced more urban pioneers to move downtown.

Figure 4. Hotel Alexandria

© Ryan Fennell

The Historic Core shared in the redevelopment frenzy that swept Los Angeles following the riots of 1992. Prominent downtown developer Ira Yellin, renowned for his restoration of the 1893 Bradbury Building, sought funding for the third Downtown redevelopment project presented here, the conversion of the nearby Homer Laughlin and Million Dollar Theater buildings into 121 apartments. The project, called Grand Central Square, included provisions for affordable housing with a mix of subsidized and luxury units. In 1993 the CRA opted to back Yellin's project with a $44 million bond to augment the $20 million the developer had raised from private investors. Yellin used his development's proximity to the Pershing Square subway portal to market his project to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of Los Angeles County (MTA) as a transit-oriented development. The MTA was impressed with the project and offered to service a portion of the bond debt in return for a share of the project's revenue (Curtiss 1994).

Within four years of opening Grand Central Square had leased most of its units. However, Yellin's corporation fell behind on its debt payments and the CRA and MTA were forced to arrange a bailout. Under the agreement the MTA received priority for repayment. The CRA

took less favorable terms as they pledged to outlay $14 million over 17 years, by which time they assumed the project would turn a profit (Gordon 1997). Conflict ensued as the CRA blamed the development's financial woes on artificially low cost projections, while Yellin countered that a five-year recession had depressed demand in the downtown real estate market. In the aftermath of the bailout commentators questioned the decision making skills of the CRA board. The embarrassment caused by the Spring Street and Grand Central Square experiences made the agency hesitant to support further housing conversion projects in the Historic Core.

Adaptive Reuse Transforms the Historic Core: Better Living through Rehabilitation

The failure of Spring Street and Grand Central Square's financial problems did not spell the end of revitalization attempts in the Historic Core, however. Shortly after Yellin's bailout, Tom Gilmore, a developer with no experience in rehabilitation, stepped forward in 1998 with a plan to convert the San Fernando Building and the Farmers & Merchants' Bank Annex (later rechristened the Hellman Building), two long derelict structures in a forgotten corner of the district.[2] Following his addition of the adjacent Continental Building through a partnership with its then owner, Gilmore had the necessary ingredients for a block-long development he called the Old Bank District (Figure 5). His projects stayed within budget and the San Fernando and Hellman buildings boasted seventy to eighty percent occupancy rates before they even opened. This shocked real estate analysts and other developers, who were at a loss to explain how a relative neophyte could enter the Historic Core and succeed where both the City and an established developer had failed.

In his development of the San Fernando and Hellman buildings Gilmore had shrewdly avoided the pitfalls that proved problematic for the district's earlier projects. He kept costs low and utilized historic preservation tax credits to keep his projects within budget, unlike Yellin's experience with Grand Central Square. Through clever marketing Gilmore created a buzz that filled his units, avoiding the occupancy problems that troubled the CRA's Premiere Towers. However, a lesson learned from the CRA and Yellin projects is that occupancy alone does not make a housing conversion successful. Realizing this, Gilmore developed his own plan for housing conversions within a greater context of urban revitalization.

Figure 5. Old Bank District, 2002

© Ryan Fennell

Gilmore's formula for urban revitalization incorporated a holistic approach. He advocated the creation of units in several contiguous buildings, contrary to the CRA's method of clustering housing units in an isolated pocket. Gilmore's idea was to redevelop the block and not the just the buildings, since he states the revitalization battle will be won or lost on the street. To this end he has suggested the creation of an "illusion" of a working neighborhood. There storefronts would be occupied by shops and services lured by artificially low rents and other incentives. His goal was to create a comfortable environment for residents until the neighborhood matures and the businesses can sustain themselves. By selling future improvements to impatient customers Gilmore risked entering the same dilemma that sank the CRA's Spring Street project. However, unlike the CRA, he had taken to actively recruiting businesses instead of waiting for them to be drawn to his development.[3]

The Gilmore public relations machine proved so powerful that his attitude became a selling point in marketing his housing conversions. His relentless optimism and strong arguments for why and how the Historic Core should be redeveloped captivated prospective tenants. One tenant told the Los Angeles Times that he attributed his decision to sign a lease for a San Fernando Building unit before it even had a floor plan to his confidence in Gilmore's vision (Grimmett 2000).

The attention generated by Gilmore's Old Bank District development meant it was only a matter of time until other developers arrived to carve out their own niches in the Historic Core. The next developer to enter the Historic Core was Izek Shomof, who acquired the Premiere Towers from the CRA in 1999 for $4 million. Shomof then purchased the adjacent Barclay Bank building, which he later rehabilitated as the Spring Tower Lofts. This transaction secured the middle of the Spring Street block between Sixth and Seventh Streets for his own block development. In his buildings Shomof sought to create an attractive neighborhood scene by filling his ground floor spaces with retail activity. He hoped this would draw more visitors and potential residents. However, he lacked Gilmore's confidence in this prospect, as he openly fretted to the local media over the task of attracting middle- and upper-income tenants to a low-income neighborhood.

Though Shomof's fears were not unfounded, his development and the Old Bank District

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Figure 6. (below) Loft interior, San Fernando Building
Figure 7. (left) Loft interior, Continental Building

successfully attracted a new class of resident to the Historic Core. The units were marketed to professionals using the appeal of "urban living": large live/work spaces with modern conveniences housed in architecturally significant buildings in the heart of the city. Interviews with housing conversion property managers revealed that their first tenants were a multiethnic mix of professionals, generally aged twenty-two to thirty-eight and between sixty to seventy percent male. Persons identified by Richard Florida as members of the "creative class" comprised a large contingent of this population (2002). Self-employed "dot-commers" and highly paid workers in the design and film industries represented this group in the Historic Core.

The author took a walk-through of model units in all three Old Bank District buildings in June 2001. The units were found to vary greatly in size but share similar accouterments. One selling point of the units is their high ceilings and numerous large windows (Figure 6). Another is their "industrial" interiors featuring exposed heating and air conditioning ducts (Figure 7). The units are separated from each other by drywall partitions of questionable acoustic quality. Most housing conversion units are cavernous, enclosing over 1,200 square feet (Table 1). The average rent for units in the Old Bank District and Shomof developments is $1,070 per month. In 2002, 550 units were scheduled for completion, a number that is projected to more than double by the end of 2003. Nineteen percent of the planned units have been set aside as affordable housing (Table 2). Though these units have been earmarked for low-income earners spending over thirty percent of their monthly income on rent, the developers have not determined how these tenants will be chosen.

Currently the housing conversions are clustered in pockets at the corner of Broadway and Third Street, along Fourth Street between Spring Street and Werdin Place, and on Spring Street between Fifth and Sixth Streets (Figure 8). Completion of the planned units will create a concentration at the intersection of Broadway and Third Street and an axis along Spring Street between Fourth and Seventh Streets. The latter is worth note since it effectively bisects the heart of the Historic Core. Here the City and the CRA hope to barrack residents

Table 1. Historic Core completed housing conversions, 2002

Building	Year Built	Year Converted	No. of Units	Unit Type	Unit Size	Monthly Rent Low-High[1]
San Fernando	1907	2000	70	Loft	1,300 to 1,330 sq ft	$790-$2,500
Hellman	1914	2001	104	Loft	730 to 2,330 sq ft	$1,000-$2,850
Continental	1903	2001	56	Loft	680 to 2,750 sq ft	$1,000-$2,500[2]
Grand Central Square	1897/ 1917[3]	1994	121	Apt	n/a	$970-$1,050[5]
Premier Towers	1923/ 1931[4]	1985	121	Apt	n/a	$800-$1,200[5]
Spring Tower	1919	2001	37	Loft	1,800 to 2,200 sq ft	$1,400-$2,200
Canadian	1910	1970	12	Loft	n/a	n/a
Santa Fe	1907	1993	29	Loft	1,500 to 3,500 sq ft	n/a
		Total Units:	550			

[1] As of March 2002.
[2] Excludes penthouse.
[3] Includes the Homer Laughlin Building (1897) and the Million Dollar Theater Building (1917).
[4] Includes the California Canadian Bank Building (1923) and the E.F. Hutton Building (1931).
[5] Rent for one-bedroom apartments.

Sources: Leasing agents, Los Angeles Conservancy

Table 2. Historic Core planned housing conversions, 2002

Building	Year Built	Projected Completion	No. of Units	Unit Type	Unit Size	Affordable Housing Units
Bartlett	1906	Sep 2002	124	Loft	n/a	--
Broadway Spring Arcade	1923	Jan 2003	156	Loft	n/a	--
Higgins	1910	Mar 2002	140	Loft	n/a	--
Irvine Byrne	1894	Dec 2002	48	Loft	n/a	--
Pacific Electric	1905	Winter 2003	350	Loft	600 to 1,000 sq ft	175
Pacific Stock Exchange	1930	Feb 2003	35	Loft	n/a	--
Rowan	1910	Spring 2003	209	Loft	470 to 1,250 sq ft	42
Sassony	1913	n/a	35	Loft	n/a	--
Security	1906	Dec 2003	153	Loft	630 to 1,850 sq ft	31
Victor Clothing	1914	Fall 2002	32	Loft	600 to 1,100 sq ft	--
		Total Units:	1,282			

Source: Los Angeles Conservancy

of a professional class, the foot soldiers of their downtown revitalization campaign.

The success of the Gilmore and Shomof developments attracted the attention of the Los Angeles Conservancy, a preservation activist group advocating the protection and rehabilitation of derelict historic structures throughout the city and county of Los Angeles. The organization authored the Broadway Initiative, its own blueprint for downtown revitalization, in July 1999. Though the text of the initiative mentions the creation of a twenty-four hour district through the conversion of vacant office space to residential apartments as a goal, it does not state how this will be accomplished (Los Angeles Conservancy 1999) (Figure 9).

Figure 8. Historic Core Housing Conversions, 2002

Cartographer: Ryan Fennell

Following the opening of the Old Bank District the Conservancy shifted its policy focus toward housing creation in the Historic Core. The organization commissioned a task force of architects and engineers to assess the adaptive reuse potential of 273 buildings in the district. The buildings were judged on sets of architectural and structural criteria, including shape, access to natural light on upper floors, construction type, condition, and seismic issues. The surveyors concluded that L-, E-, and U-shaped buildings offer the best natural lighting and ventilation for housing units. Excluded

Figure 9. Broadway, circa 1940

From the author's personal collection

from the study were 22 of the district's existing residential buildings, including some but not all of its residential hotels. The study, dubbed the Historic Core Housing Survey, was carried out in April 2000 and identified fifty buildings suitable for conversion to housing (Figure 10).

The City Council's adoption of the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance in June 1999 facilitated the Conservancy's goal of creating downtown housing through the conversion of old commercial buildings.[4] The ordinance provides adaptive reuse projects with numerous incentives. One is an exemption from the density requirements of the zone in which a building is located. Another allows the number of parking spaces to remain constant despite the building's conversion to residential use. Projects are also exempt from mini-shopping center and commercial corner development regulations. These incentives relieve developers of requirements they must meet in new apartment development while encouraging live/work

Figure 10. Candidate Buildings for Housing Conversion

Source: Los Angeles Conservancy, Historic Core Housing Survey, 2001

and mixed-use development, which are well suited to the dense Historic Core.

The passage of the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance signaled a renewal of the City's resolution to revitalize the Historic Core. However, the success of the Gilmore and Shomof developments saw the City defer the initiative and much of the financial responsibility to lenders and developers. Allowances made for rehabilitation projects, including the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance, the Planning Department's institution of live/work zoning and the Department of Building and Safety's fast track permit process for such projects removed the obstacles that formerly impeded housing conversion development. Through these measures the City positioned itself as a silent partner, facilitating revitalization rather than leading the process.

Three months after the completion of the Historic Core Housing Survey the Conservancy presented their findings to the real estate community. Armed with the results of their study, the organization sold the development potential of housing conversions to an assembled group of developers, analysts, and lenders. The Conservancy had their work cut out for themselves, considering the failures of the CRA's and Yellin's projects and the unconventional nature of adaptive reuse development. They assured their wary audience that housing conversions were less risky than suburban housing with the presentation of other western American cities where similar development had taken place.

The Conservancy supplemented their findings with a cost management consultant's detailed analysis of expense types and ranges developers would incur in housing conversion development. The results showed housing conversion costs to be comparable to new apartment developments. However, the analysis showed development costs to drop considerably when federal and state historic preservation tax credits and city zoning variances are applied. The Conservancy hoped that their findings would stimulate developers and lenders to risk taking on projects in the Historic Core. They apparently worked, since in the following year several developers and investment companies purchased buildings in the district for conversion to housing. As the projected number of housing units in the Historic Core increased with each new project, developers, city officials, and the Conservancy realized the difficult task of community building still lay ahead of them.

Having made their pitch to developers and lenders, the Conservancy then marketed housing conversions to potential tenants. Housing conversion developers, including Gilmore and Shomof, opened their buildings in August 2001 to 300 people taking part in a self-guided walking tour hosted by the Conservancy. Visitors from across greater Los Angeles paid $20 a person to view the conversions, some models, and other units opened by tenants. The developers and the Conservancy used the event as an opportunity to put "urban living" on display. Though the efforts of the latter successfully generated interest in the Historic Core housing conversions, the tour seemed to beg questions about the progress of the revitalization program rather than celebrate downtown living. Some visitors voiced concern over the ubiquitous presence of the homeless around the housing conversion buildings. Others wondered where and when the promised restaurants, grocery stores, cleaners, and other auxiliary services would appear (Rhone 2001).

Despite the ambivalence of the Conservancy's loft tourists, the housing conversions' high occupancy rates indicated change was underway in the Historic Core. Seeking to service the perceived spike in demand for downtown housing, developers purchased more buildings for conversion. The Conservancy reveled in the notion that the district's long derelict structures could be given new lives through adaptive reuse. However, their use of preservation as a commodity coupled with overwhelming developer interest has raised issues regarding the district's demographics, affordability, and architectural integrity.

One complaint is that the Historic Core housing conversion rents price out much of the middle class. This arises from Gilmore's success in filling his buildings, which in the short run has established his rents as the going rate in the district. An optimistic view holds that as more housing conversions charging comparable rents hit the market supply may outstrip demand and force developers to lower their rents. This is not foreseeable, however, since developers insist that high rents are necessary for maintenance and security in an area widely regarded as a dirty, high crime district.

Another issue is what some developers have termed "The Gilmore Effect." They accuse the developer of drawing attention to the Historic Core too quickly and driving up building prices in the process. Gilmore found himself the victim of his own success when he tried to purchase the Frontier Hotel in 1999. Though assessed with a value of $4 per square foot, the owners demanded fifteen times that amount (Anderton 2001). Such examples of enormously inflated property values have scared off other developers.

The prospect of developer absence in the present housing conversion market alarms the Conservancy. Amy Anderson, the Conservancy's Broadway Coordinator, worries that property owners with no development experience may attempt to "develop" their own housing conversions to maximize their investment at a time when loft apartments are popular. She fears that do-it-yourself developers will harm their buildings by cutting corners, not following historic building codes, using cheap materials, and producing a shoddy product (Anderson 2001). Such poorly rehabilitated buildings would likely be passed on by qualified developers unwilling to undo the work of the property owners, leaving the structures in near irreversible states of dereliction.

The Historic Core's property owners generally welcomed the Conservancy's enthusiasm and the City's legislation to promote housing conversions. Prior to the implementation of the Adaptive Reuse Ordinance property owners were restricted to uses permitted by existing zoning regulations in the district. These regulations created numerous obstacles for the

Figure 11. Grand Central Market

owners in making their buildings profitable. The process of bringing obsolete commercial buildings up to code and leasing office space at comparable rents to the newer class "A" buildings of Bunker Hill was a daunting task which many landlords refused. Instead they felt the returns made from ground floor retail activities justified leaving their buildings' upper floors vacant. The City's new regulations and the Conservancy's outreach efforts helped property owners realize their buildings' full potential through residential uses.

As more housing conversions were completed and occupied their new tenants engaged in the process of community building. This was initiated through the establishment of various forums including internet bulletin boards and newsletters. The urban pioneers used these media to plan and announce community events including flea markets, social mixers, and city-sponsored neighborhood meetings. Talk of local government initiatives, grievances over rent increases and management problems, gossip about new developments, and debates over neighborhood issues were also regularly aired. Three matters that dominated the forums were the lack of neighborhood services, management issues, and crime.

Most urban pioneers understood that services would be slow to appear at first. However, several told the author of their frustrations over trips to Bunker Hill for dry cleaning and four-mile journeys to the grocery store. Though many appreciated the presence of Grand Central Market, this group largely expressed indifference toward other hotel dweller-frequented services in the district (Figure 11). Instead they pined for the eventual appearance of dry cleaners, mini-markets, and upscale eateries in the vacant ground floor spaces of their buildings. These are unlikely to appear soon, however, since lenders have balked at financing such business ventures. Their qualms over funding shops and services arise from their original consternation over housing conversions. Loan officers argue that since such ventures do not have an established track record, their risk cannot be properly assessed. Some urban pioneers told the author that they did not mind traveling to adjacent districts to shop until services are established in the Historic Core. But they also mentioned that they would find life in the district less attractive without the materialization of promised services.

Discussions of management issues appeared to polarize the urban pioneers. Interviews with the author revealed that many felt content with their lofts and were willing to deal with the challenges that came with their new urban lifestyle. However, a number of urban pioneers expressed frustrations with their building's safety, security, and maintenance issues. In Fall 2001, over seventy tenants of the Hellman issued a petition to Gilmore demanding he address such problems. Disgusted by Gilmore's dismissal of their demands, several moved out the following Spring. This group included the building's tenant representatives, who told their experiences to the *Los Angeles Times*.[5] Angry urban pioneers posted their responses to the resulting article on their internet message boards, assailing it as a "hatchet piece." They suggested collusion between the former tenants and the newspaper to sensationalize the development's problems (Perez 2002).

Crime was another issue on the minds of the urban pioneers. Vigilant by nature, the pioneers experienced few instances of violent crime during their first years in the district. Instead they endured rampant property and nuisance crime, especially burglary and vandalism. One urban pioneer told the author of an episode at the Santa Fe Building where a burglar had scaled a seven-story incinerator stack to a ledge from which a neighbor's apartment was entered through an open window. The author was also informed of several unconfirmed instances where intruders used fire escapes to break into housing conversion buildings. Many urban pioneers interviewed assumed that the district's criminal element resides in its residential hotels. Some developers share this attitude, indicated by Gilmore's leasing agent who called the Frontier Hotel a "twelve-story crackhouse where bodies fall from the windows"

(Bastian 2001). Concern over the hotels has led several urban pioneers to suggest that the city assist the developer efforts to acquire them for housing conversions.

Downtown's Destitute Realm: The Universe of the Market Rate Residential Hotels

It is well known that developers have held talks with the hotel owners to negotiate the purchase of their properties. The media has jumped on rumors involving the sale of the hotels. The *New York Times* reported Gilmore was in escrow to purchase the Frontier (Anderton 2001). One local paper also erroneously reported that Gilmore had planned to convert the Rosslyn to mixed-income housing (Maese 2000). At the time of writing none of the occupied hotels have been sold, as developers have been rebuffed by inflated building prices. However, refusal of developers to pay the hotel owners' asking prices has not kept the latter group from considering selling out.

The interest created by Gilmore's planned renovation of the vacant El Dorado Hotel to tourist accommodation has caused some hotel owners to reexamine their market. Interviews with hotel managers revealed that two hotel owners were considering converting their hotels from residential to high-turnover occupancy. The manager of the Cecil, the Historic Core's largest hotel with 611 rooms, told the author that the owner plans to phase out his residential business (Garza 2001). Advertisements marketing the Cecil as a tourist hotel have recently appeared in the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Los Angeles Downtown News*, but the transition appears to be slow going as the hotel still rents by the week mostly to welfare recipients (Figure 12). The Frontier's manager hopes that the success of the housing conversions will improve the situation of the hotels. He believes that the revitalization of the district will restore the hotel to its former status, serving a clientele type it has not seen in half a century (La Foe 2001).

The prospect of hotel conversion to housing or high-turnover occupancy presents an ominous situation for the Historic Core hotel dweller population. This group has no safety net, since privately-owned and non-profit operated hotels in adjacent Skid Row boast similar occupancy rates and can not absorb those displaced from the Historic Core. This would place even more pressure on mission

Figure 12. Rear entrance, Hotel Cecil

© Ryan Fennell

Figure 13. Historic Core Residential Hotels, 2002

Cartographer: Ryan Fennell

four unit building (Table 3). This study does not address subsidized hotels in depth, since the organizations operating them have fixed their uses as low-income housing. The prospect of these hotels reverting to high turnover occupancy or being converted to apartments is unlikely. But the market is free to determine the fate of the privately-owned residential hotels. These are found throughout Downtown Los Angeles, where the largest hotels are clustered in the Historic Core along Fifth and Main Streets (Figure 13).

The units where hotel dwellers reside are found in low- and mid-rise buildings of shapes corresponding to those identified by the Conservancy as ideal for conversion to housing. The average monthly market rate hotel rent for the Historic Core is $370. Rents vary depending on the size of the unit and the amenities offered, such as breakfast and cable television. Rents also correlate to the hotel's proximity to Los Angeles Street, the western boundary of Skid Row (Table 4). Rooms vary in size between 96 square feet and 334 square feet. Most hotels offer a combination of rooms with private baths and rooms with shared ones, the former commanding higher rents (Figure 14).

Figure 14. Room with bath, Hotel Hayward

© Ryan Fennell

A reliable demographic profile of the hotel dweller

services that are already strained. One hotel security guard summarized the situation by stating that should his hotel be converted to lofts, "there would at least be 500 more nuts and lunatics on the street."

Today twenty residential hotels remain in the Historic Core, of which seventeen are operational. The hotel stock falls into two groups, market rate and subsidized. The market rate hotels are privately-owned and set their own room rates. The subsidized hotels are run by two non-profit groups, the faith-based Skid Row Housing Trust and the CRA-founded SRO Housing Corporation, and are commonly referred to as transitional housing. Their low rents are tied to Section 8 subsidies and their residents must navigate an application process to qualify for residency. The Skid Row Housing Trust operates five hotels containing a total of 282 units in the Historic Core, while the SRO Housing Corporation runs one sixty-

population does not exist, since statistics on their population are not readily available. Grossly undercounted in the 2000 Census, their hotel rooms are not treated as rental units and were therefore ignored by census takers. Using data collected from field observations, the author found the hotel dwellers to be mostly white and African-American males, aged between forty and sixty-five. Hotel managers confirmed these findings and indicated that though families are present in the hotels, the majority of hotel dwellers are middle-aged single males. Among this group are disabled, mentally ill, and welfare recipients collecting General Relief from the County and Social Security Insurance from the Federal government. Data revealing hotel dweller tenure in the district could not be obtained, since official figures do not exist and statements provided by hotel dwellers could not be considered reliable.

