Dr. Cynthia A. Lintz and Lauren Bulka
Abstract
In 1963, Skopje, the capital city of the Republic of Macedonia, suffered an earthquake that destroyed 80% of the building stock. Since then, the national government has worked to (re)develop and promote its national identity through the built environment of its capital city. This paper explores the effective-ness of the Republic of Macedonia in these efforts. The authors examine shifts in planning and devel-opment practices in the capital city and the subse-quent impacts on governmental effectiveness orga-nized around three time periods: post-earthquake, post-Iron Curtain, and present day, beginning with the development of the city’s latest master plan, Skopje 2014.
Keywords: Skopje, Macedonia; master planning; di-saster resilience; European history
On July 26, 1963, Skopje, the capital of the Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia was struck by an earthquake. Registering at 6.9 on the Richter scale, the quake destroyed 80 percent of the building stock, killed approximately 2,000 people and injured another 3,300, left 100,000 homeless, and, eventually, led to a near complete reconstruction of the flattened city (Home, 2007; Ladinski, n.d.). The United Nations General Assembly took the lead in efforts to rebuild the city and illustrate international solidarity, one of the first efforts of its kind (Mills, 1967). In total, over 80 countries helped with the reconstruction by providing temporary shelters, rebuilding public buildings, schools, and permanent housing (Bouzarovski, 2011). Both the United States and Russia sent aid, despite the ongoing Cold War.
After the initial recovery, the Yugoslav government had three options: Move the city; rebuild the city and keep it small; or rebuild the city and plan for growth (Fisher 1964, Ladinski, n.d.). In the 1960s, the government chose to remain small in the city scale, become earthquake resilient, and develop a unique, modern international capital based on brutalist architecture of the time.
In the early 1990s, at the same time as the world witnessed the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, Macedonia also broke away from the Yugoslav Federation to become an independent Republic. This event set Skopje on a different trajectory than post-earthquake recovery, which permitted the free market and capitalism to play a major unforeseen role in the city’s urban planning. Throughout the 1990s, Macedonia, as well as most other post-Socialist countries, experienced a backlash against the old Socialist planning system. Sonia Hirt describes these transformative years to Western democracy as a period of privatism: “the widespread disbelief in a benevolent public realm and the widespread sense that to appropriate the public may be the best way to thrive in private” (2012). Public rules and regulations were discarded in favor of individual capitalistic opportunities. Individuals used the opportunity to build private homes and businesses on the once public land. Coinciding with these shifts, Skopje became home to refugees fleeing the Bosnian War, the Kosovo War, and its own insurgency between the Macedonian Slavic and Albanian populations during the 1990s to 2000s. This increased the density of Skopje while leading to a rapid expansion of the urban landscape into newly formed suburbs.
Now in 2015, Skopje’s skyline is filled with cranes, new buildings, and public spaces. Western-style capitalism has firmly taken root, the polit-ical and economic changes have largely stabilized, and development is more controlled. In power since 2007, the current government recently established a new course for the capital city’s development under the Skopje 2014 comprehensive plan. The plan aims to strengthen the coun-ty’s international recognition from its neighbors in hopes that this will lead to its acceptance into the European Union (EU) and North Atlan-tic Treaty Organization (NATO). The new comprehensive plan, however, “glorif[ies] a single, straightforward, and unapologetically nationalist narrative in marble and bronze, at a scale meant to eliminate any and all doubt” about the nation’s history and identity (Rosen, 2013). This has led to outcries from Macedonia’s minority population and neighboring countries who want recognition of a shared regional past (ibid.).
Over the past fifty years, Skopje’s (re)construction has traveled three courses. The first began in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake; the second was the post-Socialist era during the nation’s transition from socialism to democracy; and its third path launched when planning ef-forts began on Skopje 2014 in 2010. Given the three approaches to re-construction since the earthquake in 1963, how effective has Macedonia been in developing a national identity through the capital city’s built environment?
