March 5, 2025, Filed Under: Working PaperFast and Slow Technological Transitions EMPCT Working Paper Series No. 2025-0274 pages | PDF Download | PDF in Browser Citation:Adão, Rodrigo, Martin Beraja, and Nitya Pandalai-Nayar, “Fast and Slow Technological Transitions”, February 2024 Rodrigo AdãoyBooth School of Business Martin BerajazMIT Nitya Pandalai-NayarUniversity of Texas at Austin AbstractDo economies adjust slowly to certain technological innovations and more rapidly to others?We argue that the adjustment is slower when innovations mainly benefit productionactivities requiring skills which are more different from those used in the rest of the economy.The reason is that, when such skill specificity is stronger, the adjustment of labor marketsis driven less by the fast reallocation of older incumbent workers and more by the gradualentry of younger generations to the benefitted activities. We begin by documenting that theU.S. labor market adjusted differently to the arrival of Information & Communications Technologies(ICT) in the late twentieth century than it did to innovations in manufacturing at thebeginning of that century. We then build an overlapping generations model of technologicaltransitions. It allows us to sharply characterize the effects of skill specificity on equilibriumdynamics, match the evidence in a parsimonious way, and study its welfare implications. Weshow that stronger skill specificity helps to explain why the ICT transition was more unequaland slower, driven entirely by the gradual entry of younger generations who accrued more ofthe welfare gains from ICT innovations.
February 20, 2025, Filed Under: Working PaperHow Costly Are Business Cycle Volatility and Inflation? A Vox Populi Approach EMPCT Working Paper Series No. 2025-0166 pages | PDF Download | PDF in Browser Citation:Georgarakos, Dimitris, Kwang Hwan Kim, Olivier Coibion, Myungkyu Shim, Myunghwan Andrew Lee, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Geoff Kenny, Seowoo Han, and Michael Weber, “How Costly Are Business Cycle Volatility and Inflation? A Vox Populi Approach”, February 2025. Dimitris GeorgarakosEuropean Central Bank & CEPR Kwang Hwan KimYonsei University Olivier CoibionUT Austin & NBER Myungkyu ShimYonsei University Myunghwan Andrew LeeNew York University Yuriy GorodnichenkoUC Berkeley, CEPR, & NBER Geoff KennyEuropean Central Bank Seowoo HanYonsei University Michael WeberChicago Booth, CEPR, & NBER AbstractUsing surveys of households across thirteen countries, we study how much individuals would be willing to pay to eliminate business cycles. These direct estimates are much higher than traditional measures following Lucas (2003): on average, households would be prepared to sacrifice around 5-6% of their lifetime consumption to eliminate business cycle fluctuations. A similar result holds for inflation: to bring inflation to their desired rate, individuals would be willing to sacrifice around 5% of their consumption. Willingness to pay to eliminate business cycles and inflation is generally higher for those whose consumption is more pro-cyclical, those who are more uncertain about the economic outlook, and those who live in countries with greater historical volatility.
October 25, 2024, Filed Under: Working PaperWeathering the Storm: Supply Chains and Climate Risk EMPCT Working Paper Series No. 2024-0882 pages | PDF Download | PDF in Browser Citation:Castro-Vencenzi, Juanma, Gaurav Khanna, Nicolas Morales, and Nitya Pandalai-Nayar , “Weathering the Storm: Supply Chains and Climate Risk” October, 2024 Juanma Castro-VincenziUniversity of Chicago Gaurav KhannaUniversity of California, San Diego Nicolas MoralesFederal Reserve Bank of Richmond Nitya Pandalai-NayarUniversity of Texas at Austin and NBER AbstractWe characterize how firms structure supply chains under climate risk. Using new data on the universe of firm-to-firm transactions from an Indian state, we show that firms diversify sourcing locations, and that suppliers exposed to climate risk charge lower prices. We develop a general equilibrium spatial model of firm input sourcing under climate risk. Firms diversify identical inputs from suppliers across space, trading off the probability of climate disruptions against higher input costs. We quantify the model using data on 271 Indian regions. Wages are inversely correlated with sourcing risk, giving rise to a cost minimization-resilience tradeoff. Supply chain diversification unambiguously reduces real wage volatility, but ambiguously affects their levels, as diversification may come with high input costs. While diversification mitigates climate risk, it exacerbates the distributional consequences of climate change by reducing wages in regions prone to frequent shocks.