Hotel dwellers are generally kept in a transient mode by a hotel-imposed rule restricting their occupancy to twenty-eight days. This rule, called the "twenty-eight day shuffle" by hotel dwellers, limits them to a stay of four weeks in the same unit. The rule is a hotel owner reaction to the Rent Stabilization Ordinance, which mandates that a hotel room occupied by the same tenant for sixty days becomes a rental unit.[6] The protections afforded to renters under the law make it difficult for hotel owners to evict problematic guests. In February 2002, the Los Angeles Community Action Network (LACAN), a hotel dweller advocacy group, launched a campaign to ban the twenty-eight day rule. LACAN argues that the rule is in violation of the California Civil Code, which declares illegal the forced eviction or reregistration of a residential hotel occupant before thirty days occupancy.[7] At the time of writing the group was seeking claimants for a class action lawsuit against the residential hotel owners.

Like the urban pioneers, the hotel dwellers have their own neighborhood information network. However, theirs consists of news verbally passed second- and third-hand that is usually hearsay to begin with. A Rosslyn resident mentioned one such story to the *Los Angeles Times*, recounting how one day in October 2001, "two women were raped and murdered, and one guy was hung" at the Cecil one block south. The police were left to

Table 3. Historic Core subsidized hotels, 2002

Hotel	Operator[1]	Year Built	No. of Units
Dewey	SRHT	1914	40
Genesis	SRHT	n/a	30
Hayward	HMLP[2]	1905	459
Leonide	SRO	1905	64
Pershing	SRHT	1888	69
Sanborn	SRHT	1908	46
Senator	SRHT	1912	97
	Total Units:	805	

Sources: Skid Row Housing Trust; SRO Housing Corporation; Los Angeles County Assessor's Office

[1] HMLP=Hayward Manor LP; SRHT=Skid Row Housing Trust; SRO=SRO Housing Corporation.
[2] Receiver.

Table 4. Historic Core market rate hotels, 2002

Hotel	Year Built	No. of Units	Avg. Monthly Rent	28 Day Rule
Alexandria	1905	140	$341	Yes
Baltimore	1910	215	$308	No
Barclay	1897	160	$360	Yes
Cecil	1924	611	$459	No
Frontier	1912	424	$350	Yes
Hayward	1905	66[1]	$300[2]	No
Huntington	1910	196	$500	Yes
King Edward	1905	150	$240	No
Rosslyn	1923	264	$420	Yes
Vogue	1900	n/a	n/a	n/a
Yorkshire	1909	98	$440	No
	Total Units:	2324		

Sources: Hotel managers; Los Angeles County Assessor's Office

[1] Hayward has 525 total units, of which 66 are market rate.
[2] Rent for market rate units.

Note: n/a = not available

Table 5. Violent, Property and Nuisance Crime Totals in the Historic Core, 1999-2001

Year	Violent Crime[1]			Property Crime[1]			Nuisance Crime[2]		
	Assault	Murder	Rape	Robbery[3]	Burglary[4]	Auto Theft	Narcotics	Vice	Other[5]
1999	275	3	15	214	88	52	649	30	795
2000	303	3	22	199	92	66	520	27	439
2001	310	5	19	235	92	67	676	28	512

[1] Total reported crimes and attempts.
[2] Total arrests.
[3] Counts only street robberies.
[4] Counts only residential burglaries.
[5] Includes vandalism, loitering, public urination, etc.

Source: Los Angeles Police Department, *Selected Crimes and Attempts by Reporting District*, 1999-2001; Los Angeles Police Department, *Arrests by Reporting District*, 1999-2001.

clarify, informing the reporter that while one woman was found murdered, no one was raped or hung (Ferrell 2001).

Crime is a major concern among the hotel dwellers. Since they possess few material goods, hotel dwellers are less susceptible to property crime than the urban pioneers. However, the hotel dwellers are more susceptible to violent crime committed by other hotel dwellers or the homeless (Table 5). Gangs have also established themselves in the Historic Core, using its hotels as centers for the transshipment and retail of narcotics (Figure 15). Criminal activity persists in the district despite occasional Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) sweeps and the presence of the BID security forces.

Criminal activity in and around the hotels is perpetuated due in part to the state's silent policy of dumping parolees in the Historic Core. California law requires that parolees be released to the county in which they last resided.[8] The Historic Core is the preferred point of release for Los Angeles County since it lies far from politically active districts and suburbs. Following discharge parolees are often housed at taxpayer expense in the hotels, where the temptation to lapse back into their old ways is enormous. The convicts removed from the Historic Core hotel dweller population are replaced by parolees deposited in the district on a daily basis (Steinman 2002).

Despite the city's much publicized attempt to drive the drug trade from the Historic Core in the early 1990s, narcotics dealing and trafficking persists. Today its center is no longer the Alexandria, but the corner of Fifth and Main Streets one block east. Here crack, heroin, and marijuana are sold openly to the anger of the hotel managers, who feel powerless to fight the dealers. The Frontier's manager told the author of one dealer who, following his eviction, set up shop across the street in front of the Rosslyn (La Foe 2001). Drug-related murders on and around hotel premises are common. Narcotics activity also persists inside the hotels. During hotel walk-throughs the author often found marijuana smoke and spent syringes in hallways. The drug epidemic frustrates the hotel managers and many residents.

Figure 15. 5th and Hill Street gang tag, El Dorado Hotel façade.

© Ryan Fennell

Figure 16. Hotel Barclay

© Ryan Fennell

However, the LAPD and the BID security force have yet to improve the situation in the Historic Core, where in the flippant words of one Rosslyn resident, "ninety-five percent of the people are crackheads" (Ferrell 2001).

Many urban pioneers hold a similar perception of the Historic Core's transient community. In conversations with the author several decried the hotel dweller presence in the district and blamed its high property crime rate on their low-income neighbors. One Hellman resident even suggested they be forcibly relocated from the district and demanded that the nearby Hotel Barclay be converted to lofts (Figure 16). Similar sentiments have appeared on urban pioneer internet discussion groups and bulletin boards. Though such attitudes were not reflective of the population as a whole, at the completion of this study a few well-connected pioneers had begun to lobby the city council for action to be taken against the residential hotels in the name of neighborhood improvement.

In May 2002, the CRA adopted a new redevelopment plan for the City Center project area (incorporating the Historic Core and adjacent downtown districts) that addresses the displacement of the hotel dweller population.[9] The plan contains a provision for the relocation of displaced persons and families of low- and moderate-incomes stating that the displaced shall not be relocated until suitable housing units are located. It goes on to declare that the agency will pay for the rehabilitation of housing units within the city should suitable units not be found (Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles 2002, 9). This is a tall order in view of the city's current housing crisis, in which high land prices, overcrowding, and the loss of affordable housing through condemnation and demolition are recurrent motifs.[10] The redevelopment plan also contains provisions for the retention of existing affordable housing within the project area. However, the plan states that the CRA will provide funding to preserve only affordable housing units "assisted or subsidized by public entities [that] are threatened with imminent conversion to market rates" (Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles 2002, 13-14). This provision protects

subsidized hotels from conversion, but it leaves market rate hotels, holding the majority of the district's low-income housing units, available for developer acquisition and rehabilitation.

Developers have watched the unfolding scenario with interest. They have been hesitant to acquire hotels for conversion due to inflated property values and the high cost of renovating such structures.[11] However, the notion that hotel conversions will make the district more marketable to the general public has made developers reassess the short-term costs of hotel conversions. Additionally, the perceived benefit of crime reduction through the forced relocation of the hotel dweller population has led some developers to seek partnerships with hotel owners. Ultimately the rehabilitation of the residential hotels as middle- and upper-income housing will eliminate low-income housing units in an area of high demand, and displace a community in the process.

Conclusions and Implications

On the surface the Historic Core of Los Angeles appears to be in the midst of a transformation. Rehabilitation projects have restored some of the district's venerable buildings to their former glory, albeit for different uses. This in turn has attracted a new class of residents, connoisseurs of urban living and students of community building. Planned housing projects project the critical mass necessary for the district's revitalization. However, several underlying problems exist that may bring negative consequences to housing conversion developers, the urban pioneers, and the hotel dwellers.

Developers are faced with a potential housing glut. The popularity of the existing housing conversions has facilitated the creation of more residential projects, but at the expense of services. Lender hesitance in financing business ventures contradicts developer promises of mixed-use developments. Failure to deliver services to the Historic Core will dissuade suburbanites to move to the city and embitter the resident urban pioneer population. The situation has not yet deteriorated into the CRA's Spring Street experience of the early 1990s. However, developers may find themselves in a similar position if the service variable in the revitalization equation is left unsolved.

Despite the odds, the urban pioneers have created a community in the Historic Core. This group has presented developers and the City with a reasonable wish list centered on better services. Several have stated that their patience is limited and that they will leave the Historic Core if their desires are not met. However, housing has taken priority over the introduction of services. Though the housing conversions are marketed as mixed-use developments, their residential-to-commercial square foot ratio reflects low-density suburban developments more than the central city. Some former urban pioneers, angry that the promised retail and services have not materialized, have already decamped back to the suburbs. Developers and the City must raise business to the same priority level as housing. Otherwise, as housing production continues to outstrip retail and service introduction, more disgruntled urban pioneers will abandon the neighborhood.

The success of privately-funded developments has seen the City take a more passive role in promoting housing conversions than in past decades. This has also enabled the financing of more projects, but lenders have not been as enthusiastic in supporting uses other than residential. The City should create financial incentives to lure services downtown similar to those used to draw corporations to the suburbs. Most small businesses do not possess the necessary capital to finance their entry into the Historic Core. Lenders have shown that they will not readily back retail and service endeavors in the district, and for this reason the City must actively involve itself in the revitalization process. This is an important consideration, since the Historic Core does not exist in a vacuum, and the outcome of

redevelopment efforts there will impact decisions made regarding the regeneration of other districts, both within downtown and in other parts of the city.

The hotel dwellers have the most to lose since the conversion of the hotels will remove their only practical housing option. This group would then be forced to compete for space in the missions or the subsidized hotels, two services whose resources are already in high demand. Though it is conjecture to suggest that developers will acquire the residential hotels and convert them into middle- and upper-income housing or high-turnover occupancy at present, such scenarios have played out in the past with the City's blessing. The continued existence of the subsidized hotels means the poor will never be completely expelled from the Historic Core. This suggests that typical gentrification patterns will not manifest themselves in the district, since the spatial diffusion of housing conversions and subsidized hotels limits the potential for segregation and succession. However, the removal of the district's most pervasive form of affordable housing is likely to impact the district's revitalization. Should the hotel dwellers be forced into the street, the proximity of the missions and other support services give them little impetus to leave the general area. Therefore the retention of the privately-owned residential hotels as low-income housing is imperative since these buildings are necessary ingredients for the creation of a truly mixed-income community.

The developers and the city have both expressed their desire for the redevelopment of the Historic Core as a mixed-income community. However, provisions for the inclusion of affordable housing in some housing conversions are not enough to serve the existing low-income population residing downtown. For this reason it is vital that the residential hotels have their use preserved. One method of retaining the existing low-income housing stock is by converting residential hotels into subsidized housing. This may be accomplished through a public-private partnership where the CRA helps an established housing trust obtain the properties. A possible added benefit is a reduction in crime, since the subsidized hotels are generally more secure than their market rate counterparts. The retention of the Historic Core residential hotels for low-income earners will lessen the severity of the city's housing crisis through the preservation of affordable housing in Downtown Los Angeles, an area of high demand.

About the Author

Ryan Fennell spent six months between December 2000 and March 2002 studying redevelopment in Downtown Los Angeles. He earned his B. A. in Geography from California State University, Long Beach in 1999 and his M. A. in Geography from The University of Texas at Austin in 2002. Currently he works in Austin as a Historic Preservation Planner for the Texas Department of Transportation.

Notes

1 For an example of the City's struggles to introduce mixed-use development to the Vermont Knolls district see "Who's Riot Was This, Anyway?" in Fulton, 2001.

2 The Hellman Building was named after I. W. Hellman, co-founder of the Farmers & Merchants' Bank and developer of numerous commercial buildings in Downtown Los Angeles between 1880 and 1910.

[3] This approach has yielded limited success. During a visit to the Old Bank District in January 2002 the author found a popular coffeehouse and a restaurant under construction while the most of the development's storefronts remained vacant.

[4] Adaptive reuse projects are defined by the ordinance as any change of use in buildings constructed prior to 1 July 1974 or listed on the National Register of Historic Places, the California Register of Historical Resources or the City of Los Angeles List of Historic-Cultural Monuments. The chosen date is surprising since it effectively allows the reuse of non-conforming structures within historic districts.

[5] For a detailed account of the Hellman Building controversy see Krikorian 2002.

[6] Los Angeles Municipal Code, XV.1-151.02.

[7] California Civil Code, Section 1940.1.

[8] California Penal Code, Section 3003(a).

[9] The City Center Redevelopment Project Area was established with the adoption of the redevelopment plan. City Center was carved out of the Central Business District Redevelopment Project Area following a lawsuit capping the CRA's tax increment for that project area.

[10] For more a detailed analysis of the affordable housing situation in Los Angeles see Los Angeles Housing Crisis Task Force, 2000.

[11] The conversion of hotels to residential apartments typically involves major interior demolition and renovation due to their small unit sizes.

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

Creation Myths for the Preservation of Tsumago Post-town

PETER SIEGENTHALER

Looking at one historic preservation site as a microcosm of Japan at large, this study investigates the homogeneity and implied conflict expressed in tourist brochures presenting the history of the local preservation movement. In the post-town of Tsumago in Nagano Prefecture, known for Japan's first citizens' movement to promote local historic preservation, three versions of the preservation movement's history—based on *furusato* romanticism, professionalism, and idealism—each mark the publication of three separate institutional sources. These variations suggest differing interpretations of the influence of successful preservation and present lessons for the better understanding of historic preservation nationwide.

Although the recent importing of gender-bending anime and erotic *manga* comics, the Iron Chef and fashionable "cuteness" has eroded the image to some extent, it may still be said that the popular view of Japan in the West remains one of a homogenized whole, a buttoned-down factory where for the past four or five decades all efforts—social, political, and economic—have been directed at the same clearly defined goals of economic development at home and political neutrality abroad. Such a perspective has been, in fact, a cornerstone of the dominant rhetoric shaping Japanese views in the postwar era. Foreign scholars have often commented on the pervasiveness of this Japanese self-image. At the beginning of her recent book on controversial memorial rites for aborted fetuses, Hardacre (1997, 9) notes a "deeply entrenched" view that over the course of the postwar period Japanese society has been "exceptionally harmonious." Discussing the legacies of Japan's colonial past and present-day relations with its Asian neighbors, Yoneyama (1999, 4-5) writes of the effects of "political exigencies" that have "rendered the nation's multiethnic, multiracial, and multicultural constituencies invisible." The received narrative, she finds, has been one of "totality, stability, confidence, and universal truthfulness." In contrast, a large body of research on Japan seeks to pursue what Dower terms the "heretical" endeavor of "challeng[ing] the popular emphasis…on harmony, consensus, [and] the 'group model' as the central axis of Japanese thought and practice" (Dower 1993, 4). Overcoming a common reading of postwar Japanese society as orderly, undifferentiated, and without division is one of the first tasks for anyone seeking to look closely at Japan's social and cultural history in the postwar period.[1]

By their nature, preserved heritage sites—most often framed as representations of a single, strongly asserted national identity (Winks 1976)—are particularly susceptible to easy integration into a view of the recent past that emphasizes harmony between the actors involved in their preservation. In the context of the political exigencies of postwar Japan, consensus and cooperation are commonly assumed to be the dominant models for Japanese heritage preservation (Ehrentraut 1995). This paper strives to investigate such assumptions. Using a selection of materials readily available in Japanese at the site, it attempts to open up the discussion of what was at stake as Tsumago, a historic town in the foothills of the Southern Japan Alps, was defined as important, evaluated for its suitability for preservation, and ultimately restored in the 1960s and early 1970s. Present in the historical record are varying explanations of the origins of Tsumago's preservation. Through an exploration of the historiography of the Tsumago preservation movement, we can see the possibilities, both missed and realized, that historic preservation presented to the people involved at the time and in the years since.

Although the title of this article refers to "myths," its concern is not with the refutation of untruths. Rather, what is discussed here are three widely distributed accounts produced by the central institutions involved in the town's contemporary presentation as a tourist site—that is, accounts current in the informational materials available just a year or two ago—that describe the process by which the initial preservation of the town was begun in the mid-1960s. Like any myth, each of these versions in its own way transcends its own truthfulness, realigning what common sense tells us about the past. Each is a construction assembled using materials drawn from the historical record, but in their emphases they highlight quite different aspects of past events. Each is a piece of historical writing in itself, with its own implications for our understanding of conditions in the present day.

Tsumago's Setting and History

Tsumago post-town is administratively a part of Nagiso-machi, a town in Nagano Prefecture in the Southern Japan Alps.[2] For more than two centuries, Tsumago was one of

eleven post-towns on the Kiso Valley section of the Nakasendô, the "mid-mountains highway" established at the opening of the Tokugawa era (1603–1868) and running between the nominal capital of Kyoto and the political power center of Edo (now Tokyo) (Figure 1). Tsumago itself was established in the early seventeenth century by the gathering together of local residents drawn by the promise of economic benefits of the newly rebuilt highway. Until the Tokugawa highway system was eclipsed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by competition from new modes of transportion (chiefly rail and truck), Tsumago stood as a collection of inns, restaurants, and shops catering to the Nakasendô's travelers.

The Tokugawa-era highway system, with five main roads, numerous secondary roads, and well over one hundred official post-towns, served the heart of the main islands with transport and communication. Messengers from the central government were frequent travelers, as were other officials, pilgrims, merchants, and local nobles (*daimyô*). The system of alternate attendance (*sankin kôtai*) instituted early in the Tokugawa era required the *daimyô* to reside part-time in the capital and part-time in their home region, prompting much of the heaviest use of the roads. The post-towns were generally organized around two main inns, the *honjin* and the *waki-honjin*. Transport was closely controlled, and the *daimyô* and their many retainers (often numbering between 150 and 300 people) were required to travel via the five major highways, staying at registered post-towns at every stop.

With the abolition of the system of alternate attendance in 1862, the 1868 Meiji Restoration, which returned the imperial house to the center of power, and the construction in the later nineteenth century of rail lines that bypassed the valley, Tsumago like many former post-towns fell into decline. The entire mountain region suffered economically and, as was common in all of Japan's wooden cities and towns, fires in 1825, 1868, 1921, and 1933 each destroyed between sixteen and thirty-eight buildings in Tsumago. Ironically, some measure of relief came during the Pacific War (1931–45), when rural areas offered relief from dire urban conditions and rural towns sheltered many people fleeing the cities. As the economy improved nationally in the 1950s, however, those same rural areas began losing population at a remarkable rate. Between 1955 and 1985, the population of Nagiso-machi as a whole declined from a wartime and postwar high of about 11,000 residents to barely 6,100.

The Tsumago preservation district stretches along a short section of the Tokugawa-era highway and is comprised of 184 buildings, as well as "surroundings of historical scenic beauty" (Nagiso-machi Board of Education 1993, 14–15). The town's buildings date for the most part from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The current preservation district is the nation's largest in area, measuring 1,245.4 hectares (more than 3,000 acres) and stretching at its longest 5.5 kilometers north to south and 3.8 kilometers east to west (Figure 2). Much of that area, however, is comprised of the hillsides that provide scenic backdrops for the heritage buildings; the settlement itself is relatively compact and self-contained.

Of the 184 buildings within the district, more than 100 have been substantially repaired since restoration and conservation work began in the mid-1960s (Figure 3). The first to be restored was the *waki-honjin*, named "Okuya," which was built in 1877 of the local *hinoki* cypress. It was opened as the village history museum in 1967. The *honjin*, lost to fire about 1900, was rebuilt in 1995 using original plans and drawings and is intended now to recreate closely the building's state as of the early 1830s. In the view of the tourism industry, the restoration of Tsumago has been an unquestioned success: according to figures provided by the municipal government, about 18,000 tourists visited the town in 1967, and in 1972 well over a half-million made visits there. By the early 1990s, the number of tourist visitors was nearing one million per year, a high that has diminished only slightly with the economic recession that has plagued Japan since early in that decade.

Figure 1. Map of the Kiso District in Central Honshû



Source: Adapted from Nagiso-machi Tourism Section, n.d., *A Short Guide to Tsumago*.

Figure 2. In this photo, looking south from the Tsumago castle ruins toward the town, nearly the entire viewshed of the valley and hillsides are within the historic district. The large building in the center foreground is the historical museum associated with the *waki-honjin*.

Figure 3. The November Bunka Bunsei festival brings many visitors to Tsumago to enjoy a parade along the Nakasendō against the backdrop of the town's heritage architecture.



Japanese government programs for the preservation of architectural heritage began as a counter force that sought to correct some of the early excesses of first a revolutionary, then a modernizing zeal. Including an initial period dominated by the forced separation of Buddhism from Shinto (Ketelaar 1990), in the first decades after the 1868 Meiji Restoration the ruling oligarchs rejected many of the established anchors of Japanese society in favor of a program of "civilization and enlightenment" (*bunmei kaika*) based on the adoption of social, economic, and political structures drawn from Western models. The resulting combination of governmental persecution and neglect weakened Buddhist organizations in particular and resulted in the destruction of uncounted numbers of Buddhist artifacts, the dismantling of more than forty thousand Buddhist temples nationwide, and the widespread export of antiquities. After more than three decades of losses sustained by the nation's cultural fabric, legislation was passed in 1897 to protect Buddhist temples, Shinto shrines, and the artworks contained within them. In the twentieth century, a series of cultural properties laws and amendments have steadily expanded protection: to a wider range of significant buildings and works of fine and applied arts, to vernacular architecture, crafts and craft techniques, the borrowed scenery surrounding Kyoto and other former capitals, and, most recently, to significant works of nineteenth- and twentieth-century architecture not covered by the earlier laws (Henrichsen 1998; Siegenthaler 1999b; Yamasaki 1994; Liebs 1998).