This paper reviews historical documents and recent literature to discuss Skopje’s primary development periods as a way to understand wheth-er the city can practically withstand another major change, such as an earthquake; its own ability to develop an internally cohesive identity to maintain political stability; and the ability to obtain international rec-ognition. The article is divided into three parts. The first examines the theory behind developing a national identity through the built environ-ment. The second section is a historical review of Skopje after the earth-quake, post-Socialism, and in the present day. The third section draws some general conclusions from the strengths and weaknesses of each of the approach taken to developing Macedonia’s current national identity.
Building National Identity Brick by Brick
Modern nation-building started approximately two hundred years ago. From the earliest days of nationalism, a country’s capital has been con-sidered not only the seat of government, but also the symbolic focus of the country (Vale, 2008). This means that the built environment should reflect the values, culture, and history not only of the city, but the en-tire nation. For ancient cities like London, Paris, or Athens, this built environment has been in place for many centuries and reflects the peri-od(s) of great grandeur (ibid.). While capitals were usually sited due to “the presence of a shrine, a defensible fortress, or a trade route; in the modern age, new capitals are most often sited to favor political factions” (ibid, p. 17). “In states emerging from control by an external power, [the capital] is also required to serve as the focus of efforts to promote a sense of national identity” (ibid, p. 16).
National identity can be developed or strengthened by the built envi-ronment. People tend to anchor their personality in objects and places (Tuan, 1977). The height and space between buildings, the architecture, and general overall formation within a city contributes to memories one has about living in the place (Houshangi, 2013). Within the city, “various places from urban landscapes extricate memories from a mutual past” that can unify a population and become their collective identity (ibid, p. 19). Rebuilding or replacing the buildings may, therefore, create, alter or destroy forms of national identity.
Since many large cities, including national capitals, attract diverse populations this can sometimes pose problems in unifying multicultural centers. However, in other instances, “architecture and urban planning can play a pivotal role in a city’s symbolic renewal, sometimes by the consolidation of an image, sometimes by the polarization of debate. [Cit-ies’] symbolic recall of earlier golden ages, whether through works of architecture that make use of highly charged precedents or through the re-claiming of hallowed or strategic sites as capitals, has occurred through history and remains powerful” (ibid., p. 31). This can unify a diverse city.
Skopje 1963 to 2014
Resilience immediately following the earthquake
So great was the reconstruction momentum that in the late 1960s, when “Skopje school children were asked to write an essay on ‘A major event in the life of my town,’ 80% chose to write about the master plan (for reconstruction) rather than the earthquake” itself (Home, 2007, p 4). The successful reconstruction efforts could partly be due to the five clear post-earthquake phases, and documentation showing this effort as the largest international relief operation to date in 1963 (Ladinski, n.d.). The first phase included the immediate international and national reception and dispersal of aid from more than 82 countries. “The inter-national help given to Skopje during the first stage of reconstruction was very valuable, not only from the material point of view, but especially because of its social and morale-boosting consequences,” reported UNESCO (Mills, 1967, p. 20). The second phase evacuated women and children to the countryside to prevent the spread of disease, and to allow for the reconstruction process to begin. Evacuation culminated in the shrinkage of the city’s population from 180,000 to 60,000 inhabitants (Music, n.d.; Ladinski, n.d.). The third phase examined the remaining structures to determine those that needed to be completely demolished. During this time, everything that could be recovered and reused was removed.
by low-impact machinery or by hand (Ladinski, n.d.). The fourth phase included drafting a new master plan, while the fifth phase was the physical construction of the new city. We will detail the last two phases, the master plan, and the physical construction below.