October 25, 2024, Filed Under: Working PaperPlaying with blocs: Quantifying decoupling EMPCT Working Paper Series No. 2024-0741 pages | PDF Download | PDF in Browser Citation:Bonadio,Barthélémy, Zhen Huo, Elliot Kang, Andrei A. Levchenko, Nitya Pandalai-Nayar, Hiroshi Toma, and Petia Topalova, “Playing with blocs: Quantifying decoupling” October, 2024 Barthélémy Bonadio Andrei A. LevchenkoPetia Topalova Zhen HuoNitya Pandalai-Nayar Elliot KangHiroshi Toma AbstractWe adopt a data-driven approach to measure trade fragmentation over the period 2015-2023. We assign countries to the US bloc, the China bloc, or to an unaligned group based on whether their trade costs with the US and China increased or decreased over this period. We find that the US bloc and the China bloc each contain roughly a quarter of the countries in the world, with about half the countries remaining unaligned. However, we also find that as cross-bloc trade costs increased, within-bloc trade costs fell. We use a quantitative model to compute the real income effects of this reconfiguration of the global trade costs. The median country in the world, and the median country within each bloc, has 0.4-0.6% higher real income as a result of the observed decoupling, contrary to the widespread belief that fragmentation has been welfare-reducing. Finally, we find a modest amount of bloc misalignment: the median country in the US bloc would actually be better off in the China bloc, and vice versa. These results suggest that trade decoupling does not always follow trade-driven economic interests.
October 25, 2024, Filed Under: Working PaperDynamic Models, New Gains from Trade? EMPCT Working Paper Series No. 2024-0936 pages | PDF Download | PDF in Browser Citation:Boehm, Christoph E., Andrei A. Levchenko, Nitya Pandalai-Nayar, and Hiroshi Toma, ” Dynamic Models, New Gains from Trade?” October, 2024 Christoph E. BoehmUniversity of Texas at Austin and NBER Andrei A. LevchenkoUniversity of Michigan NBER and CEPR Nitya Pandalai-NayarUniversity of Texas at Austin and NBER Hiroshi TomaUniversity of Michigan AbstractYes. We state closed-form expressions for steady state gains from trade that apply in a class of dynamic trade models that includes dynamic versions of the Krugman (1980), Melitz (2003), and customer capital (e.g., Arkolakis, 2010) models. The gains are a function of the domestic trade share and the long-run elasticity of trade with respect to iceberg trade costs, similar to Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012). In contrast to static settings, in a dynamic world this long-run elasticity cannot be estimated in one step by relying on tariff variation as shifters of trade costs. We show, instead, that this object can be recovered by combining two tariff elasticity estimates: the long- and the short-run. Thus, the short-run tariff elasticity indirectly enters the formula for the steady state gains from trade. Our main substantive finding is that the gains from trade are large. They depend crucially on the short-run tariff elasticity, and can be arbitrarily large even if the long-run tariff elasticity is high. Accounting for the transition path has a minor impact on the magnitude of the gains from trade, relative to simply comparing steady states.
October 25, 2024, Filed Under: Working PaperConcentration, Market Power, and Misallocation: The Role of Endogenous Customer Acquisition EMPCT Working Paper Series No. 2024-0699 pages | PDF Download | PDF in Browser Citation:Afrouzi, Hassan, Andres Drenik, and Ryan Kim, “Concentration, Market Power, and Misallocation: The Role of Endogenous Customer Acquisition” October, 2024 Hassan AfrouziColumbia University and NBER Andres Drenik The University of Texas at Austin Ryan Kim Johns Hopkins University AbstractThis paper explores how different margins of market share are related to markups. Using merged microdata on producers and consumers, we document that a firm’s market share is mainly related to its number of customers, while its price-cost markup is associated only with its average sales per customer. We develop a new model that reflects this empirical evidence and the endogenous nature of customer acquisition. When calibrated, this model predicts a higher degree of markup dispersion, which suggests greater efficiency losses due to customer misallocation. An analysis of the efficient allocation in this model reveals that compared with the equilibrium, aggregate TFP and output are 10.8% and 14% higher, respectively.