In the late 1960s Japan experienced the advent of nationwide citizens' movements (manifested, among other ways, in antipollution lawsuits, protests against the construction of industrial plants and airports, and resistance to the Japanese role in the war in Vietnam) that at their core questioned the government's emphasis on economic progress over citizens' health and lifestyle. By the early 1970s, the government responded with strong antipollution and consumer rights legislation (McKean 1981; Maclachlan 2002), and policies for the preservation of open space, historical sites, and cultural assets were expanded as well. Groups of heritage buildings were brought into the legal sphere in 1975, with an amendment to the 1950 cultural properties law that outlined procedures for the establishment of a Preservation District for a Group of Historic Buildings (Dentô-teki Kenzôbutsu-gun Hozon Chiku) (Hohn 1997). Building on local organizing that had begun a decade or more earlier, Tsumago was among the first national-level preservation districts established under the 1975 amendment.

Myth #1: Tsumago as Dreamland

The first expression of the historiography of Tsumago rests on the sentimentalized and romanticized concept of the *furusato*. The *furusato* has been a ubiquitous part of Japanese cultural life for more than three decades. A central trope in postwar Japan's nostalgic search for its national identity, *furusato* literally means "old village," but it is more properly translated as "home" or "native place" (Robertson 1988). Rich with resonance, the term has associations with the nation's premodern past, rurality, craftsmanship, and tradition (Siegenthaler 1999a, 1999b). For nearly two decades beginning in the 1970s, it was among "the most popular symbols used by Japanese politicians, city planners, and advertisers" (Robertson 1988, 494), selling everything from government policies to bath soap. As Ivy (1995) demonstrates, however, while *furusato* is one of the first terms that comes to mind when rural tourism is mentioned, the marketing of heritage sites in big cities and small towns alike has drawn on many of the same characteristics encapsulated in the trope of the *furusato* in order to attract visitors to the sites.

Not surprisingly, the municipal tourism authorities in Nagiso-machi have exploited the allure of the *furusato* in selling Tsumago as a tourist destination. The recent publications of

Figure 4. The cover of the tourist association's guide map from the late 1990s markets the town based on a romantic vision of its history.



Source: Nagiso-machi Tourism Association, c. 1998

the municipal tourism association draw on many of the now-standard elements involved in presentations of rural Japan. Without using the term *furusato* itself in the pamphlets under study here, the tourist office publications are almost a textbook case for how to trade on the attraction of *furusato* imagery. To take one example, the front cover of the map handed out recently at the shops and sites of Tsumago (Nagiso-machi Tourism Association c. 1998) features a nostalgic and romantic view of Old Japan (Figure 4). The architecture stands for a world apart from the everyday, and while the stone steps look treacherous in the mist, the lights of the inns promise security and an old-style hospitality.

The rest of the map's illustrations and text further refine this image of the town. The quarter-folded brochure opens out to a sketch showing the locations of Nagiso's major sights for tourists. Around its borders are photos of some of those attractions; among them, the photograph of Tsumago stands out for being misty where the others are bright and clear, for displaying a place of cultured solitude—a nearly empty streetscape—where the others more often show either majestic nature or groups of families enjoying the outdoors. Tsumago's primary importance to the town's tourism industry is shown by the space given to it in the publication. A layout with fourteen photographs features the various attractions of the preservation district, while a tagline, inviting the visitor to a "return trip to the time of first love," highlights the romance to be found in the old town. Despite rather prosaic illustrations of the sights to be found in the town, the accompanying text retains a focus on the romance that waits to be discovered there.

A similar treatment of the town's sites is contained in an earlier but more extensive pamphlet, "Nagiso no Tabi" (Nagiso Journey), also published by the tourism association (Nagiso-machi Tourism Association 1990). In this thirty-six-page introduction to the town's tourist sites, Tsumago's place as the leading attraction of Nagiso-machi is broadcast by its dominance of the cover and its prominence as the first site presented inside the booklet. Again the theme is sentimental escape: Tsumago is presented as "a town that gives dreams and romance to the traveler."

Noteworthy for this discussion, the process by which the post-town was preserved is only cursorily mentioned in these two tourism association publications. The later annotated map offers no information about the town's recent history. In the earlier brochure, the preservation process is first presented in the passive voice—that is, as an event without agency—while a further mention of the preservation movement reassures the reader that a hallmark of Tsumago's restoration is that the residents' life and lifestyle have continued unchanged during the course of the work. In this, the most widely circulated reading of the process by which the site was defined and preserved, social unity prevails: everyone wins, because their interests are complementary and not in conflict. That is, the visitor is treated to a unique experience in a place apart from the pedestrian concerns of the everyday, the nation's identity is affirmed through the maintenance of important symbols of its history, and local residents receive income from tourists without suffering an interruption in the natural passage of their community's life.

Myth #2: Tsumago and Figures of Authority

Another view of the town and its preservation is given in the materials of the Tsumago Wo Ai Suru kai, the Tsumago Protectors' Association or Friends of Tsumago. The preservation movement in Tsumago was formally institutionalized in this citizens' group with its incorporation in 1968. At about this time, as well, a basic set of rules for the maintenance during preservation activities and beyond of the former post-town's visual appearance was written and enacted into law (Nagiso-machi Board of Education 1993). This association

remains the principal organization overseeing the preservation district. Membership today is mandatory: all property owners are automatically members of the association.

The Friends of Tsumago pamphlet (Nagiso-machi Municipal Preservation Response Board 1997) is also readily available to the visitor and gives considerable attention to the history of the preservation process itself (Figure 5). Its overview of the history of the town draws a straight line from the area's past in prehistory, through its long-standing role in regional and national transport and communication, to its more recent place in postwar Japanese cultural politics as a "leader" and "living example of practice" in a nationwide movement to preserve townscapes (13).

Most striking about this history of Tsumago's preservation is its emphasis on relatively technical aspects of preservation and architectural history and its casting of town leaders and outside experts as the driving force behind the preservation movement. The publication asserts Tsumago's leadership in Japanese preservation: the post-town's unique place in the movement is said to consist of redefining what should be preserved and how best to preserve those elements. As they envision the town's restoration, the leaders of Tsumago's preservation expanded the view of "existing cultural assets and objects for protection" from "details" to "facades," finally including as well the town's scenic environment (Nagiso-machi Municipal Preservation Response Board 1997, 11).

Figures of authority, in this narrative, are juxtaposed against a reluctant local populace. In preparing for the town's restoration, Nagiso-machi's leaders solicited the opinions of "experienced scholars" and "experts." The first organization mentioned in relation to local residents is not the Friends of Tsumago itself, nor a precursor organization to express local concern for the protection of the town, but what is called a "village preservation explanation

Figure 5. A representative page from the Friends of Tsumago pamphlet emphasizes technical aspects of preservation over the romance of the visit.



Source: Nagiso-machi Municipal Preservation Response Board, 1997.

purposes of developing a regional travel demand model. The costs and benefits of synthetic data creation are outside the scope of this paper. However, the key factors to consider when comparing regions have a direct bearing on this study.

In 2000, Walker and Reeder developed a regional travel demand model using transferable data based on a compilation of Texas travel survey trip rates. In confirming the appropriateness of their data source, they relied on household vehicle trip rates and the proportion of those vehicle trips by trip purpose. Household size and household income were also key variables. A 2002 study investigating the transferability of the Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey (NPTS) Data to Regional and Local Scales (Reuscher et al) found household income and the number of household vehicles to be critical in the determination of transferability. Greaves (2000) relied upon average household size, vehicles, workers, age, gender, and proportion of 0-vehicle households to determine the transferability of NPTS data to the Baton Rouge region.

While the Wilmington MPO does not plan to build a travel demand model using the South Jersey data, a comparison of these two data sets using the variables found to be significant in transferability studies was performed to confirm the appropriateness of using the South Jersey data to understand the impact of excluding children's travel from the Wilmington household travel survey on household trip rates.

Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of Wilmington and South Jersey, as captured in each household travel survey. As indicated in that table, the Wilmington data compares favorably to the South Jersey data with regard to average household size, vehicles, income, and proportion of 0-vehicle households. The South Jersey data reflects a slightly older population (average age of 45 in South Jersey compared to 37 in Wilmington), a disparity that corresponds with a lower average of household workers in South Jersey. Given that the purpose of this paper is to investigate travel by household members under the age of 16 and the focus on the younger travelers in South Jersey, the impact of the older population may affect the magnitude of children's trip in the overall South Jersey data set, but not the general travel trends of children themselves.

Table 1. Demographic Comparison.

	WILMINGTON N=1,027	SOUTH JERSEY N=1,460
Household Size (avg.)	2.30	2.25
Household Vehicles (avg.)	1.70	1.80
% 0-vehicles	7.4%	8.4%
Household Workers (avg.)	1.47	1.06
Income – < $25k	27.5%	24.3%
$25k-<$50k	31.0%	31.9%
$50k-<$75k	17.7%	23.4%
$75k+	23.8%	20.4%
Age (avg.)	36.97	44.72
% Female	53.3%	51.8%

Sources: Cape Fear Regional Household Travel Survey, weighted, and Transportation for the 21st Century Household Travel Survey, weighted.

The second comparison of data sets was in terms of the reported trip making. Using the Texas model (Walker and Reeder), the next comparison focused on vehicle trip rates and the proportion of vehicle trips based on trip purpose. The Wilmington data had a higher overall average daily household trip rate than the subset of South Jersey data reflecting

travel by those age 16– only (7.89 compared to 7.68 – not shown in Table 2) as well as a higher average daily household vehicle trip rate (7.38 compared to 6.73). Even when travel is broken out into the standard groupings of home-based work (HBW), home-based other (HBO), and non-home based work (NHB), the Wilmington data consistently showed a higher average household daily trip rate in all categories as compared to the South Jersey travel by age 16–. This was attributed to the higher proportion of elderly in South Jersey. However, a large portion of the Wilmington growth is attributable to senior citizens, so the South Jersey data may reflect future trip rates that can be expected in the Wilmington region. In terms of the proportion of vehicle trips by trip purpose, the Wilmington data had 7% fewer HBO trips as compared to South Jersey. However, the proportions were fairly consistent on the HBW and NHB trips.

Table 2. Comparison of Household Travel.

SOURCE	HOME-BASED WORK	HOME-BASED OTHER	NON-HOME BASED	TOTAL
Wilmington	1.65	3.33	2.40	7.38
South Jersey (16+)	1.12	3.17	1.77	6.06
South Jersey (All)	1.12	3.69	1.92	6.73
Wilmington	22.4%	45.1%	32.5%	100%
South Jersey (16+)	18.6%	52.3%	29.2%	100%
South Jersey (All)	16.7%	54.8%	28.5%	100%

Sources: All vehicle trips reported in both the Cape Fear Regional Household Travel Survey, weighted, and Transportation for the 21st Century Household Travel Survey, weighted. Home-based work trips include only those trips that begin at home and end at the work destination (or vice-versa). Home-based other trips include those trips that begin at home and end at a non-work destination (or vice-versa). Non-home based trips include those trips that begin and end at non-home locations.

Demographic Characteristics of Children

The South Jersey survey included demographic and travel behavior data from 1,460 households and 3,291 persons. Of these household members, 16% or 526 were under the age of 16. This section presents basic demographic information about those children to provide a framework for analyzing the travel patterns. The demographic information includes age, student and disability status. Reported travel mode for the school trip is also included. This information was obtained from the head of household during the initial "recruitment" interview.

For purposes of analysis, the children were grouped into four categories: ages 0 to 4 (pre-school), ages 5 to 8 (elementary), ages 9 to 12 (pre-teen), and ages 13 to 15 (teen). When categorized, the distribution of children included 24% of preschool age, 27% elementary students, 27% pre-teens and 22% teens.

Of the 526 children included in the South Jersey dataset, two were reported to have disabilities: one with muscular dystrophy and using a wheelchair, the other with dyslexia. Eighty-three percent of the children attended school or daycare. Those that did not were primarily in the "preschool" group (two children were age 5). Almost half of the children were in grades K through 6 (47%), while 27% were in the higher grades. Seventeen percent of the children did not attend any type of school (those mentioned earlier), 6% were in preschool, and 4% in daycare. Five percent of the children were home-schooled.

This information means that of all respondents under age 16, 17% did not attend school, 5% were home-schooled, and the remainder (78%) attended school outside the home at some level (including daycare or preschool). For those 78% that attended some type of

school, their typical mode of travel to school was obtained. Table 3 shows a distribution of typical mode to school, along with the average age of the student using that mode. In the South Jersey region, 38% of children attending school traveled there by school bus. Twenty-eight percent were taken to school in a private automobile, while 16% walked. In terms of mode to school by age, there was a statistical difference in the age of automobile passengers (8.0 years) and those traveling by school bus (9.8 years) compared to those traveling to school by walk, bike, or public transit (all older).

Table 3. Typical Mode to School.

MODE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	MEAN AGE	STD. ERR.
Walk	64	15.5%	10.73	0.39
Bicycle	14	3.4%	11.02	0.80
Auto/van/SUV passenger	114	27.6%	8.00	0.39
Transit Bus	54	13.0%	10.48	0.41
School bus	157	38.1%	9.83	0.26
Refused	10	2.4%	8.37	1.31
Total	413	100.0%		

Source: SJTPO 2000 Travel Survey, weighted. Base: 413 respondents under the age of 16 that attend school outside the home.

Travel Characteristics of Children

The South Jersey survey obtained trip characteristics for 1,626 trips reported for respondents under the age of 16. (The survey methodology called for parents to report travel for all children, although children between the ages of 12 and 16 were asked to complete their own travel diaries). The average daily person trip rate for children in the South Jersey region was 3.09, compared to an overall trip rate of 3.41 average daily person trips when travel by all household members is considered. As indicated in Figure 1, 9% of the children reported no travel for a 24-hour period, while almost half (44%) reported making 1 to 2 trips during the 24-hour travel period. Almost one-third (29%) reported making 3 or 4 trips, and 17% reported making between 5 and 9 trips on the travel day.

Figure 1. Number of Reported Trips



Source: SJTPO 2000 Travel Survey, weighted. Base: All trips by respondents under the age of 16.

Table 4 shows the average number of trips by age cohort. Children under the age of 5 had the lowest trip rate (2.44 compared to 3.09 overall). Teenagers (age 13 to 15) had the highest reported trip rate of 3.49 trips per person.

The majority of trips by these young travelers were to return home (26%), to attend school (23%), to eat meals out (15%), and for social/recreational purposes (10%). The full distribution of trips by trip purpose is shown in Table 5.

The distribution of reported trips in terms of home-based school, home-based other, and non-home based trip purposes is shown in Figure 2, for all children as well as by the

Table 4. Trips by Age Group.

AGE GROUP	N	MEAN	STD. ERR.
Ages 0 to 4	128	2.44	0.19
Ages 5 to 8	140	3.24	0.16
Ages 9 to 12	144	3.20	0.14
Ages 13 to 15	115	3.49	0.20
Total	526	3.09	0.09

Source: SJTPO 2000 Travel Survey, weighted. Base: All respondents under the age of 16.

Table 5. Trip Purpose.

ACTIVITY	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
Other in-home activities	417	25.6%
School at regular place	366	22.5%
Eat meals	240	14.7%
Social/recreation/entertainment	168	10.4%
Drop off/pick up someone	120	7.4%
Shopping	116	7.2%
Other family/personal business	75	4.6%
Visit friends/relatives	61	3.7%
School activity at other place	24	1.5%
Change of mode	15	0.9%
Religious or civic	14	0.8%
Doctor/dentist/other professional	12	0.7%
Total	1626	100.0%

Source: SJTPO 2000 Travel Survey, weighted. Base: All trips by respondents under the age of 16.

Figure 2. Trip Purpose by Age Groups.



Source: SJTPO 2000 Travel Survey, weighted. Base: All trips by respondents under the age of 16.

specific age groups. Home-based school (HBS) trips include those that begin at home and end at school or vice-versa; home-based other (HBO) trips include those that begin at home and end at a non-school location, and non-home based (NHB) trips are those that do not begin or end at home. As shown in that figure, 40% of all trips by these children were home-based school trips, 42% were home-based other, and 18% non-home based. There is variation by age group:

· Home-based School (HBS) Trips: The youngest children (the pre-school group of respondents ages 0 to 4) only showed 20% of their trips in this category. This is consistent with the earlier finding that 17% of this age group does not attend school. Pre-Teens (ages 9 to 12) recorded the highest proportion of HBS trips at 50% of their reported trips.

· Home-based Other (HBO) Trips: 59% of the pre-school aged trips were for Home-based other purposes. This compares to 42% of elementary aged respondents, 35% of pre-teen respondents, and 36% of teenagers.

· Non-home Based (NHB) Trips: The younger children had more non-home based trips (21% and 20% compared to 18% overall). The older children (ages 10 to 15) reported a lower proportion of non-home based trips (15% and 16% respectively).

In terms of travel mode, most trips (61%) were as auto passengers, 23% using the school bus, and 14% walking. This also varied by age group. Auto (passenger) was the dominant mode for all travel, regardless of age. The highest proportion of walk and bike trips were by teenagers (ages 13 to 15), while pre-teens (ages 9 to 12) had the highest proportion of school bus trips. This distribution is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Mode Usage by Age Groups



Source: SJTPO 2000 Travel Survey, weighted. Base: All trips by respondents under the age of 16.

Twenty-three percent of all trips by children were reported to be unaccompanied, meaning that no other household member traveled with them. Figure 4 shows the distribution of travel party size for these trips reported by children. The average travel party size for all trips was 2.5 persons.

Figure 4. Number in Travel Party.



Source: SJTPO 2000 Travel Survey, weighted. Base: All trips by respondents under the age of 16.

Table 6 shows the average travel party size by age group. Travel party size decreased as age increased, with the larger groups reported for the youngest children (averaging 2.83 persons). The travel party size for the "teens" (ages 13 to 15) was statistically lower than that reported for all other age groups. Travel party size for children ages 9 to 12 was also statistically different from the other age groups.

Of all reported trips by children, 23% were unaccompanied. Of those children reporting an unaccompanied trip, most (80%) were for the older children (age 9 and older) and 20% were for children ages 5 to 8. The travel modes associated with these unaccompanied trips were mainly school bus trips (67%) and walk trips (24%).

Table 6. Average Travel Party Size by Age Group.

AGE GROUP	N	MEAN	STD. ERR.
Ages 0 to 4	312	2.83	0.06
Ages 5 to 8	453	2.71	0.06
Ages 9 to 12	460	2.46	0.06
Ages 13 to 15	401	2.16	0.07
Total	1,626	2.52	0.03

Source: SJTPO 2000 Travel Survey, weighted. Base: All trips by respondents under the age of 16.

Findings

The purpose of the review of children's travel patterns captured in the South Jersey survey was to sufficiently document trip making by those under the age of 16 such that the implications of excluding this group of travelers from the Wilmington survey could be documented. In particular, three assumptions were made that can be verified through this analysis.

The first assumption was that most travel by children would be made in the company of older household members, whose travel would be included in the Wilmington survey data set. As shown above, this assumption was accurate in that only 23% of all trips (or 374 trips) reported by children participating in the South Jersey survey were unaccompanied. Of these trips, most were on the school bus (67%) and thus related to travel to and from school, while 24% were walk trips. The data show that these unaccompanied travelers were older children, with 80% being children age 9 and older. In terms of the larger, overall data set that includes travel by all South Jersey household members, the 374 trips represents about 3% of the total reported trips.

A second assumption pertained to the unaccompanied travel. Specifically, the unaccompanied travel by children would be between origins and destinations of travel within the same traffic analysis zone. Since travel demand models focus on travel that utilizes higher-level transportation infrastructure and is more regional in nature, trips within the same traffic analysis zone are not modeled. Of the unaccompanied trips made by children, 87% of all unaccompanied trips were between origins and destinations in the same zones. Thus, of the 374 trips attributable to children in the South Jersey data set, 325 were within the same zone. This also means that 49 unaccompanied trips occurred between origins and destinations in different zones. So, of the total 11,260 trips reported by all household members participating in the South Jersey study, less than 1% were unaccompanied trips made by children between zones. Since Wilmington's current travel demand model will only focus on automobile trips, these trips would not have contributed to the modeling effort. However, as Wilmington grows and begins to consider alternative modes of travel, those missing trips will be excluded from the analysis.

The third assumption in the process of conducting this study was made when comparing the average daily household trip rate of 7.89 to the NCHRP "standard" trip rate of 9.0 average daily household trip rates for regions of similar size to Wilmington. Although the Wilmington trip rate is 88% of the "standard", the difference was attributed to the exclusion of children's travel. The proportions of travel by children reflected in the South Jersey data set can be used to validate this assumption. Specifically, children in the South Jersey survey contributed 1,626 trips or 15% of the total 11,216 trips to the survey data set. This means that those over the age of 16 contributed 85% of the trips within that region. Assuming this proportion would also hold in the Wilmington area, the overall Wilmington average daily household trip rate of 7.89 as captured through the survey might actually be closer to 9.28 average daily household trips (7.89 / 85%), which is above the NCHRP benchmark average daily household trip rate. This suggests that the overall household trip rate resulting from the Wilmington household travel survey is indeed reasonable, given the exclusion of household members under age 16.

Conclusions

Given budgetary constraints and a plan to develop a regional travel demand model that focused only on travel by automobiles, the Wilmington household travel survey was designed to document travel only for household members age 16 or older. In doing so, two assumptions were made about travel by household members younger than 16: (1) Most travel by children would be in the company of household members age 16 and older, and (2) Unaccompanied travel by children would be intra-zonal. An additional assumption was made when benchmarking the resulting average daily household trip rate of 7.89 trips against an accepted standard of 9.0 trips (that the lack of children's travel accounted for the difference).

Travel data from the South Jersey household travel survey, which is the best available household travel survey data set that contains travel for all household members to serve as a comparison to the Wilmington survey results, was used to test these assumptions. Relying on the identification of key variables through prior research, the South Jersey data was compared to the Wilmington data and found to provide a reasonable foundation for this analysis. The assumptions made at the start of the household travel survey were validated through this comparison process.