The United Nations (U.N.) was one of the main catalysts in drafting a new master plan. The U.N. provided technical assistance by initiating the Skopje Urban Plan Project, a collaborative effort by Professor Adolf Ciborowski (known for rebuilding War-saw after the Second World War), Skopje’s Institute for Town Planning and Architecture (ITPA), and the City’s Planning Department (CPD)
(Ladinski, n.d.). The team ex-amined documents related to impacts from previous seismic activities on the city in years 518, 1555, and 1921 C.E. and ran initial soils tests. The re-sulting 1965 Skopje Master Plan presented three options for the future of Skopje: (1) Move the city (which was not possible due to seismic condi-tions throughout the country); (2) rebuild the city, but keep the population under 150,000 people (in this plan the Roma, Turkish and Albanian ethnic minority populations would be transferred to other ar-eas within Macedonia); or (3) rebuild the city and plan for growth (Fisher, 1964; Ladins-ki, n.d.). The government chose to remain small, strengthen earthquake policies, and plan for future disasters
In 1965, the United Nations and Yugoslavia invited four for-eign firms and four Yugoslav firms to participate in a mas-ter plan competition (Ladinski, n.d.; Lovanovska, 2012). While the jury announced no clear winner, they divided the re-sponsibility between two firms. Kenzo Tange, known for the development of the reconstruc-tion plan for Hiroshima, Japan, produced a plan that focused on the city center. Tange’s plan had two components: the City Gate (also known as the trans-portation center) and the City Wall, an imposing belt of apartment complexes, to metaphorically “protect’ Skopje from future disasters and to provide it with a new internationally recognizable symbol” (Tolic, 2010, p. 30). Tange’s plan was regarded as utopic and too idealistic.
The second winners were architects and planners from the Croatian Town Planning Institute, lead by Radovan Miščević and Fedor Wenzler, in Zagreb, who developed a more modest plan (ibid.). By July 1966, the two winners had produced a combined plan, the 1965 Master Plan, largely based on Tange’s ideas. The final plan set the stage for bold expressions of artistic creativity, using the built urban landscape and brutalist architecture as ways to bring about modernity and enforce the image of an internationally rebuilt city (ibid.).
The central government played a major role in orchestrating the redevelopment. University students conducted a social survey of 4,000 families, though in reality prompted the people to accept a more international or Western image (Home, 2007). The focus was on shifting people’s attitudes to accept high-rise and medium-rise housing, in an attempt to clear the 13,000 single-story slum dwellings (ibid.). The pre-earthquake single-story homes often had garden plots, where the occupants raised their own food. Planners felt that this continued a more rural mentality, and they attempted to apply a more urban social attitude (ibid.). “The new housing was also designed to accommodate nuclear rather than extended families, and the ‘doubling-up’ of families with in-laws was actively discouraged, even though this might override ‘cultural practices’” (ibid., p. 18). The end result was a population reluctantly forced to move into the new houses provided to them, destroying their old community fabric. “The social survey team, however, recommended against interfering with minority cultures until they could be re-educated (or relocated)… The Roma, for example, rather than being forced straight into high-rise apartments, were relocated to the edge of town in an ‘unplanned, do-it-yourself community’ in Suto Orisari” (ibid., p. 19).
The ultimate 1965 Master Plan aimed to implement neat, well laid-out blocks of housing with standard utilities by moving industry to the ur-ban fringe, creating new traffic corridors, and moving estates outside the urban core (Bouzarovski, 2011; Fisher, 1964). “Planning orthodoxy followed prevailing international principles of the day: dispersed settle-ment in neighborhood units; separation of land uses; priority to indus-try and the motor vehicle; preservation limited to some public buildings rather than area conservation; large-scale slum clearance for high densi-ty housing; and hierarchies of service centers” (Home, 2007, p. 20).
The plan demarcated three hundred acres to the new city center (ibid.). The Vardar River, which ran through the city and frequently flooded, was channeled and reserved for recreational uses including paths, parks, and a sports stadium (ibid.). With the Vardar River as a point of reference, the left bank was reserved for cultural institutions such as the national theater, a television building, courts and part of the university (ibid.). The right bank was designated for administration, commerce, shopping, and entertainment. A third of the total area was zoned as housing for 30,000 people; however, the Tange’s proposed City Wall plan was scaled back due to seismic precautions (ibid.).