October 25, 2024, Filed Under: Working PaperMonetary Policy without Moving Interest Rates: The Fed Non-Yield Shock EMPCT Working Paper Series No. 2024-0579 pages | PDF Download | PDF in Browser Citation:Boehm, Christoph E, and T. Niklas Kroner, “Monetary Policy without Moving Interest Rates: The Fed Non-Yield Shock” September, 2024 Christoph E. BoehmUT Austin and NBER T. Niklas KronerFederal Reserve Board AbstractExisting high-frequency monetary policy shocks explain surprisingly little variation in stock prices and exchange rates around FOMC announcements. Further, both of these asset classes display heightened volatility relative to non announcement times. We use a heteroskedasticity-based procedure to estimate a “Fed non-yield shock”, which is orthogonal to yield changes and is identified from excess volatility in the S&P 500 and various dollar exchange rates. A positive non-yield shock raises stock prices in the U.S. and around the globe, and depreciates the dollar against all major currencies. The non-yield shock is essentially uncorrelated with previous monetary policy shocks and its effects are large in comparison. Its strong effects on the VIX and other risk-related measures point towards a dominant risk premium channel. We show that the non-yield shock can be related to Fed communications and that its existence has implications for the identification of structural monetary policy shocks.
October 24, 2024, Filed Under: Working PaperRelative-Price Changes as Aggregate Supply Shocks Revisited: Theory and Evidence EMPCT Working Paper Series No. 2024-0456 pages | PDF Download | PDF in Browser Citation:Afrouzi, Hassan, Saroj Bhattarai, and Edson Wu, “Relative-Price Changes as Aggregate Supply Shocks Revisited: Theory and Evidence” October, 2024 Hassan AfrouziColumbia University and NBER Saroj BhattaraiUniversity of Texas at Austin Edson WuUniversity of Texas at Austin AbstractWe provide theory and evidence that relative price shocks can cause aggregate inflation and act as aggregate supply shocks. Empirically, we show that exogenous positive energy price shocks have a positive impact not only on headline but also on U.S. core inflation while depressing U.S. real activity. In a two-sector monetary model with upstream and downstream sectors and heterogeneous price stickiness, we analytically characterize how upstream shocks propagate to prices. Using panel IV local projections, we show that the responsiveness of sectoral PCE prices to energy price shocks is in line with model predictions. Motivated by post-COVID inflation in the U.S., a model experiment shows that a one-time relative price shock generates persistent movements in headline and core inflation similar to those observed in the data, even in the absence of aggregate slack. The model also emphasizes that monetary policy stance plays an important role in propagation of such shocks.
October 24, 2024, Filed Under: Working PaperIlliquid Lemon Markets and the Macroeconomy EMPCT Working Paper Series No. 2024-03106 pages | PDF Download | PDF in Browser Citation:Bierdel, Aimé, Andres Drenik, Juan Herreño, and Pablo Ottonello, “Illiquid Lemon Markets and the Macroeconomy” October, 2024 Aimé BierdelColumbia University Andres DrenikUT Austin Juan HerreñoUC San Diego Pablo OttonelloUniversity of Maryland and NBER AbstractWe study the macroeconomic implications of asymmetric information in capital markets. We build a quantitative capital-accumulation model in which capital is traded in illiquid markets, with sellers having more information about capital quality than buyers. Asymmetric information distorts the terms of trade for sellers of high-quality capital, who list higher prices and are willing to accept lower trading probabilities to signal their type. Led by the model’s predictions, we measure the distortions from asymmetric information by studying the relationship between listed prices and trading probabilities in a unique dataset of individual capital units listed for trade. By combining the empirical measurement with the model, we show that information asymmetries can play a quantitatively large role during economic crises when the degree of asymmetric information deteriorates.
October 24, 2024, Filed Under: Working PaperThe Inflation Attention Threshold and Inflation Surgers EMPCT Working Paper Series No. 2024-02 72 pages | PDF Download | PDF in Browser Citation:Pfäuti, Oliver, “The Inflation Attention Threshold and Inflation Surges” October, 2024. Oliver PfäutiThe University of Texas at Austin AbstractAt the outbreak of the recent inflation surge, the public’s attention to inflation was low but increased quickly once inflation started to rise. In this paper, I quantify when and by how much the public’s attention to inflation changes, and derive the macroeconomic implications of these attention changes. I estimate an attention threshold at an inflation rate of about 4%,and that attention doubles when inflation exceeds this threshold. Adverse supply shocks become more inflationary in times of high attention, and the increase in people’s attention to inflation in 2021 accounts for half of the subsequent supply-driven inflation. I develop a model accounting for the attention threshold and show that shocks that are usually short lived lead to a persistent surge in inflation if they induce an increase in people’s attention. The attention threshold further lengthens the last mile of disinflation after an inflation surge, and leads to an asymmetry in the dynamics of inflation.