Specifically, to consider the impact of the unaccompanied trips in relation to the travel patterns in Wilmington, these rates were used to estimate children's travel in Wilmington. Taking the distribution of children by age among the participating Wilmington households and applying the trip information observed in South Jersey yields some insight into how the unaccompanied travel by children in Wilmington could be accounted for in future model updates, as alternative mode travel becomes a greater focus. Within the South Jersey survey data, 14% of all trips were made by children (1,626) and of these, 23% (374) were unaccompanied. Applying these rates to the Wilmington survey, the current 8,103 trips (reported by Wilmington household members age 16+) would increase to 9,422 trips by adding 1,319 trips made by children. Of these 1,319 trips associated with the children of the Wilmington region, 23% would be unique, unaccompanied and not accounted for in the travel reported by those 16 and older. This means that Wilmington could expand the current data set by 1,015 trips using the details of reported trips by the older household members, but would lack details associated with 304 trips (or 3% of all trips in this "new" data file).

Since these unaccompanied trips were made using non-automobile modes (school bus, walking, etc.), their inclusion in the Wilmington data set would increase the proportion

of non-automobile travel by 18% (from its current level of 19% to 22% overall). Therefore, 18% of alternative mode trips were "missed" by surveying only household members age 16 or older. Thus the impact of not surveying those under the age of 16 in the Wilmington survey does become significant when considering alternative modes of travel.

In the travel demand modeling process, the data adjustments to the Wilmington data using the South Jersey proportions would factor up the alternative mode trips throughout the travel demand model to account for walking, bicycling, school bus, and public transit trips missed by not including children in the Wilmington regional travel survey. Given the aggregate nature of transportation analysis zone structures in most regional travel demand models, no intra-zonal trips are assigned to the network. However, an estimated 49 of the unaccompanied trips by children would be inter-zonal and therefore should be, but are not currently, assigned to the Wilmington regional travel demand model. Although this is a small amount, when expanded to represent the regional population, it accounts for approximately 3,283 trips, of which 1,083 are non-motorized trips (walking or bike).

At such time as multi-modal capabilities are added to the Wilmington regional travel demand model, and transit, bicycle, and pedestrian networks are added to the model, these trips may be a significant portion of relatively short distance inter-zonal trips in the model using alternative modes. As future improvements in the alternative mode infrastructure are made in greater Wilmington area and the mode share of alternative modes increases, the importance of this factor also increases. A future multi-modal model used to test alternative development scenarios designed to encourage alternative mode use would need to account for the travel of those under 16.

Since 40% of all children's trips involve travel to or from school, the impact of school location and related congestion resulting from school bus and parent traffic flows is affecting many neighborhoods today. In most travel demand models, school bus transportation is treated much like public transit on the transportation networks. However, the greater impact of school bus travel is felt in the neighborhoods and by local planners who must design adequate traffic circulation flows at each neighborhood school site to accommodate the peak demands associated with this daily travel.

Although the Wilmington regional travel demand model is not being developed initially to forecast alternative mode travel, it remains an important exercise to quantify and characterize the travel of those under the age of 16 in the greater Wilmington area. For long range planning purposes, it emphasizes the share of travel that is really being made using alternative modes and potential to increase that total share. It is not possible to accurately account for the total alternative mode travel patterns and characteristics without including the travel of those 16 and under. Therefore, when justifying future alternative mode transportation infrastructure, it will be necessary to include this travel component in order to more accurately support its level of usage.

The funding constraints and initial plans for the new Wilmington regional travel demand model are not unique to the Wilmington region. Many MPOs in smaller urban areas are making similar assumptions and devising survey methodologies that will provide the necessary data given the level of funding available. This analysis shows that it is possible to survey only those household members age 16 and older and to use comparable data for estimating most trips by children. However, MPOs will have to make similar decisions regarding the true proportions of alternative mode travel within their region and understand the data limitations when evaluating alternative mode transportation infrastructure and measuring estimated impacts of transportation control measures.

In addition to travel demand model implications, three areas of future research have been identified through this work. First, the selection of the best available and most appropriate data source to use as the foundation for estimating children's travel as developed in this paper relies on key demographic factors. Future applications should also include consideration of densities, development patterns, and employment base when comparing regions.

Second, the travel demand modeling effort is regional in scope, which results in the exclusion of intra-zonal trips from the modeling process. While these trips may not impact the travel on the regional transportation network, they do have a large impact on neighborhood design and accessibility decisions. An understanding of travel at the neighborhood level is critical to identifying and prioritizing neighborhood projects or those geared towards pedestrians or alternative modes.

Finally, this neighborhood or micro-scale focus is at the heart of emerging research concerning the interaction between transportation and health. Travel by children and the spatial patterns of unaccompanied children's travel may provide valuable information in informing these studies. In addition, efforts to estimate the impacts of land use densities and other walkability factors on travel mode choice may be expanded with an increased understanding of unaccompanied children's travel.

Notes

[1] Traffic analysis zones are sub-geographic regions, similar to census block groups, which form the basic unit of analysis for travel demand modeling.

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

A Marriage of Convenience?

Fiscal Incentives and Residential Development Patterns in California

RICHARD BRADY

The term "fiscalization of land use" is often used to describe a phenomenon whereby local land use decisions are mostly influenced by fiscal concerns, contrary to expressed desires of the affected community. A loose theory of fiscalization of land use has emerged with several associated hypotheses. Central to this article are those hypotheses that claim affordable and market-rate housing development is retarded due to fiscalization of land use. Based on interviews with elected officials, city planning and finance department staff, and analyses of local government documents, this article presents case studies from neighboring cities in northern San Diego County that suggest the oft-asserted relationship between fiscal incentives and residential development patterns in California is merely a marriage of convenience.

Introduction

Considered sacred to local governments, the power to determine land use policy is a last vestige of local autonomy in California. Judicious execution of this power should enable local policymakers to direct growth according to the vision set forth by their constituents. These officials determine an appropriate blend of land uses they feel will improve quality of life in their communities. In doing so, decision-makers must also consider the facilities and services necessary to support future development. State and federal retrenchment has lead to many innovations in local government finance. One such innovation is what is known as "fiscalization of land use"; the phenomenon whereby land use decisions are mostly influenced by fiscal concerns, often contrary to the expressed desires of the affected community.

In California fiscalization of land use research has focused on the relationship between sales tax revenue and local land use decisions. Three hypotheses have emerged which Lewis and Barbour (1999, 72) have articulated clearly:

Hypothesis 1: Gaining sales tax revenue is a key goal for local land-use decisions, and thus retail development is given favorable treatment over other types of development.[1]

Hypothesis 2: This favoritism toward retail uses has the effect of retarding residential and industrial development.

Hypothesis 3: The built landscape would look systematically different were it not for the over-reliance on sales tax revenue.[2]

Although not explicitly stated, a fourth hypothesis is conceptually implied: residential development is also retarded for fiscal reasons independent of the pursuit of sales tax revenue. Because certain types of residential uses do not generate sufficient revenue to pay for requisite public facilities and infrastructure, it is assumed that land use policymakers act on this fiscal disincentive by restricting residential development or failing to adequately plan for housing. The purpose of this article is to challenge those fiscalization of land use hypotheses that claim fiscal motives are behind constrained market-rate residential development in California. This article also suggests that, although there is a fiscal motive to restrict affordable housing development, the motive is often subordinate to a community's desire to maintain social exclusivity and property values.

Exhibit 1. Regional Location

The neighboring cities of Carlsbad and San Marcos, situated in northern San Diego County, serve as case studies for this investigation (see Exhibit 1). Although the cities share a contiguous border, they have pursued distinct land use development strategies. The voters of both cities passed growth management initiatives requiring new development to "pay for itself"; however, only Carlsbad's initiative includes a strict limitation on the number of units allowed in the community. While San Marcos has successfully attracted numerous "big-box" retailers, Carlsbad has rejected such development and eliminated the land use designation permitting for these uses.[3] In addition, although Carlsbad failed to meet its regional affordable housing production goals during the last housing planning period, the City Council recently decided to further restrict the number of housing units that can be built in the

city (Baldwin 2003). In contrast, San Marcos exceeded its regional affordable housing production goals for the same planning period and has embarked on an economic development strategy that includes converting existing commercial land uses to mixed-use centers, thereby increasing the residential intensity of its community (Ibid).

Evidence from the San Marcos and Carlsbad cases suggests the examined hypotheses are suspect and should no longer be uncritically accepted. Three broad lessons drawn from the case studies substantiate this claim:

- Housing might do a better job "paying for itself" than originally thought. Increasing net local revenue is often tied to increasing population and housing.
- While the state-local fiscal structure is responsible for the increased use of development fees and exactions, and other methods of requiring new development to "pay for itself," this does not create a fiscal motive for policymakers to resist new housing development; in fact, it mitigates any such motive.
- Widespread negative perceptions held by residents toward affordable housing (and those who live in these developments) drives exclusionary residential development policy, not an imbalanced fiscal incentive structure.

The article proceeds accordingly: First, it reviews fiscalization of land use research and collates existing findings and discussion into a single fiscalization of land use theory to cogently challenge key associated hypotheses; Second, the article revisits a theory debunked in the 1970s philosophically similar to the challenged fiscalization hypotheses. And third, the article presents evidence from two case studies which raises questions about the validity of the conventionally held belief that misaligned local government fiscal incentives are linked to observed declines in residential development patterns.

Literature Review: A Tale of Two Theories – Fiscalization of Land Use and Fiscal Motive Theory of Zoning

Fiscalization of Land Use Theory

To effectively challenge hypotheses associated with fiscalization of land use theory, there must be a clear outline of the theory itself. For some, fiscalization of land use implies only that "the system of local public finance exerts an influence on local land use decisions" (Wassmer 2002). Kotin and Peiser (1997) go beyond issues of mere influence, suggesting fiscalization of land use describes a phenomenon where "land use decisions are *based* on the net tax revenues they will generate."[4] While the theory should state that fiscal considerations do more than exert *influence* on the land use planning process, the claim that land use decisions are *based* on these considerations is unnecessary. Fiscalization of land use should denote a phenomenon whereby fiscal concerns mostly influence land use decisions. Nevertheless, this condition, while necessary, is not sufficient for an effective theory as it must also describe situations where fiscally motivated decisions are made contrary to the expressed desires of affected communities. This aspect of fiscalization of land use is tacitly accepted by some academics and planning practitioners (Kirlin 1998; and Fairbanks, *et. al.* 1997). If fiscal incentive structures reinforce a community's sense of "good planning" then land use outcomes should no longer be considered "fiscalized."[5]

Therefore, a useful theory of fiscalization of land use should at minimum describe situations where fiscal concerns mostly influence land use choices, contrary to the expressed desires of the affected community. In addition, the theory should be applicable to any fiscal structure so long as there are a set of grossly disproportionate incentives systematically favoring certain uses over others. Not only is it important to distinguish fiscalization of land use from its asserted effects so that it may be applicable independent of diverse local

government fiscal structures; separation is necessary to evaluate the merits of each asserted effect. In other words, the theory of fiscalization of land use is a static theory with a dynamic set of hypotheses.

Existing fiscalization of land use hypotheses are summarized in Exhibit 2.[6] Of interest here is the aspect of Hypothesis II and IV that claim the fiscal incentive structure strongly impacts residential development patterns in California. Evidence from the cities of Carlsbad and San Marcos reveal the suspect nature of these hypotheses. Prior to delving into the case studies, it is appropriate to examine and consider implications of a theory debunked in the 1970s that is philosophically similar to contemporary assertions.

Exhibit 2. Fiscalization of Land Use Theory

Fiscal concerns mostly influence land use decisions, contrary to the expressed desires of the affected community.

In California, three associated hypotheses have emerged dealing with over-reliance on sales tax revenue (Lewis and Barbour, 1999, 72).

Hypothesis I: Gaining sales tax revenue is a key goal for local land-use decisions, and thus retail development is given favorable treatment over other types of development.

Hypothesis II: This favoritism toward retail uses has the effect of retarding residential and industrial development.

Hypothesis III: The built landscape would look systematically different were it not for the over-reliance on sales tax revenue.

The following hypothesis is independent of a focus on sales tax revenue.

Hypothesis IV: Because residential uses often constitute a net fiscal loss for local governments, residential development is retarded.

Fiscal Motive Theory of Zoning

Widespread use of restrictive zoning contributed to large-scale affordable housing shortages on the east coast in the 1960s (Babcock and Bosselman 1973, 1-38). It was widely assumed that exclusionary zoning practices were at root fiscally motivated and that eliminating the ability of local governments to enact exclusionary zoning ordinances would lead to a more equitable distribution of housing (Windsor 1979, 8-9). An academic theory evolved to describe this phenomenon; the Fiscal Motive Theory of Zoning.

While many embraced Fiscal Motive Theory, it had its critics. Branfman, Cohen, and Trubeck (1972, 501) suggested that racism, not the fiscal motive, guided exclusionary zoning. They found "no substantial relationship between residential patterns and fiscal incentives for imposition of (land use) controls." Windsor and Franklin (1975, 90) concurred: "we suggest that the asserted linkage between fiscal zoning and exclusionary zoning may not exist." An empirical examination of this question involving 175 New Jersey municipalities concluded: "a community's desire for social exclusiveness does not always match its real fiscal interests… There was no significant relationship between fiscal incentives and actual zoning patterns" (Franklin and Windsor 1976, 134-137). The fiscal motive could not adequately account for the pervasiveness of exclusionary zoning ordinances in New Jersey.

Fiscal Motive Theory asserted a causal link between fiscal incentives and land use outcomes. However, it turns out that the perceived fiscal structure only reinforced widespread prejudices and racism within these communities (Haar 1996). In consideration of the evidence presented in this article, keep in mind that the debunked Fiscal Motive Theory is philosophically similar to the challenged fiscalization of land use hypotheses.

The Carlsbad and San Marcos case studies proceed as follows: 1) the degree to which each city relies on sales tax revenue is examined and the impact that this reliance has had on residential growth is evaluated; 2) the idea that the state-local government finance structure has created a fiscal motive for city officials to limit or prevent new residential development is directly challenged; and 3) the question about whether historical decisions to exclude affordable housing projects have been at root fiscally motivated is answered.

Methodology

An exhaustive examination of general plan amendments, zoning changes, and a thorough tracking of public statements made by city council members and planning commissioners regarding historical residential development decisions would appear to be an appropriate method for answering the research questions at hand, however this approach is limited.[7] First, in the cases of Carlsbad and San Marcos, there is a lack of recorded historical data. City Council meetings are not transcribed and in most cases, the minutes provide only a cursory record of the proceedings. Second, these methods cannot account for changes in proposed residential projects made by developers upon recommendation by city staff (namely planning staff) prior to submission to the Council or Planning Commission. Therefore, a more effective method for determining the relationship between fiscal incentives and residential development in Carlsbad and San Marcos is to balance historical data concerning development decisions with interview data from those closest to the land use planning process in each city. Interviewees for this study included:

- Jerry Backoff, Planning Director, City of San Marcos
- Lupe Cano, Finance Director, City of San Marcos
- Rick Gittings, City Manager, City of San Marcos
- Craig Ruiz, Management Analyst, Department of Housing and Redevelopment, City of Carlsbad
- F.H. "Corky" Smith, Mayor, City of San Marcos
- Dennis Turner, Principal Planner, City of Carlsbad

Despite having different roles in the local decision-making process, it appears all interviewees have a similar understanding of the motives behind residential land use policy in their cities. In addition to the interviews, an examination of public planning and budget documents, reports prepared by city staff, as well as journalistic accounts of events for which data was not available from other sources aided in the inquiry. Contained in these sources were quotes from non-interviewed elected officials and staff, which supported data collected in the interview process.

Case Studies: Carlsbad and San Marcos, California

Despite sharing a contiguous border in the same county, Carlsbad and San Marcos are socially, economically, and fiscally disparate. The cities also have distinctly different track records regarding commercial and market-rate housing development, yet it took judicial or regulatory pressure for both jurisdictions to take action on affordable housing. When applied to these cases, fiscalization of land use-residential hypotheses predict that Carlsbad, in its unique position of fiscal stability, would be in the best situation to embrace additional residential development. Similarly, it is also assumed that San Marcos, with fewer resources, would be more inclined to restrict residential development. However, the exact opposite has occurred. The Carlsbad and San Marcos cases present a unique laboratory for the investigation of the relationship between fiscal incentives and residential development patterns in California.

Both Carlsbad and San Marcos are growing suburbs in northern San Diego County. Carlsbad is a coastal community with a population and land area slightly larger than San Marcos. As of January 2003, Carlsbad's population was 78,247 compared to 54,977 in San Marcos (State of California, Department of Finance 2003). In 2000, San Marcos was racially more diverse than Carlsbad. In that year, 46.1 percent of its residents were non-white, while only 19.5 percent of Carlsbad's population was non-white (United States Census Bureau 2003a). In both cities, Hispanic or Latino residents comprise most of this non-white population. Carlsbad households are much more affluent than are San Diego County and San Marcos households. In 1999, the median household income in Carlsbad was $64,145 compared to $47,067 in San Diego County and $45,908 in San Marcos (United States Census Bureau 2003b). The overall household affluence has translated into fiscal affluence for the City of Carlsbad as 2002 per capita general fund revenue was much higher than that of San Marcos ($1,031 *v.* $648), indicating that Carlsbad's fiscal capacity is also greater (City of Carlsbad 2002d; and City of San Marcos 2002). The discrepancy in fiscal capacity can account for the stark difference in commercial development patterns.

Commercial Development Patterns

Sales tax revenue is one of the last remaining sources of discretionary revenue for local governments (Lewis and Barbour 1999, 81). In California, commercial land uses are often the most "preferred" land uses because they generate huge surpluses for cities and counties when compared to other uses (Ibid). Over the past 25 years, traditional mechanisms for raising local revenue have eroded, leaving many cities to "over-rely" on sales tax revenue. It is this over-reliance that has lead to the fiscalization of land use. In his study on the impact that this reliance has had on sprawling retail development patterns, Wassmer (2002) operationalized "fiscalization of land use" by looking at the proportion of a city's general fund comprised of sales tax revenue. This method of determining "over-reliance" is appropriate for a large-*n* study such as Wassmer's; however, a comparison of per capita revenue from sales and property taxes that highlights a type of revenue "dependency" is most useful here.

Carlsbad's per capita sales tax revenue was $284 and its per capita property tax revenue was $288 in 2002 (City of Carlsbad 2002d). San Marcos' per capita sales tax revenue was $200 and per capita property tax revenue was $74 in the same year (City of San Marcos 2002). San Marcos, with very low per capita property tax revenue has been forced to rely more heavily on other revenue sources, namely the sales tax, whereas Carlsbad's per capita property tax revenue is much greater, giving it substantial fiscal flexibility.[9] Following is an analysis of both cities' reliance on sales tax revenue and its potential impact on residential land use decisions.

Carlsbad

Until 1996, Carlsbad's General Plan included four commercial land use designations: Regional, Travel-Recreational, Community, and Neighborhood (City of Carlsbad 1994). The Regional Commercial designation is intended to accommodate mall-type high volume centers, while the Travel-Recreation designation is intended to serve the needs of tourists. A "big-box" retailer should anchor a typical Community Commercial center, whereas the anchor of a Neighborhood Commercial center is typically a grocery store. While the General Plan included a Community Commercial land use designation, historically development had not been consistent with this designation. Instead of the "big-box" discount retail centers that were supposed to occupy this land, grocery store anchored centers were approved instead. Acknowledging the general policy direction in which the City seemed to be moving, the City

Council began to question the continued usefulness of the Community Commercial land use designation and decided to look into the possibility of removing it altogether.

In 1996 the City conducted a series of community workshops and telephone polls to measure public opinion regarding the adequacy of city shopping centers.[8] The overwhelming response from participating residents was that their needs were best served with a limited supply of neighborhood commercial stores and expressed the desire to restrict community commercial uses. "Residents were perfectly happy driving outside the city to shop" at discount retail centers explained Mr. Turner. "However, (these types of retail uses) are the highest sales tax revenue generators you can get…And if you take a grocery store, about half of what they sell is non-taxable food items" (Turner 2003). The direction community residents gave to land use decision-makers was that it desired to exclude revenue-rich "big-box" retailers against the City's best fiscal interests.

The Council directed the finance department to assess the fiscal impact of converting Community Commercial land to Neighborhood Commercial use. In a letter to Principal Planner Dennis Turner, Finance Director Lisa Hildabrand wrote:

> If the City were to convert land designated as regional commercial or community commercial to neighborhood commercial, the anticipated net revenues to the City may be reduced (City of Carlsbad 1996, Appendix A).

The Council followed with the question: "Should the city pursue developing more 'true' community commercial developments?" The Finance Department responded that the City did not have to pursue this type of development, if it did not wish to do so (Ibid, 4).

Carlsbad has not, to any noticeable extent, used the land planning process to secure sales tax revenue. In fact, the City has rejected the "big-box" type of development typically associated with fiscalization of land use. Therefore, pursuit of sales tax revenue has not had any recent impact on residential development patterns in the community.

San Marcos

While Carlsbad only has one "big-box" retailer, Costco, when all currently planned retail projects are completed, the City of San Marcos will have a Fry's Electronics, Home Depot, Costco, Best Buy, Kohl's, Lowe's, Guitar Center, and two-Wal-Marts. City Manager Rick Gittings (2003) estimates that the combined revenue generated from these high-volume retailers could total more than $4 million per year, or 34 percent of the City's projected sales tax revenue in 2004-05 (City of San Marcos 2002).

A prominent reason why the City has pursued "big-box" projects is because these are the only viable type of commercial uses remaining in north San Diego County. San Marcos is what Mr. Gittings calls "the hole in the doughnut" explaining that, "There is lots of shopping, but there are no department clothing type stores (in San Marcos) and I can tell you why. You need a certain mass (of residents) and most clothing retailers go into malls" (Gittings 2003). North San Diego County has two regional malls, which are located in the neighboring jurisdictions of Carlsbad to the west and Escondido to the east. San Marcos Mayor Corky Smith stated that the City would love to have more clothing oriented retail stores because that is what residents consistently ask for so they do not have to drive so far away for these items (Smith 2003). Despite the fact that residents of San Marcos desire clothing retail stores and the City Council has long been willing to accommodate, only recently has a prominent clothing retailer, Kohl's, signed a lease with the City (Gittings 2003).[10]

San Marcos' fiscal and economic development strategy rests largely on maximization of sales tax revenue through accommodating a number of "big-box" retailers (San Marcos Economic Development Corporation 1998, 18). However, the question remains, if the City were in a better financial situation, would the Council be less willing to have so many "big-box" uses? "No" replied the Mayor (Smith 2003). "I will tell you that the Council in this community has been much more an advocate of property rights and not using land use planning as a tool to deny people their property rights," stated Mr. Gittings while adding that the Council has not altered land use decisions to accommodate recent "big-box" projects; these uses are sited in places that make sense for retail uses (Gittings 2003).