Outside the city center, the 1965 Master Plan proposed expanding the eastern industrial zone to include industrial operations previously lo-cated in the city center (ibid.). Planned residential neighborhood units called for a standard population of 6,000 residents, based upon the op-timal size of primary schools, and 400 meters as the maximum walking distance to the nearest bus stop (ibid.). The intention of the plan was to create a modern, almost futuristic, international city. For example, the facades of many public buildings used brutalist geometrical shapes (Photo 1, see page 23). As noted previously, community fabrics were torn apart and families were placed in blocks rather than in single-family houses as a way to build up an urban density. All this is to say that the aim was to build an internationally recognized city, keeping the city small (300 acres), and erecting modern buildings within a landscape of broad, densely inhabited streets.
After the fall of Socialism
The planners of the 1965 Master Plan could not have foreseen the col-lapse of the Iron Curtain, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the end of cen-tral planning. The transition period from Socialism to free-market radi-cally changed Macedonian cities with “the return of market mechanisms and the re-commoditization of space, change of ownership patterns, a shift of control from state to local levels, a sharp increase in the number of actors participating in city-building, and a fundamentally changed role for planning” (Hirt, 2012, p. 43). The changes were seen in not only building renovations and additions, but in the development of whole neighborhoods.
This new market capitalism, coupled with the Kosovo and Bosnian wars and a brief internal conflict, brought masses of refugees to Skopje. The refugees from these wars were predominately Albanian and Bosniaks (Muslim minorities) who settled in the urban fringe of Skopje within previously abandoned villages. Many Slav Macedonians (Orthodox majority) felt threatened by the change of the religious makeup of the city, marked by the new construction of minarets on the outskirts of town. In 2003, a huge cross was constructed on the mountain peak above the city to celebrate 2,000 years of Christianity, symbolically conveying the dominant religion of the country (Dragićević Šešić, 2011).
The flood of refugees, when taken with the unfettered development, radically transformed the city into a larger-than-envisioned national capital losing all sense of its previously focused post-earthquake identity. Hirt points out that the effects of the post-socialist urban change included:
“(1) The end of compact spatial form; (2) a decrease in the scale of civic and residential spaces (including a shift to-ward individual dwellings); (3) a tilting of the land-use balance away from public (and industrial) and toward commercial uses; (4) an emergence of stark social con-trasts, informality and marginality; and (5) the end of vi-sual uniformity and the advent of a free mixing of styles” (ibid., p. 47).
The bureaucratic chaos led to an estimated 32,000 illegal housing units as of 2004 (Sudiorum, 2004). Most of the houses were built on municipal-ly owned land, thereby complicating the process for land tenure status (ibid., p. 14). This rule-breaking also had an effect on the standards of building. An analysis in 1991 showed that only 20% of the homes com-plied with the 1981 anti-seismic code (the most updated code at the time), 41% complied with an earlier outdated version, 10% did not incorporate any earthquake protection measures, and others built before 1963 were excluded entirely from these requirements (Home, 2007).
The 2002 Master Plan seemingly legitimized the trend towards concentrated development, specifically mandating a “densification of all inner-city quarters” (ibid., p. 271). It was thought that the consolidation of residential development would allow for a more concerted effort on the restructuring of the transportation infrastructure by infilling vacant land untouched by post-earthquake reconstruction. Despite the plan’s foresight, the development pace in some areas of the city far exceeded the municipality’s capacity to enforce urban development policies. This resulted in a host of newly constructed buildings that met few standards and were arranged with little coherence. “The streets in these areas of-ten end in unplanned dead-ends, with some of the developments’ win-dows and balconies facing dark and narrow chasms created by the cha-otic nature of the construction” (ibid., p. 272). Moreover, the city not only lacked the ability to regulate private development, they lagged behind in
The bureaucratic chaos led to an estimated 32,000 illegal housing units as of 2004 (Sudiorum, 2004). Most of the houses were built on municipal-ly owned land, thereby complicating the process for land tenure status (ibid., p. 14). This rule-breaking also had an effect on the standards of building. An analysis in 1991 showed that only 20% of the homes com-plied with the 1981 anti-seismic code (the most updated code at the time), 41% complied with an earlier outdated version, 10% did not incorporate any earthquake protection measures, and others built before 1963 were excluded entirely from these requirements (Home, 2007).