While San Marcos has done what it can to attract sales tax generating uses, the strategy has not been pursued to the detriment of residential development. Planning Department Director Jerry Backoff explained, "We have always anticipated that the areas around the major arterials, along the freeways would make sense for commercial use, but we did not go in there and change it from housing...to make it retail" (Backoff 2003). High-volume traffic areas are perfectly suitable for commercial uses; however, the environmental hazards (noise, pollution, safety, etc) associated with land surrounding these arterials make it difficult to justify residential land uses in many of these corridors. A closer look reveals the City's revenue enhancement strategy has resulted in increased residential opportunity in the community. Mr. Gittings highlights a logical flaw in the claim that pursuit of retail development impedes residential development:

> We have gotten them ("big-box" retailers) in here and it is a conscious strategy on our part because we know our (fiscal) limitations, but the Council has not gone into a residential area and said, this is going to be commercial…The irony of it is local retailers won't come to town unless you have a certain number of residential rooftops! (Gittings 2003).

Therefore, from San Marcos' perspective, fiscal stability and health is tied to steady growth in housing production.

Evidence of this can be found in the City's recent strategy to allow residential uses on land previously zoned solely for commercial use. Mr. Backoff stated that the Council came to the realization that to increase retail activity, the City would have to permit housing next to, or on top of, the retail space. "You can say you are not getting the full value of the retail by putting the people in there with it, but it gets you a better project than if it was purely commercial" (Backoff 2003). For example, the Paseo del Oro project, completed in 2002 included 120 multi-family units (98 affordable) and over 23,000 square feet of retail space, while turning a dilapidated commercial center into a vibrant mixed-use community (Marks 2003). It appears that the desire to improve sales tax ratables actually drove decisions to allow higher-density residential development in San Marcos, not vice-versa as fiscalization of land use Hypothesis II contends.[11]

The claim that an "over-reliance" on sales tax revenue is leading to retarded residential development is dubious. A growing number of rooftops has made San Marcos an attractive destination for "big-box" retailers. Therefore, increasing *net* local revenue has been explicitly tied to increasing housing and population in San Marcos. Carlsbad on the other hand has shunned "big-box" retail development, despite the fiscal benefits of such development. While the neighboring cities have pursued distinctly different commercial land use policies, both cities passed growth management initiatives that may be construed as fiscalization of land use.

Growth Management

In 1999, nearly 94 percent of California cities had policies designed to control or manage growth and the vast majority of these policies impacted residential development (Lewis and Neiman 2002). Growth management polices ranged from inclusionary housing requirements which facilitate affordable housing development to moratoria on new residential construction (Ibid, vii). According to Lewis and Neiman's study, "local officials appear to formulate residential policies, in part, in reaction to or anticipation of residents' opposition to new development" (Ibid, viii).

Carlsbad and San Marcos are no exception. Both cities passed growth management ordinances to implement voter-approved initiatives. However, the ordinances differ on an essential point. While both essentially require new development to "pay for itself," only Carlsbad's ordinance overtly restricts future residential development. Furthermore, in 2002, residents of Carlsbad succeeded in convincing the City Council to approve further restrictions on future residential growth, while recently a second growth management initiative that would have hampered San Marcos' ability to increase residential density failed to qualify for the ballot. According to fiscalization of land use hypotheses challenged by these cases, it would be San Marcos that would tend to gravitate towards more restrictive growth management policies due to its weaker fiscal position, not Carlsbad.

Carlsbad

Prior to 1986, Carlsbad's General Plan estimated the City could accommodate approximately 108,300 housing units. Alarmed by the rapid development in the community in the early 1980s, Carlsbad voters ratified a Growth Management Plan through passage of Proposition E. Not only did the Plan require new residential development to "pay for itself," it sharply reduced the City's residential development capacity by capping the total number of dwelling units at 54,600 (City of Carlsbad 2002c). According to one City publication, "Common sense was the guiding force behind the (Growth Management Plan). The Council felt that existing residents should not have to pay to create and maintain the services and facilities needed by incoming residents" (Ibid). While it makes sense for new development to pay its way in the post-Proposition 13 fiscal environment, the decision to cut 53,700 units from its residential buildout capacity cannot be rationalized when considering fiscal factors alone.

The Growth Management Plan divided the City into Facilities Management Zones, each with a corresponding facilities and services plan. "If the City Council determines that a public facility or service is not in conformance with an adopted performance standard, then no future building permits which would impact the facility shall be issued" (City of Carlsbad 2002e, 7). Facilities may be funded by impact fees or are included as a normal development requirement; however, a project's proponent has the option to join or form a Community Facilities District (CFD) to fulfill its Proposition E responsibilities (Ibid, 3).[12] According to Principal Planner Dennis Turner, the City decided to "put all the infrastructure costs onto the builder. So the builders said, "we will pay for it." We'll put an assessment district on it...to hide the cost of the infrastructure" (Turner 2003). In addition to the use of CFD's to fund new infrastructure, Carlsbad had the highest residential development impact fees in the region in 1998 according to one survey (SANDAG 1998, 103). In response to the threat to local revenue resulting from California's recent budgetary crisis, Carlsbad's 2002-03 budget cited the city's Growth Management Plan:

> Regardless of what happens at the State level, Carlsbad is positioned well for its future…This plan was adopted to

> insure that all necessary public facilities were constructed along with development. It also insures that a financing plan is in place to pay for the facilities prior to the development of the property (City of Carlsbad 2002e).

Growth management has enabled housing to "pay for itself" in Carlsbad, mitigating the fiscal motive from future residential land use decisions. While California's state-local government finance structure necessitates that developers pay for public facilities and infrastructure, what was the motivation behind further restriction of housing growth?

If fiscal concerns were at the heart of the decision made by voters to cut in half the total number of units allowed at buildout of the City's General Plan, then the evidence would support the challenged fiscalization of land use hypotheses. However, Mr. Turner explains that fiscal motives were not at the core of this aspect of the Growth Management Plan:

> In the 1980s there was a big swell in the number of units permitted, just before growth management…Any time you have big peaks of building activity you have concern from people about congestion…And that expresses itself as political discontent against political officials and [*sic*] proposed developments (Turner 2003).

It was at the peak of a spurt in residential development that Carlsbad voters passed Proposition E. While residents saw increasing population affecting quality of life through the growing inadequacy of public facilities and services, requiring new development to pay for itself would have been sufficient to mitigate any facilities and services impact caused by new development. This suggests that in addition to the fiscal motive, there were other motives working to limit residential growth in Carlsbad. The non-fiscal motives became more evident in recent action by the City to restrict residential development further, despite its excellent fiscal situation.

Carlsbad experienced a flurry of residential development following of the early 1990s recession, reviving latent anti-growth sentiments within the community. In response to an open-ended survey question, 87 percent of Carlsbad respondents felt that growth, over-development, or overcrowding was the biggest concern facing Carlsbad in 2002 (City of Carlsbad 2003, 83).[13] Only three percent of respondents indicated that an increasing cost of living (which at least one respondent indicated was due to high property taxes) was the City's biggest concern and one percent cited "Lack of/Poor City Services." These survey results echoed results from a similar survey in 2001; however, the degree to which residents were concerned about growth reached its peak in 2002 (City of Carlsbad 2002e, 31). "We hear that (Carlsbad is too dense) over and over every time we do a city survey" explained Councilmember Julie Nygard (Mayer 2002b). At the urging of residents, the City Council again looked at issues of growth control in Carlsbad.

After detailed planning of the City's Local Facilities Management Zones following passage of Proposition E, it was determined that the City could only accommodate 48,000 dwelling units if it was to continue preserving habitat and open space. Units approved by Proposition E above 48,000 were placed in an Excess Dwelling Unit Bank (Turner 2003). Units have been drawn from the Excess Dwelling Unit Bank over the years to implement a State mandated density bonus program and to allow a degree of flexibility for projects deemed desirable by the City (City of Carlsbad 2002a).

Additional units have been added to the Bank over the years as proposed residential projects have consistently been approved with densities lower than allowed by the Growth Management Plan. Each unit that a developer could have built, but did not is placed in the

Excess Dwelling Unit Bank. So why has the City not approved projects at the allowable density?

According to Councilmember Matt Hall, the City Council "has been very conservative when it comes to either allowing maximum density for developers, or in handing out density bonuses to developers" (Mayer 2002b). Principal Planner Dennis Turner qualified this statement saying:

> It's not like we go in and say "Reduce the density." (It is the) developers who want to put humongous houses on little bity tiny lots and they don't meet our development standards. So we say, you can either have your humongous houses, or you can have your lot yield (allowable density), but you can't have both…Their lot yield goes down because they aren't willing to reduce the size of their houses (Turner 2003).

Mr. Turner believes this tendency to allow developers to under-utilize residential land has actually inhibited higher density development as the Council has approved projects proposing single-family detached homes on land zoned for higher density use such as apartments or condominiums. Aside from the obvious implications this policy direction has had on lower-cost housing options in Carlsbad, these decisions have generated more units for the Excess Dwelling Unit Bank.

Because Carlsbad is not on pace to grow to the capacity of 54,600 units, the City began to "over-design" public facilities realizing that, eventually it could reach its dwelling unit ceiling. Planning Director Michael Holzmiller explained why the Council has taken this approach:

> Because (the City Council) needs to be conservative and can't assume that any of the excess dwelling units are going to be used, they came up with a way to have 48,000 units fund the facilities for 54,600 [*sic*] units (City of Carlsbad 2002a).

Therefore, for every unit built over 48,000 paying development or facilities fees, the City will receive surplus revenue.

In short, the City's best fiscal interest is to allow the maximum number of units approved under the growth management plan. However, similar to its decision to prohibit community commercial uses, the Council established a citizen's committee to look into three options concerning the Excess Dwelling Unit Bank: 1) eliminate the entire Bank; 2) reduce the number of units in the Bank; and 3) leave the Bank alone. By a narrow margin, the citizen's committee recommended that the City should leave the Bank alone and keep all the excess dwelling units. However, the minority concluded the Council should reduce the number of units in the Bank drastically:

> For the past three years, the City Public Opinion Survey has shown strong discontent from those polled regarding traffic, population growth, and development. As the Council is aware, in this year's survey, when citizens were asked to provide suggestions for improving the quality of life in our city, the number one response was "set limits on growth and development" (Citizens' Committee 2002, 6).

Considering the minority recommendation, City staff commented on the fiscal implications of reducing or eliminating the excess dwelling unit bank:

> A reduction in residential development capacity equates to fewer tax-payers, and thus, reduced General Revenues (property taxes, sales taxes, utility charges). Although there will be fewer services needed in some areas, such as reduced utility usage and possibly reduced maintenance and protection services, the per capita operating costs (Parks and Libraries, for example) will be greater with fewer property owners paying for a larger share of these facilities than originally anticipated" (City of Carlsbad 2002b).

Essentially, the advice given by City staff, which included members from the Finance and Planning Departments, was that a decision to reduce or eliminate the Excess Dwelling Unit Bank would have fiscal consequences.

Despite the implications, Carlsbad's City Council decided against the citizen's majority recommendation and cut over 3,000 units from the Excess Dwelling Unit Bank (Ibid). Justifying his vote, Mayor Lewis stated, "My biggest concern…is that the citizens in different areas should be protected. Excess dwelling units are a driver for increasing density" (Mayer 2002a). The decision to reduce the Excess Dwelling Unit Bank, thereby ultimately restricting residential development, was made at a time when the City was in solid fiscal health and against the City's real fiscal interests. The decision concerning the Excess Dwelling Unit Bank combined with 14 years experience working with the City leads Mr. Turner to conclude:

> The fiscalization of land use is not the issue so much as it is the perceptions of the community of the kinds of housing, the image that the City has about the kinds of residents, the kind of community that Carlsbad offers (Turner 2003).

Carlsbad's residents are like many that have chosen the suburban lifestyle; they are opposed to density. The opposition is not targeted solely at housing, but any increase in the density of development. "More and more, we are experiencing citizens who don't want anything built near their homes" explained Management Analyst for the Housing and Redevelopment Department, Craig Ruiz (Brady 2002, 5-13). While fiscal concerns may have provided the impetus for growth management in Carlsbad, it cannot explain decisions to restrict residential growth. This suggests that asserted fiscal concerns are the mask behind which hides a truer reason for these decisions: a desire to maintain social exclusivity. This assertion is clarified by examining San Marcos' growth management ordinance. While San Marcos is much more constrained fiscally than Carlsbad, its residents have not advocated decreased residential development or density.

San Marcos

In 1990, the voters of San Marcos passed Proposition R, a growth management initiative that was clearly fiscally motivated. The ordinance that implemented Proposition R stated:

> It is necessary to require that all new development bear the cost of providing public facilities and services reasonably needed to serve the development and to mitigate the impacts created by that development" (City of San Marcos 1990).

Without these fees the "public health, safety and welfare" would suffer because the existing public facilities and services were quickly becoming inadequate to meet the needs of the growing city (Ibid).

While the ordinance was fiscally motivated, it did not overtly restrict residential development and it cannot be argued that the ordinance is somehow providing locally elected officials with a fiscal motive for restricting residential development; in fact it mitigates any such motive that may have existed prior to its passage. The ordinance is structured so that *all* new development (not just residential) must pay its own way when it comes to public facilities, infrastructure, and services. When asked if the state-local government finance structure has impacted residential development, Finance Director Lupe Cano cited the growth management ordinance saying, "I can tell you from a Finance Department perspective, there has been no impact on our housing development" (Cano 2003). Fiscal impacts resulting from new residential development are largely offset by Proposition R.

While voters approved a growth management ordinance in 1990, a small number of San Marcos residents felt it did not go far enough. In 2002, volunteers began circulating a petition to place a more restrictive growth management ordinance, the *San Marcos Growth Management and Neighborhood Protection Act*, on the 2004 ballot. The initiative would have required voter approval for any proposed General Plan amendment or zoning change that would result in increased intensity or density (City of San Marcos n.d.). For example, the mixed-use development strategy recently embraced by the City would trigger the Act and require a public vote on future mixed-use development proposals. However, the measure failed to garner enough signatures to qualify for the ballot. According to City Manager Rick Gittings the Act failed because, "People see the improvement of quality of life and approve (of the actions the City is taking)" (Gittings 2003). When referring to improved quality of life, Mr. Gittings is referring to the increased level of services and facilities provided to residents that has resulted from the City's proactive approach to securing sales tax revenue, which includes making more opportunity for housing.

Negative fiscal impacts to residential development in Carlsbad and San Marcos that have resulted from a regressive state-local fiscal regime have been for the most part offset by growth management initiatives. Growth management has allowed Carlsbad to "over-build" community facilities, so that future residential development would generate surplus revenue for the City. San Marcos' growth management initiative, has enabled it to tie housing growth to overall fiscal stability because its growing population makes the City an attractive destination for lucrative retail uses. In sum, housing might do a better job paying for itself than originally thought.

There is perhaps one notable exception to the claim presented here that housing does a better job paying for itself than originally thought. Affordable housing projects still carry a fiscal penalty for accommodating jurisdictions. However, fiscalization of land use theory cannot explain decisions to restrict affordable housing development in Carlsbad and San Marcos.

Affordable Housing

While the market may supply some housing affordable to lower income households, in California this has become rare. Use of the term "affordable housing" here denotes units that are preserved affordable through regulatory mechanisms (public or private) to lower income residents.[14] Affordable rents are typically capped at 30 percent of the household's income, regardless of the community's market rates. Although affordable housing projects in Carlsbad and San Marcos typically pay full development and facilities impact fees to the City, most projects receive some other form of financial assistance or concession from the City and affordable units typically do not generate the net revenue that a market rate unit does (Turner 2003b; and Gittings 2003b). Under the fiscalization of land use theory, the higher the

fiscal impact of a given affordable housing development, the more likely local governments would resist its approval. The Carlsbad and San Marcos cases elucidate many problems with such an assertion.

Carlsbad

In the early 1980s, two affordable housing developments existed in Carlsbad providing 106 affordable units and from 1985-1992, no additional affordable units were built (Calavita and Grimes 1998, 162-163). The City's poor track record concerning affordable housing combined with the loss of a lawsuit for failure to spend redevelopment funds set aside for affordable housing,[15] made it clear that the "paper-chase" was coming to an end in Carlsbad.[16] For too long Carlsbad had produced the required documents to comply with the housing element law, without taking effective action to produce affordable units. The City Attorney warned that a non-compliant housing element would render the general plan vulnerable to lawsuit (Ibid, 162). Nevertheless, the Council failed to heed the City Attorney's advice, and in 1990, its housing element failed to receive certification from the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD). According to Housing and Redevelopment Department Management Analyst Craig Ruiz, three years of negotiations with HCD lead to the adoption of an inclusionary housing policy (Ruiz 2002).

As of June 2003, Carlsbad's inclusionary housing program could account for over 80 percent of all the affordable units available in the City and these units were constructed within 10 years of the program's implementation. Carlsbad had a total of 1,213 affordable units located within its jurisdiction, 1,030 of which were the result of inclusionary housing (Ruiz 2003). In addition, 900-1,000 affordable units are scheduled for construction through 2010 because of the inclusionary housing requirement, while zero units were planned for development through other means (Ibid). However, despite inclusionary housing and compliance with redevelopment law concerning the proper expenditure of affordable housing funds, the City failed to meet its affordable housing goals for the 1992-1999 housing planning period (Baldwin 2003).

It can be concluded that Carlsbad's historical nonfeasance regarding affordable housing development was remedied in part through the lawsuit brought against the City; however, HCD's refusal to certify its housing element provided the strongest sanction, which ultimately lead to the adoption of an inclusionary housing program. So why was the City so reluctant to provide affordable housing in the first place? Principal Planner Dennis Turner offers this insight gained from years of experience with the community:

> We have people who...come here because of that picture of what Carlsbad is. We are an upper-income kind of community and a lot of people who come here say, "I pay big bucks to be here and I want my gated community. I want that security. I want that low density. I don't want those kinds of people living here, people who live in apartments generally, and especially low-income people" (Turner 2003a).

California's state-local government finance structure has not constrained affordable housing development in Carlsbad. Decisions restricting these uses were made as a result of pressure by constituents, not pressure to balance a municipal budget. While Carlsbad and San Marcos differ in many respects, when it comes to historical affordable housing production, the cities are highly similar.

San Marcos

In 1986, Legal Aid sued the City of San Marcos for failure to spend redevelopment money on affordable housing as required by redevelopment law. "To be blunt about it, at the time, we were not (complying with the law). So they had a good case," explained City Manager Rick Gittings who is also the director of the San Marcos Redevelopment Agency (Gittings 2003). The City was forced to make serious concessions concerning expenditures on affordable housing as a result of the lawsuit.

Following settlement of the lawsuit, San Marcos has exceeded its affordable housing goals. Producing 551 affordable units (23 above goal) during the 1991-1999 housing planning period, the City Council now prefers affordable housing to market rate apartments (Smith 2003). "Affordable housing apartments are a lot better than regular apartments in our City. I would much rather have affordable housing than regular apartments anymore," said Mayor Smith (Ibid). According to the Mayor, when the City is proactive in affordable housing development, it has more control over the quality of the project. So why then had San Marcos been reluctant to provide affordable housing in the first place? Mr. Gittings offered the following observation:

> Initially, the Council, based on what they have heard from their constituents said they did not want affordable housing. From their perspective, they thought it drove down property values (Gittings 2003).

While the perception that affordable housing would "drive down property values" likely played a part in residents' opposition to affordable housing, this does not imply that the *City's* decisions were fiscally motivated. In other words, for reasons independent of the state-local fiscal structure, affordable housing was opposed, and therefore this example does not fit our understanding of fiscalization of land use.

Despite the City's initial reluctance, or outright failure, to produce or support affordable housing, the lawsuit forced San Marcos to rethink its position. Now, the City has exceeded affordable housing goals in the last housing cycle and according to the City Manager is well on its way to exceeding its allocation for the 1999-2004 housing cycle. According to City Manager Rick Gittings, the implications for the challenged fiscalization of land use hypotheses are clear:

> The argument that this fiscalization of land use is driving out affordable housing is simply not true. Are there cities that don't want affordable housing? Sure. But it is not for fiscalization of land use reasons. It's because of image reasons (Gittings 2003).

While there might be a fiscal disincentive to provide affordable housing, the Carlsbad and San Marcos case studies demonstrate that any such fiscal disincentive has been subordinate to the deeply held desire among local residents to maintain social exclusivity and private property values.

Summary of Findings

For many cities in California housing might do a better job "paying for itself" than originally thought. Growth management policies requiring new development to pay for itself through development fees and exactions, and use of Community Facilities District's (CFD's), create a fiscal environment whereby increasing local population contributes to a city's fiscal stability. Even though the fee revenue generated by the residential uses might not cover the entire cost to provide services, urban areas with a growing number of rooftops are attractive

destinations for large retailers and increasing *net* local revenue is often tied to increasing population. Therefore, the claim that an "over-reliance" on sales tax revenue is leading to retarded residential development should be viewed more critically.

In addition, costs related to development fees and exactions, and mandatory participation in CFD's are (to a certain degree) reflected in the sale or rental price of residential units. Numerous macro- and micro-economic factors contribute to the overall affordability of local housing markets. One such factor is the passing of these fees on to occupants of residential units through increased sales or rental prices market-wide. While the state-local fiscal structure has created an environment whereby CFD's and development fees are necessary to fund basic services and infrastructure, this does not create a motive for local policymakers to resist new residential development for the purpose of balancing municipal budgets; in fact, it mitigates any such motive.

Finally, the large majority of affordable units that have been built over the years in the studied communities are a direct result of a threat of sanction. Although there was (and is) a fiscal incentive to restrict affordable housing production, these cases demonstrate that this motive is subordinate to the deeply held desire among local residents to maintain social exclusivity and property values. This article argues that there is no discernable connection between fiscal incentives and residential development patterns in Carlsbad and San Marcos. While additional studies are appropriate, conclusions drawn from these initial case studies suggest two prominent hypotheses associated with fiscalization of land use theory are suspect. Perhaps the asserted link between fiscal incentives and residential development patterns in California is merely a marriage of convenience.

About the Author

Mr. Brady lives in San Diego, California with his wife and two children. As an associate planner with Cotton/Bridges/Associates, a Division of P&D Consultants, he has a strong background in housing, community, and environmental planning. Mr. Brady's experience includes the preparation of housing elements, general and community plans, analysis of impediments to fair housing choice, consolidated plans, and environmental impact reports. In 2003, he received his B.A. in Urban Studies and Planning, earning Highest Distinction from the University of California at San Diego.

Notes

1 Refer to Schwartz (1997), Fulton (1997, 258-281), Kotin and Peiser (1997), Schrag (1998, 178), and Lewis and Barbour (1999, 78) for a review of research and discussion of this hypothesis.

2 Refer to Fulton (1997, 262) and Wassmer (2002, 1307) for a review of research and discussion of this hypothesis.

3 "Big-box" refers to retail development projects that generate a high level of sales tax revenue per square foot. San Marcos has successfully sited the following "big-box" retailers: Fry's Electronics, Wal-Mart, Costco, Home Depot, Best Buy, Kohl's, Lowe's, and Guitar Center. Contrast this with Carlsbad, where Costco is the only "big-box" retailer in that city.

4 After all, land use has always been "fiscalized" to some extent (Barbour 2002, 60).

5 In these cases, the fiscal windfall that would accrue due to a policymakers decision would be subordinate to the decision makers desire to please her constituency.

6 Fiscalization of land use is *one* result of the regressive state-local fiscal regime. While a result of the state and local fiscal structure, the nearly ubiquitous use of innovative financing mechanisms that force developers to carry an increased burden of the cost to provide public facilities, infrastructure, and services do not necessarily constitute fiscalization of land use (Schrag 1998, 178; and Barbour 2002, 59). Fiscalization of land use theory has appropriately moved beyond attributing every effect of a regressive state-local government finance regime, focusing instead on those effects that affect local government land use decisions.

7 The author would agree with Lewis' (2001, 26) claim that the problems of studying local development decisions are often "intractable."

8 As noted by Dr. Bussell, a lecturer at the University of California at San Diego and commenter on an early draft of this article, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that this may change with time. Windshield surveys of new residential development projects reveal many new homes starting over $500,000, triggering higher property tax assessments, and therefore giving greater fiscal flexibility to decision-makers in San Marcos. It will be interesting to see if land use policy shifts in accordance with the shift in demographics that will likely occur in San Marcos as more and more houses are built for upper-income households. In fact, the City's approval of a second Wal-Mart has recently caused residents to circulate a petition to overturn the decision.

9 Survey methods and results were not available in written form and were therefore conveyed by Mr. Turner in the interview.

10 An interesting discovery that emerged from this investigation is the fact that San Marcos, itself, is in the land development business. An earlier version of this article characterized San Marcos as an *entrepreneurial city* that has bought, developed, and currently manages large tracts of land within its jurisdiction as a means of countering California's regressive state-local government finance structure. Because this activity does not fit our definition of fiscalization of land use (nor should it), further discussion of this issue was determined to be off-point and not appropriate for this article. Whether *entrepreneurial cities* like San Marcos are common in California's local government landscape is not known to the author, but further exploration of this issue could prove revealing.

11 Riverside is another example where in order to increase sales tax revenue and revitalize dead or dying retail commercial centers the City has approved mixed land uses in previously commercial-only areas. The City's General Plan 2025 will include three new mixed land use designations permitting a variety of residential densities on top of, or along side commercial uses on the same lot.

12 CFD's (Mello-Roos Districts) enable cities to finance new public facility projects through issuance of bonds embedded in the property taxes paid on a parcel. Although these types of bonds are subject to a two-thirds vote of affected voters, passing them has been generally successful as it guarantees that the money generated will be spent in the immediate community. In addition, on large vacant parcels, a two-thirds vote of the landowners is required, enabling a relatively small number of landowners to create a CFD and when the property develops, new residents who purchase a new home are required to join into the agreement (Shires and Haber 1997, 22-23).

13 Annually since 2001, the Carlsbad has contracted with the Social and Behavioral Research Institute of California State University at San Marcos to conduct a public opinion survey. The referenced, 2002 survey was conducted via telephone interviews of 1,019 residents of Carlsbad over the age of 18 between July and September, 2002. Respondents

were randomly selected from two regions in Carlsbad (North and South) and there were at least 500 respondents from each region. Interviewers transcribed all responses to open-ended questions and a list of the transcribed responses is contained in the survey report. Findings were determined to be significant to the 95 percent confidence level and the margin of error for the survey is +/- 3 percent (City of Carlsbad 2003, 1-3).

14 A "lower income household" is a household that earns less than 80 percent of the Area Median Income (AMI).

15 As referenced by Calavita and Grimes (1998, 162).

16 The term *paper chase* is used by Fulton (1991, 75) to describe how the California Department of Housing and Community Development often focuses on whether the housing element "complies" with state law, but often does not deal with whether or not enough housing is actually being constructed.

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

The Visioning Process

Point/Counterpoint

Edited by Andy Karvonen

Since the late 1980s, a number of regions in the United States and abroad have engaged in visioning and planning processes to help guide metropolitan development. Cities such as Portland, Nashville, Denver, Baltimore, Atlanta, Salt Lake City, and Austin have used these processes to address issues associated with land development, population growth, traffic congestion, infrastructure, pollution, taxation, housing affordability, environmental conservation and so on. At the same time, regional visioning and planning is aimed at broadening the regional decision-making process to include as many regional stakeholders as possible in future growth choices. In this feature article, we asked six individuals active in regional visioning and planning processes to respond to several questions on the subject. The following are their responses.

Kevin Fayles

Kevin Fayles is the Development Director of Envision Utah, a private/public partnership seeking a regional quality growth strategy through local control and implementation. He is also a member of the West Valley City Board of Adjustment.

Jeff Jack

Jeff Jack is a practicing architect with extensive experience in neighborhood and community planning. He is a past president of the Austin Neighborhoods Council and has also served on the Austin Downtown Development Advisory Committee, the Affordable Housing Taskforce, and Capital Metro's Strategic Advisory Committee. He is currently on the Board of Directors of the Central Texas Clean Air Force and is Chair of the Austin Area Human Services Association Budget and Political Action Committee.

Robin Rather

Robin Rather is an environmentalist and community activist focused on protecting Austin's quality of life. She is the former Chair of the Save Our Springs Alliance and is currently the Chair of Liveable City and the Vice President of the Hill Country Conservancy. She is also a member of the Executive Committee of Envision Central Texas.

Jim Skaggs

Jim Skaggs is a member of the Executive Committee of Envision Central Texas. He is active in transportation planning issues in the Austin area and is the Chairman of Austin Area Citizens for Mobility Excellence. He is the retired Chairman, Chief Executive and President of Tracor, Inc. which was Austin's first Fortune 500 company and the 'granddaddy' of the Austin high-tech industry.

Fritz Steiner

Dr. Fritz Steiner is Dean of the School of Architecture at the University of Texas at Austin. He is a noted author of many books on landscape architecture including "The Living Landscape" and "Human Ecology: Following Nature's Lead." He has worked on numerous environmental plans and designs throughout the United States and is a member of the Executive Committee of Envision Central Texas.

Tim Taylor

Tim Taylor is on the Executive Committee of the Real Estate Council of Austin (RECA) and is the Chair of RECA's Ordinance and Legislation Review Committee. He is also a partner at Jackson Walker LLP where he specializes in land acquisition and development issues. He has been intimately involved with the redevelopment of several neighborhoods in Austin.

QUESTION 1

Is a regional visioning process necessary? Why or why not?

Steiner

A regional visioning process is helpful because it presents alternative futures that citizens can embrace or reject. Regional visioning helps paint pictures of the future that will occur without good planning and positive options that can occur without leadership and imagination.

Fayles

A regional visioning process is necessary because there exists in most regions tremendous fragmentation of cities, towns, special service districts, agencies, and so forth. Many jurisdictions have been left to act independently, compounding the challenges of growing populations. This fragmentation contributes to a "bunker mentality," causing citizens to entrench themselves within the smallest defensible unit (i.e., their city, neighborhood, department, and so on) and to try to manage growth from a "micro" level.

Often, there is no single organization that brings together the major public and private stakeholders to coordinate activities related to growth within the region. For example, a metropolitan planning organization typically focuses on transportation needs and trends – often without considering the impact of roads on land-use; a city council focuses on obtaining a "big box" within its boundaries to generate much needed income without considering the long-term implications with neighboring communities; and a police officer seeks to find affordable housing within the community she serves and protects. There is a tremendous inter-connectedness of local land-use decisions that is often not understood or realized, unless one is able to step back and see the "big picture."

A regional visioning process helps citizens to find ways to overcome their micro-vision and their isolation as individuals and interest groups, and leads to addressing their challenges as a community. Stakeholder involvement, when thinking for the long-term, tends to reduce self-interest.

Taylor

Comprehensive regional visioning is a necessary process for comprehensive regional planning and coordination, but that regional planning must lead to actual implementation strategies and well-defined milestones by which to measure adherence to the vision and plan. The visioning process can be a vital component of such planning to establish a common understanding of stakeholder issues and concerns. The operative word in this question is "regional." This assumes an approach that transcends jurisdictional boundaries and local issues, but nonetheless is responsive to the variety of issues, concerns, and goals that citizens of a region may have.

Skaggs

Regional visioning is not absolutely necessary but, if implemented in a responsible manner, it could have some positive results. Market forces have generally enjoyed much greater success in producing communities that are more effective in addressing the guiding principles of Envision Central Texas (ECT) than central planning approaches. Most countries and U.S. entities using central planning have failed and many have changed or are in the process of changing to more market-oriented solutions.

However, there is a distinction between visioning and planning which often is blurred even by those in the visioning process. Visioning is not intended to be planning. The current visioning process has brought together a selection of diverse citizens from the

region and exposed them to a better understanding of a broad range of growth implications. This should lead to a better understanding of the many perspectives of the stakeholders throughout the region. Hopefully, better understanding will result in more effective communications and progress in making this a better region for all citizens.

Jack

The fact that our community continues to grapple with the problems of transportation, affordability, environmental protection, and preservation of our neighborhoods suggests that our current approach to dealing with the consequences of growth falls short of being able to resolve these issues. Whether we look at the responsibility of government or the role of the private sector in our society, we find that the tools for successful growth management are lacking.

It is clear that the structure of our local governmental entities cannot successfully address these issues within the limitations of their authority and geographical reach. However, it is also obvious that a market economy whose focus is on individual profit and not on the viability of the whole community inherently does not have market mechanisms to address these issues on a regional basis either.

Therefore, a community-based visioning process can be very helpful in identifying what both our jurisdictional authorities and our market economy have to change to address a shared set of community values that can be identified by a visioning process.

Rather

If you believe, as many of us do, that most cities and regions in the United States are increasingly unsustainable, then developing a healthier vision of the future is an extremely valuable and necessary tool. The ECT process provided a critical first look at the possible futures we face in Central Texas. The two years of work built new relationships across antiquated geopolitical boundaries and created a deeper shared knowledge for discussions of the future. These are essential steps in creating a sustainable region.

The ECT vision that has just been released is a very powerful statement of the region's desire to change and to develop in a much healthier direction. This desire is an important and necessary precursor to implementing a meaningful shift in growth and other socio-economic trends.

QUESTION 2

Are there key elements that lead to a successful regional vision?

Taylor

The key elements of a regional vision are identifying the common goals and priorities of a region's residents (e.g., clean air, clean water, efficient transportation network, housing, jobs, and schools). However, a vision by its nature is not an "implementable" plan. Therefore, a plan should incorporate the ideals and goals expressed in the regional vision. Plan components must integrate transportation network construction, civic/institutional uses, utility infrastructure, programmed open space, as well as identification of optimal sites (but not mandated sites) for particular uses (e.g., agriculture, office, retail, industrial). The plan must also address and hopefully enable regional cooperation and inter-governmental communication and coordination.

Jack

There are several key factors in the success of a visioning process:

- It has to be community-based with full public participation.

The process has to be constructed to ensure that all facets of the community have an opportunity to be involved. If a stakeholder process is used, these stakeholders have to truly represent the range of identifiable community interests. A self-selected group that is slanted in its perspective or has a hidden agenda will only result in further community tension. The funding has to come with "no strings attached" so as to preclude any appearance of prejudice.

- It has to provide accurate and thorough data on the existing conditions for the region. This background data may be the most important service to the community that a visioning process can provide in the short-term. This data should include all geographic based data that can be assembled. This would include everything from environmental conditions to man-made infrastructure. It should also include data on quality of life issues such as income levels, ethnic diversity, education levels, and so on.
- It has to provide a thorough assessment of where the current population wants to go with regard to the major issues.

The values of the people need to be recognized as a primary determinant of any "vision." What is it that people like? Why are they here and not someplace else? What do they want their future to be for themselves and their children? These core values should be used to evaluate how we get from where we are to where we want to be.

- It has to develop alternatives with the tradeoffs accurately documented.

We have choices to make with almost every decision about a regional plan and with each choice there are tradeoffs. It is critical that when the choices are presented to the community they really have full knowledge of the tradeoffs. If you are asked if you want to be given a new car and you can pick between a Mercedes and a Ford, you may choose the Mercedes, but if you are told that the monthly payment for the Mercedes is four times what it is for the Ford, you may change your mind if you have to make that monthly payment. Without full disclosure of what the implications of the choices are, it is just a beauty contest and such a plan will falter when the community is presented with the real consequences of these choices.

- It has to have public scrutiny to see how well the alternatives meet the community's desires, goals, and objectives.

Since most visioning processes are actually developed by a core group of volunteers, maybe some donated governmental staff time and some professional consulting, there is a tendency for the guiding group to take the public and stakeholder input and then formulate a resultant "vision" without taking the step to go back and see if this product truly reflects the will of the people. But this step is essential if the vision will have significant buy-in from the community.

Skaggs

Early understanding of the true implications and trade-offs of growth decisions will lead to a more successful regional vision and resulting plans. The beginning vision is not yet fully developed in this regard. The total implications of such things as the actual choices of citizens, much higher population densities, and transportation solutions are not well understood.

A successful vision should provide for the dynamic, adaptive, and evolutionary nature of neighborhoods and cities. It should not lead to prescriptive, centralized plans that attempt

to determine the detailed outcome of community form and function. It should allow a diversity of neighborhood design as desired by the market. Densities and land use should be primarily market driven and not plan driven.

Success can be measured in a number of ways. A short term measure is how well the vision is accepted by all the stakeholders. Longer term measures include:

- Are the vision and the sustaining organization successful in facilitating the bringing together of various parties to resolve growth issues in a more effective way?
- Is the vision the catalyst for changing growth patterns and decisions in a way that enhances the region's ability to better achieve the vision's guiding principles?
- Are planning and zoning codes changed to allow more development patterns such as traditional neighborhood design, historic neighborhood renovation and conversion, and other mixed-use development which are supported by the market?
- Have property rights been respected?
- Is the quality of life improving for the citizens?
- Absent a material threat to other individuals or the community, are people allowed to live and work where and how they like?

Steiner

The key elements to a successful regional vision include: strong leadership, an active core group of participants, effective consultants, broad participation, ample media coverage, and concrete measures to implement the vision.

Fayles

Feedback from the community interviews conducted by Envision Utah's Steering Committee led to the following conclusions on key elements of a successful regional vision:

- Develop an on-going process – not a project.
- Create a process that could be repeated and updated over the years to address growth challenges.
- Identify representatives from both the public and private sectors of the community who would be willing to work toward the common good.
- Design a group that is manageable in size and represents as many segments of the community as possible.
- Develop several alternative growth scenarios as choices for future growth.
- Complete a baseline report projecting how the area would grow without change in current growth trends.
- Design an effective technical model to create and analyze a baseline and alternative scenarios.
- Provide area residents with an opportunity to be involved in the process as much as possible, be able to assess the results, and make decisions about how the region should grow.

Rather

The question of timing or whether the region is ready to approach problems on a regional scale is an important element in determining the success of a visioning effort. Were Austin and Central Texas ready to deal with regionalism? What conditions or preparations should be in place before certain visioning processes are undertaken? How does the region's historical, social, and political culture determine which visioning approach will work best? Few of these questions were asked or answered in the case of ECT. Nevertheless, ECT will likely be seen down the road as a significant milestone in changing the way planning and

implementation is approached. As an initial education, communication, and relationship building process, ECT was not perfect but was a big step towards a regional framework.

Even more important than timing is a real commitment to inclusion of the people of the region. This is far easier said than done. This commitment means extensive participation across cultural and age groups. ECT was not able to foster much participation from within the Hispanic community or among the younger generation and did not spend much time considering cross cultural perspectives.

Hopefully, near term efforts will focus on the large and growing Hispanic population as well as schoolchildren/young adults who are so important to the future success of the region and will make them a permanent part of the process.

The Sustainability Indicators Project is an important program that goes a long way to providing a framework for measuring progress towards the key goals outlined by the ECT vision. But the most important way to measure success may be whether the vision acts as a catalyst for change across the region. What types of innovation does the vision foster over time? How much independent action is taken by local communities in the region as a result of the vision? And what is the depth of the commitment that people feel for moving forward with the shared vision? These are the crucial human questions that will measure the ultimate success of the Vision.

QUESTION 3

Who should be involved in the process of regional planning? Is it possible to represent all stakeholders?

Rather

Ideally, all stakeholders should be involved, of course. In practice however, this is almost never achieved. Generally, the most privileged voices and those that are most politically dominant are over-represented while the politically, economically, and socially disadvantaged are under-represented. That was certainly the case with ECT.

At every point in the process, regional visioning organizations need to push past their own comfort zones and take extraordinary steps to ensure participation across all segments of citizenry, especially those less powerfully and politically connected. This is particularly important in regions such as Central Texas that anticipate a high degree of demographic change.

Skaggs

Most planning in the region is conducted by local entities such as counties, cities, towns, and neighborhoods or regional planning organizations. It is not perfect and there are problems but, to a substantial degree, planning between these jurisdictions has been reasonably successful for some time.

There are also various regional planning efforts by organizations such as the Texas Department of Transportation, the Regional Mobility Authority, and the Capital Area Metropolitan Planning Organization. The Austin – San Antonio Intermunicipal Commuter Rail District, the Capital Area Planning Council, the Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and various other organizations address issues such as water supply and quality, education, health care, and so on. Each of these organizations has stakeholder representation and has established processes for stakeholder input, involvement or approval. In effect, all citizens should be involved in regional planning either directly or indirectly through representation which they support or elect.

However, it is very difficult to represent all stakeholders on every issue. ECT's stated

intent is to have a balanced board with proportional representation from the five counties, with a balanced representation of the Civic/Neighborhood, Business, Environmental, Elected Officials, and Public Officials areas and a good balance of gender and ethnicity. It is debatable that ECT's board membership goal has fully achieved this objective and the desired balance has been somewhat less effective because about half of the ECT board attended 30% or fewer of the meetings. This does not invalidate ECT's work but it is a factor to consider in representing positions as a consensus of the entire community. Likewise, citizen participation in the visioning process, while very important, is not truly representative of the entire region. ECT must remain mindful of this shortcoming in the work ahead.

Jack

The simple answer to this question is that everyone impacted by the regional plan should be involved in the planning effort. However, this is not practical with the limitations of an individual's time to be involved with all decisions that affect him or her. We also need to recognize the various degrees to which individuals are impacted by certain decisions. Certainly, someone who drives down a street is impacted by the traffic congestion on that street, but to the person who has a business on that street, the congestion and any proposed solutions to the traffic problem is of much greater concern.

It is probably not possible to have everyone involved but it is possible to identify key groups that are impacted and invite them into the process as part of a "stakeholder" process. The key elements to the success of such a stakeholder process are:

- Be sure that the determination of who is a stakeholder is a public process which allows for full public disclosure of who is invited to the table. A select set of stakeholders chosen from the top down is unlikely to be inclusive and will only generate resentment by those left out of the process.
- All stakeholders have to have mutual respect and acknowledge the legitimacy of other groups designated as stakeholders. The process will be ill-served by some groups having preference over others.
- The selected stakeholders need to truly represent the group's interest and have the ability to speak for the group they are supposed to represent. This opportunity to be a stakeholder is coupled with the responsibility to act as a representative of the larger constituency, facilitating communication in both directions and conveying information and decisions.

But, as valuable as a stakeholder process can be, it needs to be coupled with the opportunity for the general public to have access to the process and the opportunity to have meaningful input to the decisions made.

Taylor

Regional planning should involve those with expertise and those with decision-making authority. Ultimately, no plan is viable unless it is supported and endorsed by elected officials throughout the planning region. Furthermore, experienced leaders in the fields of planning, engineering, and regional economics must be involved in regional planning. Ideally, these individuals would not represent any individual stakeholder group and would not have any preconceived bias in order to ensure an optimal and equitable planning recommendation. It is up to the elected officials to ensure that their constituents' concerns are adequately represented.

While it is possible and even beneficial to have as many stakeholder groups as possible involved in a visioning process, an actual planning process can get hopelessly bogged down if there are "too many cooks in the kitchen." Opening the regional planning process to

each and every remotely interested stakeholder group will likely result in many single-issue debates, causing the participants to lose sight of the envisioned goals, and negate the purposes of comprehensive planning.

Steiner

Regional planning should involve elected officials, the leadership of agencies involved in planning, business and environmental groups, neighborhood organizations, minority groups, the press, educators, youth groups, and anyone else who is interested. I think it is possible to involve all stakeholders, either directly or through representation or by surveys and the media.

Fayles

For a regional planning process to have staying power, it must include representation from as many factions as possible, including opposing parties, to respond to the growth question. Gaining community input is a critical step in building community support to begin the process. In the case of Envision Utah, interviews were held with more than 150 community leaders, including educators, business leaders, religious leaders, media representatives, conservationists, developers, local and state government leaders, utility companies, minority leaders, and so on. Each person was asked:

- Do you believe a process to coordinate future growth would be helpful?
- Will you support this process?
- Who should be involved in this process to ensure its worth and success?

The interviews yielded important feedback on how to proceed and what obstacles might occur.