The 2002 Master Plan seemingly legitimized the trend towards concen-trated development, specifically mandating a “densification of all inner city quarters” (ibid., p. 271). It was thought that the consolidation of residential development would allow for a more concerted effort on the restructuring of the transportation infrastructure by infilling vacant land untouched by post-earthquake reconstruction. Despite the plan’s foresight, the development pace in some areas of the city far exceeded the municipality’s capacity to enforce urban development policies. This resulted in a host of newly constructed buildings that met few standards and were arranged with little coherence. “The streets in these areas of-ten end in unplanned dead-ends, with some of the developments’ win-dows and balconies facing dark and narrow chasms created by the cha-otic nature of the construction” (ibid., p. 272). Moreover, the city not only lacked the ability to regulate private development, they lagged behind in
The bureaucratic chaos led to an estimated 32,000 illegal housing units as of 2004 (Sudiorum, 2004). Most of the houses were built on municipal-ly owned land, thereby complicating the process for land tenure status (ibid., p. 14). This rule-breaking also had an effect on the standards of building. An analysis in 1991 showed that only 20% of the homes com-plied with the 1981 anti-seismic code (the most updated code at the time), 41% complied with an earlier outdated version, 10% did not incorporate any earthquake protection measures, and others built before 1963 were excluded entirely from these requirements (Home, 2007).
The 2002 Master Plan seemingly legitimized the trend towards concentrated development, specifically mandating a “densification of all inner city quarters” (ibid., p. 271). It was thought that the consolidation of residential development would allow for a more concerted effort on the restructuring of the transportation infrastructure by infilling vacant land untouched by post-earthquake reconstruction. Despite the plan’s foresight, the development pace in some areas of the city far exceeded the municipality’s capacity to enforce urban development policies. This resulted in a host of newly constructed buildings that met few standards and were arranged with little coherence. “The streets in these areas of-ten end in unplanned dead-ends, with some of the developments’ win-dows and balconies facing dark and narrow chasms created by the cha-otic nature of the construction” (ibid., p. 272). Moreover, the city not only lacked the ability to regulate private development, they lagged behind in providing necessary services and basic infrastructural maintenance. The end result of the densification and development encouraged by the 2002 Master Plan was a reversion back to the predominant strategy guiding development prior to the 1963 earthquake
Skopje 2014
“As Macedonia scrambled for its identity in the wake of Yugoslavia’s disintegrations, a group of historians, architects and politicians decided that the country should remind itself—and the world—of a proud past” (De Laurney, 2014). These efforts came together in 2007 when the right-wing political party VMRO took office after winning the election. VMRO brought the renewed promise of transforming Macedonia into a modern, cosmopolitan, Western nation as a means of improving the country’s international image from its war-torn and socialist past (Graan, 2010). This political strategy of modernization was effectively a call for Macedonians to redevelop their public image to be more accepted by the international community, and in particular Europe. The ultimate intention of this promise was to gain acceptance into the European Union.
As a means of creating and promoting Macedonian pride and asserting its new identity as a European capital, the government prioritized the construction of a number of large public buildings and monuments in a plan called Skopje 2014. The plan is not actually a plan, but rather a YouTube video called Macedonia Timeless Capital Skopje 2014, or Skopje 2014 for short. It has been the main guidelines for future development (YouTube, n.d.). Skopje 2014 provides the justification for constructing new public buildings, such as the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, Constitutional Court, State Achieves, and the nation-al theater. The buildings themselves have been deliberately placed in the city center and built at a grandiose scale, with historic-style domes and large pedestals to resemble many other European capitals. Many of these monumental buildings are recreations of pre-earthquake and even pre-World War II buildings (Bouzarovski, 2011). The Ministry of Culture also commissioned 30 large pieces of public art in public spaces, which incorporate a wide range of styles and sizes (ibid.).