Utah, like many states, reveres local control and a move towards the establishment of another layer of government in the form of a regional power would be easily defeated. In some political circles, "planning" is considered a four-letter word. Therefore, Envision Utah's Steering Committee understood that local control had to be protected. In addition, a steering committee should take the form of a public/private partnership, motivated by good information and a sincere desire to work for the common good of all residents – both present and future. In other words, "leave your self-interest at the door, but bring your expertise with you."

QUESTION 4
What methods are most effective to determine the needs of the population in a given region?

Taylor

The greatest challenge of planning, beyond the issues of time and space, is working in the public interest. The public interest is the tense intersection between the needs of the region, the needs of the communities comprising the region, and the sum of needs of all individuals in the region. Transportation needs vary among communities and among households within each community. The same can be said for housing, employment, and recreation needs, among other elements or factors. There are likely not many common needs, but rather a matrix of needs depending on a variety of factors (such as location within the region, income level, children, and so forth).

Thus, I think that identifying all of the varying wants and needs of each community and each household cannot be strictly determined; however, a regional visioning process that incorporates as many methods of input as possible will be more likely to give the direct participants or leaders in the visioning process and the planners in a regional planning process information that is useful and meaningful. These methods include surveys in local newspapers, "town hall meetings," direct mail polls and surveys, and, ideally, some independent polling that uses a truly scientific polling process. Too many visioning and planning processes rely on the input coming from persons willing to commit the time or volunteer information. Some scientific polling that interviews a cross section of the communities and the region is more likely to produce a clear view of the needs of the population. For example, a single parent with three children and two jobs is not likely to spend a lot of time going to town hall meetings or filling out surveys, but that person might be responsive to a telephone poll or direct, in-person canvassing.

The key point is that there is not a "one-size fits all" approach to determining a regional population's needs. We need to recognize that all households require food, shelter, mobility, employment, and the means by which each household achieves those needs must not be centrally planned. However, the extent to which an understanding of the variety of needs can be achieved is more likely to result in a vision and a plan that enables its citizens to fulfill their needs.

Skaggs

As an example, Envision Central Texas is addressing very complex issues and concepts which are not well understood by most citizens and many are very controversial among various groups. Tradeoffs between different policy options for addressing the issues are poorly understood. Therefore, it is difficult for an individual to make an informed determination of needs based on the short time available and the very surface and summary level information provided. It is vital that eventual planning be based upon facts and not perceptions. I have a strong belief that if people are provided all the relevant facts and considerations without political or vested interest 'spin,' they will make decisions which will best serve the overall community.

First and foremost, the actions and decisions of people reflect their needs better than any other indicator. Beyond this, there are many representatives of the population such as elected officials and their appointees who represent their needs. Valid, random surveys can provide important information concerning population needs.

ECT's goal is to establish a vision which best serves the current and future citizens of the region. Therefore, all public input to the ECT process is important in the board's development and adoption of the regional vision which will serve as the foundation for

future ECT activities. The input to date is important but it is by no measure a "mandate." The self-selection nature of all the participants in the ECT workshops and the final public survey, as well as strong lobbying efforts by some organizations with vested interests, must be considered in the evaluation along with prior random survey and focus group information, and decision trends by the citizens.

Fayles

Some of the most effective methods to determine the needs of a population are questionnaires, random sampling surveys, and polling. Envision Utah has had great success in hosting community workshops where residents are educated on possible planning tools (i.e., clustering development, public transportation options, and baseline trends) and given the opportunity to express their opinions. Our approach has been to divide those individuals attending workshops into diverse groups and ask them for input on where growth should be accommodated and how. Paper chips, representing different types of development, are then placed on maps. Each group's map is subsequently compared with the others from the workshop to determine common themes. Follow-up workshops are held for additional comment and modification. These maps lead to zoning and code changes by the local officials. The workshops put citizens in the proactive role of property development, rather than the usual role in which developers make a plan and citizens can only react to it. Developers, property owners, city officials, and others benefit from working together and making tradeoffs in conjunction with problem solving.

For Envision Utah, another key element was conducting a series of in-depth interviews to find out what residents valued about Utah. For example, our research showed that Utahans would be more receptive to nature preservation as it related to places families could go to get away rather than preservation for its own sake. Many activities and education campaigns were subsequently tied back into the data discovered in this values study. It proved to be critical to the regional planning process.

Rather

Benchmarking and indicators are important methods that can be used to identify and track needs and changes in needs over time. However, to understand and identify diverse community priorities, regional organizations need inclusive representation within their leadership coupled with a serious commitment to listening across cultural, social, and economic barriers. These are crucial components to a deeper understanding of the needs and hopes of the people of the region.

Unfortunately, the temptation exists for the most dominant voices to override or gloss over community needs with their own interests rather than negotiating in a more equitable fashion. One of the most interesting examples of this problem during the ECT process was the ongoing discussion about the role of market forces. While some representatives of the development community argued that market forces automatically address the important needs of the region, other members of the environmental, neighborhood, and social services communities believed reliance on market forces ignores the pressing needs of the historically disadvantaged and negates the concept of sustainability.

This legitimate question of "whose world view is the plan based on?" is an important part of the dialog in any visioning exercise. A vision that includes multiple definitions is likely to be more meaningful and credible. Balancing existing market trends with the ability to shape innovative yet pragmatic alternatives is an irreplaceable regional skill set.

Jack

There are a variety of methods that can be used to determine the needs of a community. Typical methods include simple opinion polling, statistical sampling, and benchmarking key indicators. However, each of these has it own limitations with regard to determining what the community really desires and we have to be mindful of the difference between true needs and wants. As an example, opinion polling is often used to gauge the sentiments of a community. However, public opinion can be shaped by many factors and may not actually correspond to the real needs of the people. If the popular press and local elected and community leaders believe that a certain action is needed in the community, they may use their position to mould public opinion. In Austin, after several years of almost daily media attention on traffic issues, was it a surprise that when polling was done that "traffic congestion" was rated the biggest problem in the area?

Statistical sampling is a little better in gauging real needs but it too has its own drawbacks. The significance of the sample may be scientifically verifiable, but this form of response is entirely dependent on how the questions are constructed and what information is provided to the respondent. A sampling question like "Do you want highways improved to relieve traffic congestion?" is a very different question than "Do you want to add 10% to your property tax bill to widen our streets?" Again, this process can be manipulated toward a predetermined outcome by how the process is constructed.

Benchmarking how the community is doing seems to offer a better opportunity to extrapolate the real needs. As an example, if per capita income is rising more slowly than the cost of living, then this may indicate the need to address either cost of living factors or economic viability. If the education levels of the current population are less that the education needs of new businesses, then we may need to ask if these are the right businesses to bring to the area or what we need to do to increase the education levels of our current population? This type of benchmarking can help ascertain specific needs in the region.

However, to be of real service to the community, whatever benchmarks we use must be relative to one another and connected to some higher community value. One possible unifying indicator is "Do people stay in the community over time?" It is only reasonable to assume that people stay where they want to be and move on when their needs are not being met. Some change is due to personal preference, such as wanting to be closer to grandchildren, while other decisions are made because of personal needs such as having to move for a job. While we are a very mobile culture and moving around is easier than ever, it is the "why" and how much we move that is important in ultimately determining the community's needs.

QUESTION 5

How important is population forecasting when designing a regional plan?

Taylor

Population forecasting serves best to provide a timeframe in which to implement a regional plan. Various plans may result based on the assumptions of varying population projections. The greatest value is providing planners and service providers a plan with alternatives and milestones to accommodate the needs of future residents, whatever the number may be.

Skaggs

Population forecasting is important but, due to the uncertainty of population forecasting, ECT indicated an approximate doubling of the population over a 20- to 40-year period. This allows the vision to consider the broad implications of doubling the population but the more

detailed planning and implementation will develop on a schedule paced by the actual population growth and its location. The most likely thing to happen is that the actual population increases will be substantially different in size and location from that projected in the vision. This is why the vision must be broad and flexible and is not a plan.

Fayles

It is very important to know what the future population is likely to be, so plans can be made to anticipate their needs. In Envision Utah, the projected 20-year population figure was used as the absolute number of people who needed to be accommodated with the chips process. (In our community visioning workshops, each chip represented a certain number of people. By requiring workshop attendees to place all of the required chips on the regional map, they could visualize just how many people needed to be accommodated within the geographic constraints.)

Jack

Traditionally, regional planning starts with projecting population growth and then plans on how to accommodate it. The usual methodology is to do a statistical progression analysis based on a selected number of past years' data, extend it out for a period of years, and then try to figure out how best to manage the result. This approach is very speculative and therefore very risky to solely base regional planning on. As any stock prospectus will tell you "past performance is no indicator of future profit." And so it is with such population projections. While we should have this data available for consideration, it should not be seen as a given.

However, planning needs to be based on some form of expectations. Fortunately, there are other ways to make forecasts that can be more useful in regional visioning. One essential analysis that should be done is to look at the carrying capacity of the region's resources. The ability of a region to accommodate additional growth should be assessed with regard to the available water, wastewater treatment capacity, electrical generation capacity, transportation systems, agricultural lands, and food production. These are critical in assessing a region's sustainability. In addition, we should assess what the current population's expectations are for quality of life issues such as the cost of living, cultural amenities, educational opportunities, and so forth. These sustainability and subjective factors may be more important in determining the appropriate population growth for a particular region than just a statistical projection of the past.

Rather

For ECT, forecasting 1.25 million future residents over the next 20 to 40 years was a pivotal and controversial issue. By simplifying the process and considering only one high estimate, it may have over-projected infrastructure needs with all the resulting costs and impacts while not providing the most realistic set of scenarios. Cities grow and change differently over time and it may be more effective to create scenarios around several different variations of population trends – high, medium, and low. Also, a twenty-year forecast may be too short a time horizon. Regions may need to look at even longer planning cycles to fully understand the impact on issues such as water availability and open space.

Steiner

Population forecasts are very helpful, but, as Lewis Mumford observed, "trend is not destiny." Good forecasts are usually derived from past and current trends which have limited predictive power.

QUESTION 6
What are the short-term and long-term goals of the regional planning process? Who should be responsible for carrying these goals forward?

Rather

The long-term goal should be to create a sustainable region and the most important short-term goal may be to first define and establish a sustainable economy. All citizens, stakeholder groups, and elected officials should be responsible for developing the expertise necessary to achieve these goals.

Taylor

Short-term goals must be focused on action and implementation within the principles of the regional vision. Short-term goals are concerned with details: road construction, financing/payment, utility infrastructure, and inter-governmental cooperation.

Long-term goals must allow for flexibility because community and individual needs evolve over time. Therefore, planning and implementation must reflect those changes. Adhering to a plan developed in the 1970s prior to the development of the Internet and mobile phone technology, for example, would prove futile as it does not represent the realities of today or the possibilities of the future. In real estate, site design and development constantly change. Also, new engineering techniques and solutions and new technologies may allow a type and/or density of development which is environmentally-sensitive but which could not have been foreseen during the original visioning and planning process. Commercial design, residential design, and ideals of communities and neighborhoods are not timeless laws set in stone, so flexibility and the tools for responding to change are key elements of a good regional plan.

Plans must be responsive, yet maintain goals that are timeless: a healthy and sustainable economy, a good quality of life with the cornerstone being a clean and protected environment, and a culture that seeks to achieve social equity. The goals should help achieve the common vision, which, for example, will likely be along the lines of an outstanding community in which all citizens have the opportunity to find meaningful employment, affordable housing, and outstanding education within a clean and safe environment. Generally speaking, the goal of regional planning and visioning is to reach consensus and develop goals that will help the region achieve a sustainable balance of economic, social, and environmental interests to ensure the long-term vitality of the region and the communities within the region.

Long-term goals are the responsibility of the region's citizens. That statement is not necessarily contrary to the statements above regarding those involved in the regional planning effort. Planning is the delicate balance between implementing short-term solutions while maintaining long-term flexibility. Elected officials must carry out the short-term goals. It is up to the electorate to insist upon future leaders who adhere to and promote the regional vision.

Steiner

The short-term and long-term goals of the regional planning process will vary from place to place. Generally, the goals will need to address issues that are regional in scope which most likely will include transportation, water and sewer systems, environmental quality (especially clean air and water), open space, land use, and economic development. I think the best entity to carry these goals forward is some type of regional organization, either governmental or non-governmental.

Fayles

Both the short-term and long-term goals of a regional planning process should develop through a grassroots, inclusive process that allows residents to make their preferences known. In the case of Envision Utah, years of exhaustive involvement of the public, local and state officials, and numerous stakeholders led to the broadly and publicly supported Quality Growth Strategy (QGS). The seven goals of QGS help protect the environment and maintain economic vitality and quality of life as the region accommodates anticipated growth:

- Enhance air quality
- Increase mobility and transportation choices
- Preserve critical lands, including agricultural, sensitive, and strategic open lands
- Conserve and maintain availability of water resources
- Provide housing opportunities for a range of family and income types
- Maximize efficiency in public and infrastructure investments to promote other goals
- Revise the tax structure to promote better development decisions

The primary responsibility for implementation falls on local governments, state and local incentives, and the actions of developers and consumers in the free market, as well as public approval of transit tax through a county referendum. Envision Utah's objective is to analyze and disseminate the costs and benefits associated with these goals and their accompanying 32 strategies. Envision Utah seeks progress over time by working with the entities that hold responsibility for these goals and strategies. Most of the strategies are incremental steps that can take place over time, provided the right regulatory and market environment. Envision Utah's role is to encourage the creation of that environment by providing information and resources to community leaders in order to broaden the choices available to them, to facilitate more informed decision-making, and keeping regional goals and objectives in the minds of local officials.

Skaggs

The short term goals are to find a way to fund the continuation of the ECT organization and to establish a set of prioritized tasks which are consistent with the vision and can bring early positive results in improving regional planning. The long term goal is to continue to work with governmental and stakeholder groups throughout the region to educate, encourage, motivate, and facilitate the solution to growth related issues which will enhance the quality of life of all citizens.

Jack

The most important short-term resultant of such a process is to engage the region's residents in a discussion of these issues. The long-term goal is to create mechanisms at both the governmental and market level to achieve a sustainable regional population.

QUESTION 7

Is there a way to measure the success of a regional planning process?

Fayles

Generally, success is measured in specific quality of life targets the process has defined, such as air quality, vehicle miles traveled, transit ridership, appropriate densification, development of a regional public transportation system, open space preservation, changes in long-term plans and ordinances at the local level, and so forth. Though more anecdotal, success can be measured by what percentage of active stakeholders support the regional plan, how well it has made its influence felt in local planning decisions, or if it has been an active force in shaping growth decisions in the region. Knowing what can and cannot be measured, as well as when to actually measure an area, is often an art rather than a science.

Jack

The most important measure of success of a regional plan is to look at who we are today and then assess as the plan unfolds, how those people who are here today fare as a result of the actions taken by both the market and our local governments in response to the regional vision. If we are truly building this plan to guide our collective decisions so as to help better the quality of life for those who live here now, then we just need to keep an eye on that target as we move forward. If we see that we have built a beautiful new community but the majority of folks who live here today have had to move away, then we have failed the most basic purpose of such a planning exercise.

Steiner

I think sustainability indicators that assess progress on specific environmental, equity, and economic conditions can be effective measures.

Taylor

Success of a regional planning process lies in execution. The best-laid plans are worthless if left on a shelf gathering dust. Planning is not supposed to be an intellectual exercise for the sake of debate and pretty maps. There are always needs to be addressed at any time, and planning without execution addresses none of those needs. Therefore, success can be measured in terms of how well a plan is realized through construction, job creation, improved health measures, and so forth. Furthermore, the success of a planning process is based on its relevance and responsiveness. A planning process must be deemed a failure if it has not been implemented and is replaced by another effort.

Finally, the ultimate measure of success of a regional planning process is the vitality of the region viewed over a long period of time. Were the goals and ideals of the vision achieved? Did communities prosper? Did the region actually grow in a way that reflected the vision and the plan? The answers to these and other questions that visioning is intended to address will allow one to determine whether or not a regional planning process was successful.

Rather

In the case of Austin, the most important measure of success for a plan is whether or not it is actually implemented as opposed to just sitting on the shelf. Most of the plans, regardless of how much citizen input was received, have not been implemented at all, resulting in a considerable amount of "planning cynicism" and frustration. Thus, it is crucial to capture both imagination and confidence in the region with a bold vision to debunk the widespread sentiment that plans don't matter.

Special thanks for Mark Yznaga and Kathleen Ligon for contributing to this article.

Solomon, Daniel, 2003. *Global City Blues*. Washington D.C. : Island Press.

Review by Oormi Kapadia

Global City Blues is a collection of essays by Daniel Solomon, one of the nation's leading designers of housing and urban neighborhoods. He is Emeritus Professor of architecture at the University of California, Berkeley and co-founder of the Congress for a New Urbanism. These essays are compelling anecdotes of the horrors of modernism and the post-World War II rationale that inform today's American cities. The book addresses present day dialogues regarding sprawl, urban disintegration, and placelessness as well as a wide range of issues affecting everyday life from the place of technology to the essential nature of food and urbanism.

The essays are as much a critical re-examination of modern urban theories as they are a romantic nostalgia of the author's personal experiences. They are structured under seven main themes: Nearness, Times, Site vs. Zeit, Urbanism, In Asia, Cybertime, and Signs of Life. Through these groups of essays readers are introduced to various people, places, and ideas that have been instrumental in shaping the world we inhabit. Solomon argues that in the past fifty years the Zeitgeist dreams of modernism have been successful in ignoring the historical legacy and the identities attached with the American cities. Furthermore, the manifestation of these dreams have succeeded in replacing the complexities of traditional urban streets with monstrous freeways and neighborhood corner stores with placeless boxes and shopping malls.

The book begins on the philosophical basis conveyed by Heidegger's argument of "loss of nearness." Contemporary, everyday life experiences this loss of nearness in the social, physical, and natural environments as well as from one's own self. Throughout the book, this central idea is elaborated by various examples from the author's personal and professional experiences. On the ideological front, Solomon manages to criticize both Corbusier (a proponent of mid 20th century's modernistic utopia) and Koolhas (an advocate of the 21st century's humanist deconstructivism) in the same breath. Rather than creating an aura of pessimism, the book initiates an alternative perspective of looking at the cities through the glasses of New Urbanism. The essay about the author's personal experience with urban theorist and critic Colin Rowe barely manages to question the theory of New Urbanism which is presented as the proposed solution. Two essays at the end of the book are aptly dedicated to the efforts of various organizations like the Congress for a New Urbanism and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development towards achieving the vision of place making and HOPE VI's efforts at addressing the issues of equity on an urban scale. The book concludes with the optimistic beginnings of what the author terms "a new era" where efforts would be concentrated at creating a city fabric as opposed to isolated monuments in a park.

The lucid language and anecdotal structure of the book provides entertaining as well as a thought-provoking reading. Since this serves to introduce the reader to existing issues in planning, design, and sustainability, it is recommended reading for enthusiasts, professionals, and especially for those who care about the future of urban life in America.

Frank, Lawrence D., Peter O. Engelke, and Thomas L. Schmid. 2003. *Health and Community Design: The Impact of the Built Environment on Physical Activity*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

Review by Lisa M. Weston



The relationship between the health and planning professions goes back many years. The connection between the smokestacks of the early days of the Industrial Revolution and the poor health of nearby neighbors was direct and addressed by nascent planning efforts. Since then, public health officials have worked on issues such as communicable diseases while planners addressed growth issues as the influx of automobiles has lead to a changing cityscape. Now planners, public health officials, and researchers have come together once again grappling with problems as intuitively direct as the one described above – how does the built environment, that combination of land use, the transportation system, and design, promote or deter good physical health?

Journals, popular magazines, and newspapers are filled with articles about urban sprawl, traffic congestion, and the increasing percentage of overweight and obese Americans. In *Health and Community Design: The Impact of the Built Environment on Physical Activity*, Lawrence D. Frank, Peter O. Engelke, and Thomas L. Schmid attempt to untangle the separate elements contributing to the dynamic association between people's health (specifically physical activity) and the environment. They focus on three strands of influence: the transportation system, land use, and urban design.

Frank, Engelke, and Schmid have done a good job of bringing together relevant material from a variety of disciplines. A reader who is from one discipline might be tempted to skip the chapters in their area and just read the ones from the other disciplines. That approach is not recommended. Instead, the reader may benefit from first reading the conclusion of each chapter. The conclusions to chapters two through five and seven through nine (there is no conclusion for chapter six) are excellent, well-crafted summaries. Readers with some familiarity with a topic would benefit from reading the chapter conclusions in order to assure they understand the authors' arguments and then decide how much they need to go back and read.

The chapters describing the essential elements from the public health and planning professions provide the reader with background material that serves two purposes. First, it allows someone new to the profession to understand its basic tenets. Second, it provides a bridge between the professions since they often have different ways of describing the same thing. For example, many transportation professionals have been asking, "How can we get people to drive less?" While health professionals are asking, "How can we get people to walk more?" Clearly, these questions are two sides of the same coin.

After presenting the fundamentals of this new dialogue between the disciplines, the concluding chapters are anticlimactic. Data from Atlanta, Georgia and Portland, Oregon are used to flesh out the theoretical constructs of the earlier chapters. Admittedly, the combination of land use, the transportation system, and urban design manifests itself in a spectrum of outcomes. The authors have tried to isolate the impacts of these three main elements, but it is the chemistry among these elements (as well as other factors such as climate and topography) that determines the impact of the built environment on physical activity.

This is not a book about answers. However, it is an excellent resource for many reasons. To demonstrate the interaction among the three main fields discussed here the authors present a diagram of three overlapping circles. This book allows those that assemble where the three circles meet to speak to each other in a common language. Furthermore, this is an excellent introduction to the dialogues on this subject that are happening in other professions. Lastly, the authors articulate many questions that require scrutiny by researchers, planners, public health professionals, and policy makers interested in addressing this serious health issue.

Revell, Keith D. 2003. *Building Gotham: Civic Culture and Public Policy in New York City, 1898 – 1938*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Review by Andy Karvonen

In 1898, the New York State legislature passed a landmark law to create Greater New York, a metropolis of 3.5 million people including the boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island. The nascent region instantly became the second largest urban area in the world and presented a plethora of new challenges to planning and management due to its great diversity, complexity, and physical size. The centralization of greater New York was undertaken to consolidate shared public services and create an efficient and rationally planned hub of economic activity. *Building Gotham: Civic Culture and Public Policy in New York City, 1898 – 1938* documents the rise of the city as an interconnected metropolis and highlights the difficulties and challenges in large-scale urban planning. The author emphasizes the influence of experts, including engineers, bankers, lawyers, and planners, in fostering the interdependence of the region through technical, financial, legal, and physical means.

The need for comprehensive infrastructure planning in New York City emerged with the proliferation of skyscrapers, rail lines, roads, subways, water and sewer lines, and electricity service, all elements of the new and modern city. Keith Revell, a professor in the School of Policy and Management at Florida International University, explains the emergence of urban interdependence and divides the topic into three sections to describe how both private and public interests coped with large-scale system building. The first section of the book addresses the development of private infrastructure, specifically rail lines for transporting goods from the busiest port in the country to the rest of the United States. The port was the key to growth of the region and the municipal government was in continual negotiation with railroad companies to make infrastructure decisions that would benefit the public as well as function as a part of the larger, comprehensive transportation network. Engineers working as employees of the railroad companies often mediated between realizing profits for their companies and maximizing the public good. These experts were instrumental in viewing the railways from a systems perspective and recognized the long-term benefits of planning private infrastructure so that it would protect the welfare of the general public.

In the second section of the book, Revell describes public infrastructure and how the regional governments in Greater New York systematically created underground services including water, sewer, and subway lines. These service networks required the successful coordination of numerous local governments and managers of these systems often wrestled

with the problem of the "free rider" or those individuals who did not pay their fair share for public services. Experts in finance, particularly J.P. Morgan and his banking colleagues, were instrumental in creating the municipal taxing strategies to finance these new public services. Bankers were also influential in determining how the government would spend the funds they borrowed and how they would manage their debt loads.

The third and best section of the book describes the development of planning and the struggle of the metropolitan government in negotiating private property rights. Edward Bassett, a leading proponent of zoning in the United States, campaigned for zoning laws to guide the development of skyscrapers in Manhattan as well as resolve the ever-increasing conflicts in land use throughout the region. Skyscraper regulation was at the heart of the zoning debate because these buildings affected residents in terms of economics, safety, health, and welfare. Bassett was successful in framing the zoning debate on specific zoning decisions instead of its overall legal constitutionality. Regional planning experts also fought for a centralized planning authority that would consider the metropolis from a regional instead of local perspective. This shift to a regional focus was often perceived as a threat to local politicians, particularly the borough presidents who relished their discretion in planning their jurisdictions. Proponents of comprehensive planning were eventually successful in establishing a regional planning authority in 1938 after two decades of debate and, while not immediately successful, the new agency represented New York City's genuine commitment to regional planning.

This book covers a wide range of topics and, for the most part, Revell succeeds in demonstrating that the idea of collective living on such a large scale required a novel approach – thinking regionally while acting locally. No longer could local bureaucrats monopolize how a particular area of the metropolis would be shaped but instead would have to consider neighbors and the region as it related to infrastructure planning. This new regional focus also highlighted the tension between public and private investment in urban areas. Revell debunks the myth that the sole motivation of private interests is profit and emphasizes the importance of companies such as railroads and banking to the development of infrastructure systems in New York City through their private planning efforts. These private companies recognized the advantage of comprehensive planning and hired experts to devise solutions that would serve both private and public interests. Finally, Revell demonstrates that the rise of the metropolis is intricately linked to the emergence of the "expert." Engineers, financial analysts, planners, lawyers, and sanitarians were all crucial actors in the regional planning efforts of New York City and often served as rational moderators between public and private interests.

Florida, Richard. 2004. *The Rise of the Creative Class: and How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, & Every Day Life*. New York: Basic Books.

Review by Elizabeth D. McLamb



In *The Rise of the Creative Class: and How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, & Everyday Life*, Richard Florida, a Professor of Regional Economic Development at Carnegie Mellon University and a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., describes his creative class theory of economic growth. First released in hardback in 2002, Florida's ideas received widespread attention from a variety of academic and professional fields. In early 2004, *The Rise of the Creative Class* was released in paperback, including a new preface that responds to some of the criticisms of the first edition and presents new information. Also included are updated city rankings based on a revised Creativity Index, a new appendix explaining the technical details of these changes, and an example of one community's "creative environment building principles" called the Memphis Manifesto. The remainder of the paperback version is unchanged, providing the same highly readable and engaging description of the development and implications of the creative class theory, as well as the controversial assumptions and methodologies used to quantify creativity.

Florida introduces the creative class theory by analyzing economic transformations over the last century. While natural resources and agriculture drove economic growth initially, today's growth is driven by people and ideas. Florida argues that this transformation is illustrated both through the change in the share of jobs held by the three principle economic classes, the working class, the service class, and the creative class; and by examining the rising importance of "information" and "knowledge" in the new economy.

Florida defines the creative class in two components: the super creative core and the creative professionals. The creative core includes artists, musicians, scientists, engineers, architects, designers, entertainers, and educators – people who create new ideas, technology, and creative content that are widely usable and transferable. The creative professionals make up a broader group from business and finance, law, healthcare, and related fields – people who integrate and apply the new ideas developed by the creative core. Both groups "share a common creative ethos that values creativity, individuality, difference, and merit."

Comparing historical census data and 2001 occupational and employment data, Florida found that the percent-share of creative class jobs has increased from approximately 10% in 1900 to 30% in 2001. Likewise, Florida cites more than 800% increase in research and development investment and 250% increase in patents granted between 1950 and 2000 as evidence of the growing significance of the creative class in the U.S. economy.

The increase of the creative class has caused numerous social, cultural, and lifestyle implications. According to Florida, more and more people work in casual and autonomic office environments, blend work and life into one common experience, spend more and non-traditional hours at the office, and choose to delay marriage and children. In addition, the labor market has become more horizontal, where workers are not as tied to one particular company and tend to move laterally from job to job. There is less desire for the security once found in a lifetime with a large corporation – people are willing to take risks to have the experiences that they want.

In Florida's mind, creativity is more than just a skill – it is a way of life that more and more people are *choosing*. This is where many of his peers disagree. Social commentators like Jill Fraser believe that changes such as longer work hours are being forced on today's workers, creating the modern "white collar sweatshop." Robert Putnam claims that changing lifestyles decrease "social capital," or the civic engagement and community spirit once at the source of prosperity. Florida addresses these arguments more carefully in the 2004 preface, admitting that economic transformations do not always happen smoothly. He advocates for new social institutions and policies that will address these problems and calls on the creative class to "harness the creative energy we have unleashed to mitigate the turmoil and disruption that it generates."

Another point of contention is Florida's claim that the new economy does not abide by traditional economic growth theories. Florida believes that workers today are choosing location over jobs, instead of allowing jobs to dictate their location. He claims that members

of the creative class are abandoning traditional corporate communities, working class centers, and Sunbelt regions for places referred to as "Creative Centers." Critics argue an opposite view, claiming that economic growth comes from growth of companies, jobs, or technology in a region.

In the 2004 preface, Florida addresses this by offering a more holistic approach – economic growth is complex and dependent on several independent factors working together. Florida believes that creative people choose to live in "Creative Centers" based on the amenities and experiences offered, the openness to diversity, and the opportunity to express their creativity in their life and work. These ideas culminate in his "creative capital theory" which says, "regional economic growth is driven by the location choices of creative people…who prefer places that are diverse, tolerant, and open to new ideas." Likewise, the Creativity Index was developed to measure city and regional creativity and is composed of three equally weighted parts: technology, talent, and tolerance.

In the initial version of the book, Florida focused heavily on the creative city rankings. As a result, some critics felt that the Creativity Index was too narrow – simply producing "winners" and "losers" of the creativity game. In the new preface, Florida asks readers to use the Creativity Index in more general way, "Please view the Creativity Index as a broad-gauge indicator of a region's ability to harness energy for long-run economic growth. All my measures are best used as tools to focus strategic effort."

Examined in the broad context, the ideas in *The Rise of the Creative Class* are significant to the future of cities and regions. The combination of Florida's easy to read writing style with an attention to empirical detail in the appendices allows his ideas to reach a diverse audience. By attempting to prove quantitatively that intrinsic "livability" values also contribute to economic growth, Richard Florida makes the case for newer, non-traditional economic development strategies.

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Alumni Notes

News about Graduates

Community and Regional Planning Program, University of Texas at Austin

In recognition of Planning Forum's landmark Volume 10 edition, the editors have added a new section entitled Alumni Notes. The following pages include profiles of just a few of the graduates of the Community and Regional Planning Program at the University of Texas at Austin. The profiles provide updates and information about alumni – their type of work, publications, areas of research, and other notes of interest. Many include advice to future planners as well.

Other alumni of the program are encouraged to submit their information to the editors. New profiles will be featured in subsequent volumes as space allows. Submissions received first will take priority. All submissions are subject to editors' review. An archive of all submissions will be housed on the Planning Forum website. Our thanks to the planning alumni for forging the path. Best wishes for all who follow.

Richard Abramowitz (1983)

Since graduating from CRP in May of 1983, Richard Abramowitz has done several things, mostly being involved in the recycling and solid waste industry. He is currently a Market Area Recycling Manager for Recycle America Alliance, a subsidiary of Waste Management. He manages six recycling plants in four states, namely Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas and Mississippi. His current position is in Dallas, Texas, where he has lived for the last 9 years.

Max Beauregard (1976)

Max Beauregard is an independent consultant for GIS projects and demographic research with applications in planning, market research, transportation, environmental affairs, political/election analysis, and school enrollment forecasts. Max's most recent political work examines trends in Hispanic and other minority voters, identified from name analysis based upon languages spoken at home. Max has architecture and city planning degrees from the University of Texas at Austin (1974 and 1976), and has been employed in Houston for the last 20+ years.

Dr. Barbara Becker, AICP (1983)

Barbara Becker is a Professor in and Director of the School of Planning at the University of Arizona in Tucson, Arizona. She has co-authored a book with Eric Kelly, ***Community Planning: An Introduction to the Comprehensive Plan***, which is widely used today as a planning text.

Becca Bruce (1995)

Becca has been working in affordable housing development since graduating from the CRP program in 1995. She has a consulting business, Vacri Development and Consulting, where she works largely with nonprofit organizations to help them obtain financing and work through the development process to rehabilitate or construct affordable housing in Austin. She also works as a commercial real estate agent for Southwest Strategies Group (www.swsg.com), which is a full service brokerage, real estate planning and investment services firm. She is currently in the 2003-2004 Class of Leadership, Austin. She is happy to offer advice to any CRPers!

Paula Brumbelow (1995)

Paula works for the Development Planning and Zoning Division, Philadelphia City Planning Commission. She reviews plans for small and large projects, works on zoning code amendments, represents the Planning Commission at the Zoning Board of Adjustment, conducts research on zoning issues and prepares reports, and is currently the Project Manager for a consultant based project. She has previously worked with the City of Solon, Ohio, where she performed various planning duties that pertained to growth management of a small city, writing grant proposals, and managing projects that were given grants. She has also worked as a zoning consultant for Telecommunications Carrier. As for words of advice, she notes that her experience has taught her that it pays to be flexible in the type of planning you want to do. The more general your experience the more marketable you are to most cities and consultants. It gives the employer more ways of using and developing your own skill set out in the work world. Also in writing, remember that the majority of the people you

benefit do not know the acronyms or need big or impressive phrasing. Write for the average reader. She has a primary focus within land development and zoning as a planning field in her current job. She has had experience in most other types of planning (community, capital budgets, preservation, design, and GIS) from working for a city with a population of 25,000. In working with a large city, she feels planners end up focusing in one area of planning without the chance to do other types. She notes that with her work experience, she wished she had paid more attention to Planning Law. Also being removed from school for a few years now, she has also realized that there is much more to the world than work and planning. She is involved with several organizations that do not involve the field of planning, where she volunteers or serves as a Board Member. She also spends a large portion of her free time traveling.

Jackie (Brown) Chuter (2002)

Jackie works as a Neighborhood Planner for the City of Austin's Neighborhood Planning and Zoning Department. After working on the Central Austin Combined Neighborhood Plan for 15 months, she looks forward to her transition to the East Riverside/Oltorf Combined Neighborhood Plan this year.

Philip Farrington, AICP (1994)

After leaving the CRP program in 1990 (MSCRP in 1994), Philip worked as a regional water resources planner in central Texas, and then in Oregon as a parks planner and land use planning consultant. Some highlights of his work include: helping develop the Edwards Aquifer Protection Program, which led to acquisition of what is now Government Canyon State Park north of San Antonio; co-authoring an award-winning update to the Oregon Department of Aviation's Airport Land Use Compatibility Guidebook, and securing approvals for an updated Eugene Airport Master Plan, OR; planning for completion of the riverside multi-use trail system in Eugene; planning and development for Oregon's first critical care access hospital serving a rural area south of Eugene; and preparing master plans for parks and neighborhoods for communities from the Oregon coast to the Cascades. Two years ago, Philip left consulting to spearhead planning and development for a new regional hospital, the largest between Portland and San Francisco. Currently, he is concluding his second term as a board member of the Oregon Chapter of the APA, and running for chapter Vice President/ president-elect. He is also developing the program for a joint conference between the Oregon and Washington APA chapters, Fall 2004, in Portland.

Brett Firfer, AICP (1997)

Brett received his BSAS in August 1995 and his MCRP in December 1997. Following graduation, he spent a year and half learning full-time at Yeshivas Ohr Somayach in Monsey, NY, and teaching high school English part-time. He then began working for Ricci Associates, now called RicciGreene Associates, an architecture and planning firm in Manhattan, where he is currently working as a "Justice Planner." The firm specializes in justice facilities, specifically courthouses, jails and juvenile facilities. His role as a planner includes population and caseload studies, space programming, cost estimating, other courts master planning functions, and architectural support. He has been living in Manhattan since April 2000.

Todd Hemingson, AICP (1992)

While he pursued environmental planning with Prof. Kent Butler as his advisor, the need for a job in a slow economy led him to the Texas Department of Transportation, where he worked on public transportation issues for a couple of years. After a brief stay (9 months) in Houston working for the Metropolitan Planning Organization, he moved to "Planner Mecca" (AKA the Portland, Oregon area) to take a job as a planner with a public transportation agency, and pursue a Ph.D. in Planning at the Portland State University. While he never received the degree, he did learn a lot and totally enjoyed his five years in the beautiful Pacific Northwest. With a yearning for job advancement, he moved back to Texas and took a Planning Manager position at VIA Metropolitan Transit in San Antonio. Now nearing four years at the agency, he has advanced to Vice-President, Planning and Development, and enjoys the challenges his job brings him every day. He is interested to see what his fellow students are up to!

Linda Howard, AICP (1982)

Linda Howard graduated from the CRP program in 1982. She is currently the Director of Planning & Programming for the Aviation Division of the Texas Department of Transportation. She is responsible for the development and continuous update of the Texas Airport System Plan, and the Texas Aviation Facilities Development Program, which allocates approximately $60 million annually in federal and state funding to general aviation airports.

James Koski (2001)

Upon graduation in 2001, James Koski received an American Planning Association Fellowship, which took him to Washington, DC and placed him in the office of U.S. Congressman Blumenauer. Congressman Blumenauer's legislative theme in Congress is "Livable Communities." James currently serves as his Legislative Director, where he works on issues as diverse as the Congressional Bike Caucus to International Relations. He also serves on Washington DC's Bike Advisory Council, which is made up of volunteer citizens, and provides bicycle policy advice and recommendations to the Mayor.

Daniel Krzyzanowski (2003)

Daniel recently finished his PR, and graduated in December 2003. In October, he took a position as an Urban Planner with the City of Galveston, Department of Planning and Community Development. His work has a focus on neighborhood and historic district planning.

Joelle Labrosse, AICP (1998)

After graduating from the CRP Program, Joelle worked for the Water Development Board for five years as a planner, developing population and water demand projections and providing economic analysis of projected water shortages in the State. She currently holds the position of Senior Planner at the City of Round Rock. Her focus is on Long Range Planning, including downtown redevelopment, demographic analysis, historic preservation and neighborhood planning. Joelle currently lives in Leander, Texas.

Makela Mangrich, AICP (2000)

Makela Mangrich is an Associate with Vandewalle & Associates in Madison, Wisconsin. Due to Wisconsin's Comprehensive Planning Law, commonly known as the "Smart Growth Law", she has been able to prepare comprehensive land use plans for predominantly smaller communities in the Upper Midwest. She is also working to develop a professional specialization in land conservation planning, and is working for a conservation district in Illinois to update their Master Plan. Prior to joining Vandewalle & Associates in October 2003, she worked for the City of Austin and Hill Country Conservancy in Austin. She would like to encourage students to stick with the profession and have patience with the numerous bureaucracies planners face. They can be painfully slow, but good things can come to those with patience. She also recommends investigating numerous employment options while still in school and talking to people with experiences in a variety of firms and agencies before taking a job. The options can be overwhelming, but research can help find a good fit for your career objectives.

Charles Scott McCutcheon (1995)

Charles is currently employed as a Market Intelligence Manager for Austin Micro-Devices (AMD). He lives in Austin, Texas.

L. Ashley McLain (1997)

Ashley is a Senior Project Manager at Hicks & Company Environmental, Archeological, and Planning Consultants. After graduation, she spent 8 months working in Paris for the United Nations Environment Program - Industry and Environment Office as a part-time consultant on ecotourism issues. She has worked for Hicks & Company for the past six years. She conducts socioeconomic and environmental justice analyses for transportation projects, assesses proposed rules for aquifer management, and manages regulatory compliance and permitting for city water projects. She was on Planning Forum's first editorial board, and prepared the initial Point/Counterpoint article on Neotraditionalism.

Scott Polikov (2002)

After graduating, Scott Polikov formed Gateway Planning Group (www.gatewayplanning.com), providing town planning and transportation consulting services to both public and private sector clients. Scott works with communities and developers to capture growth in mixed-use pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods, specializing in transect-based plans and codes.

Laura Powell (1995)

The idea for Planning Forum grew, in part, out of Laura's conviction that interdisciplinary studies are vital to the continued relevance of many academic disciplines, including planning and architecture. Not coincidentally, Laura's own "interdisciplinary" (read: tortured) career path exemplifies this. After graduation in 1995, she received a Fulbright Fellowship and moved to Quito, Ecuador, where she spent about a year doing research on housing finance and gender issues in Ecuador, but quickly decided that academic research was not the career for her. She eventually obtained a job in educational administration at a private university in Guayaquil, Ecuador, where she stayed until 1998. At that point she realized that she lacked a fundamental understanding of the mechanics of finance, which she deemed essential, and

hence moved on to Columbia University's MBA program. Laura graduated in 1999, and in her search for a real job, stumbled across a career which combines a number of her academic interests and skills—public finance. Laura is currently the Vice President of UBS Financial Services Inc, located in San Antonio, Texas. She works as an investment banker to state and local governments, assisting them in evaluating their financial options and raising capital in the debt markets.

Andrew Spurgin (2001)

After completing coursework in 2000, Andrew began work for the Planning Department, City of San Antonio. Presently a Senior Planner in the Neighborhood & Urban Design Division, he has worked on neighborhood plans, conservation districts, and the Unified Development Code revision. In the past three years, five of these projects have received awards from the American Planning Assocation. He currently manages the Corridor Overlay Districts program and the limited purpose annexation program. As a result of recent annexations, including the Southside Initiative, San Antonio is now the largest City in the U.S. as calculated in area. Andrew's office regularly employs student interns and often has entry level planning positions for hire. Interested students are encouraged to contact him.

Barbara Stocklin (1991)

Barbara's areas of study were historic preservation and economic development planning. She worked in historic property compliance for the Texas Department of Transportation from 1987 - 1997, and as the City of Austin historic preservation officer from 1997 - 2002. She is currently the City Historic Preservation Officer in Phoenix, Arizona. At that job, she manages a 12-million dollar historic preservation bond fund, and oversees the city's historic preservation planning program. She also writes a monthly newspaper column on local history and historic preservation issues for a monthly newspaper in Phoenix.

Andrew Tadross (2002)

Andrew is currently working in Cambridge, MA for ConsultEcon, Inc (www.consultecon.com). They specialize in economic and management planning (feasibility studies) for public attractions, such as museums, zoos, aquariums, visitor centers etc.

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Information for Contributors

Planning Forum serves as a medium for the multi-disciplinary exchange of ideas related to the study of human communities and to the interaction of social, political, and built and natural environments. The journal welcomes submissions of original research papers, timely book reviews, and discussions of current debates, literature, and theory. The journal's intended audience is primarily academic – graduate students and faculty members in worldwide planning-related disciplines – but also includes practitioners who work in fields directly related to journal content.

Submission Guidelines: Suggested length is 5,000-10,000 words, including notes and references. Please indicate the number of words on the cover sheet. Authors should follow the style and spelling requirements of the Chicago Manual of Style, 14th Edition. Authors should use the parenthetical author-date style of references, and should include only those works actually cited in the text. *Planning Forum* cannot accept papers that include footnotes. Papers are reviewed anonymously, authors should therefore refer to themselves in the third person in text and notes. Each illustration, chart, table, or graph to be included in the text should be submitted on a separate sheet, with desired text locations clearly indicated. If the manuscript is accepted, the author will receive detailed instructions regarding the proper format of non-text elements. Submission of black and white photographs to accompany the article is encouraged, but publication of these will be at the editor's discretion. Images must meet the required minimum resolution of 300dpi. Images not produced by the author must be accompanied by permission to use or reprint.

Number of Copies: Authors should submit five (5) copies of each manuscript, which will not be returned, and an electronic copy on diskette or as an email attachment to the address below. Please include a cover sheet listing the article title, author's name, author's address, phone number, and email address.

Review Process: Submissions are anonymously evaluated by the student editorial staff and faculty reviewers according to the following criteria: clear statement of purpose or thesis, clear significance of the contribution to an existing body of literature, clear and effective writing, and use of explicit, sound, and appropriate methods. All submissions are subject to final content and style editing with the acquiescence of the author before publication.

Deadlines: *Planning Forum*, Volume 11, will be published in late spring 2005. Abstracts (250 words max) may be submitted via email until October 1, 2004, indicating that the author intends to submit a full manuscript. Full manuscripts prepared according to the guidelines above are due no later than November 1, 2004. Note: Papers must be received by this deadline, *no exceptions*.

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