This large earmarking of public funds and the prioritization of rebuilding the capital has come with considerable controversy, both within and among the neighboring nations. Internally, Macedonia has seen much debate over the large expenditure of public funds dedicated to the construction of imposing public buildings, as well as with the contained focus of those funds on the capital. Both conditions do little to address the issues plaguing the rest of the nation, which include high unemployment and failing infrastructure. The other controversy stems from the singular promotion of the Macedonian Slav ethnicity, while the nation maintains a large constituency of minorities, primarily Albanians. It appears that the ethnic struggles from the violent 2001 conflict be-tween Macedonians and Albanians continue to play out in provocation in the built arena. One primary example is the plan to build a church in the main city square in which the bell tower will be 50 meters larger than any surrounding buildings (Bouzarovski, 2011). In response the Albanians erected a monument to Skenderbeg, a 15th century Albanian hero, depicted on horseback in the Albanian quarter (Photo 2, see page 24). This monument is modest in size compared to many of the newer Slav-featured statues. However, Skopje’s mayor, when asked about the Skenderbeg monument, said that to him “this object is just illegitimate construction” (ibid., p. 40).
Externally, Macedonia must overcome an even larger obstacle. It has yet to be fully and equally recognized by the neighboring nations: Serbi-ans do not accept the autonomy of the Macedonian Church; Bulgarians dispute the language, and the Greeks have blocked European Union ac-cession due to its name. Additionally, all three nations dispute claims to its exclusive history. In addition, to qualms over Macedonia’s name, contention with Greece has escalated as numerous monuments to Philip and Alexander the Great have been constructed throughout the nation (Dragićević Šešić, 2011, p. 40) (Photo 3, see page 24). Bulgaria often disputes the display of Bulgarian historic figures, such as Tsar Samuil,1 in today’s Macedonia (Novinvite, 2011). With such deep-rooted and pervasive controversies, it has been difficult for the nation to build its individual identity as a new Republic.
Despite this, not all recent disputes over Macedonia’s national identity originate from neighboring nations. In 2009, the city erupted in dissent over the ill-designed memorial home dedicated to Mother Teresa (Bou-zarovski, 2011). The Ministry of Culture opened an international competition, won by Portuguese architect Jorgan Marum, but the government overruled the decision; the project went to Macedonian architect Vangel Bozinovski instead (ibid.). Despite the abrupt change in architects, the final materialization of the project failed to adequately memorialize the modest lifestyle of the woman receiving tribute. As a project contained within Skopje 2014 this memorial also signifies the decision of local authorities to use architecture as the vehicle for generating their vision of national identity.
Conclusion
The questions set in this article are: How likely can modern Skopje with-stand another disaster; develop internal cohesiveness; and obtain inter-national recognition to develop a national identity in the built environment?
In viewing the post-earthquake reconstruction of Skopje, the series of plans that guided this process give incredible insight into the outcome and current state of the city. In both the 1965 Master Plan and Skopje 2014 the primary mission and policies focused on modernizing the city for an international audience. Through this international-style development and modernization the city believed that it would form a new national identity. The 1965 plan sought to achieve modernity through innovative architectural design and spatial layouts from leading international planners, but kept its small footprint as a way to contain disas-ter from future earthquakes. Within Skopje 2014 are policies departing significantly from the 1965 plan. Skopje 2014 promotes and prioritizes the re-creation of previously grandiose public buildings (pre-1963 earth-quake) intended to transform the city into a historic European capital. While Skopje solicited international competitions and advice, in the end they were largely ignored in order to emphasize an ethnic Macedonian Slav identity.
The piecemeal and often contradictory reconstruction plans have led to an urban development pattern that is different from what it was prior to the 1963 earthquake. “With over 80% of the building stock in noncompliance with seismic regulations, the city is just as unprepared for another major earthquake as in pre-1963 times” (Ladenski, n.d.). Additionally, continued ethnic and national struggles, both internally and externally, will unfavorably impact the built environment, detracting from the creation a unified internationally-recognized identity.
The nation tends to be in a constant reactionary role in terms of long-term planning, desperately looking for an external international identity instead of truly cultivating a multicultural Macedonian identity from within. Considering the blank slate provided by the earthquake with the international energy in supporting reconstruction, it is discouraging to realize that the government is not taking the precautions necessary to prevent another disaster nor capitalize on a truly innovative and mod-ern Macedonian image.
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