The size of the human population is projected to peak in the 21st century. But quantitative projections past 2100 are rare, and none quantify the possibility of a rebound from low fertility to replacement-level fertility. Moreover, the most recent long-term deterministic projections were published a decade ago; since then there has been further global fertility decline. Here we provide updated long-term cohort-component population projections and extend the set of scenarios in the literature to include scenarios in which future fertility (a) stays below replacement or (b) recovers and increases. We also characterize old-age dependency ratios. We show that any stable, long-run size of the world population would persistently depend on when an increase towards replacement fertility begins. Without such an increase, the 400-year span when more than 2 billion people were alive would be a brief spike in history. Indeed, four-fifths of all births—past, present, and future—would have already happened.

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

There is growing international consensus that animal welfare is a crucial consideration in policy analysis, affecting domains ranging from food systems to biomedical research. Concern for animal welfare also features in many government regulations, certification programs, and institutional ethics codes across the globe and is central to many philanthropic and values-based investment decisions. However, although there are well-developed quantitative tools for incorporating human welfare into policy analysis, comparable tools for animal welfare are in their earliest stages. Without them, it is impossible to assess the net welfare impacts of a policy on humans and nonhumans alike on a common scale, which is crucial for making informed and transparent trade-offs (1). In practice, then, animal welfare is often ignored. Given that animal welfare matters in many cases, there is an urgent need for best-practice methods for integrating animal welfare into decision analyses.

All leading long-term global population projections agree on continuing fertility decline, resulting in a rate of population size growth that will continue to decline towards zero and would eventually turn negative. However, a literature inspired by mathematical biology has suggested that because fertility is heritable (i.e., higher-fertility parents tend to have higher-fertility children) and heterogeneous within a population, long-term population growth must eventually be positive. In this research note, we show that heritable fertility is not sufficient for positive long-term population growth, for empirical and theoretical reasons. First, empirically, even higher-fertility sub-populations show declining fertility rates which may eventually be below replacement (and in some populations already are). Second, in a simple Markov model, because heritability is imperfect, the combination of heritability and fertility rates may be quantitatively insufficient: it may be that higher-fertility parents nevertheless produce too few children who retain higher-fertility preferences. These results underscore the importance both of understanding the possible consequences of long-term fertility decline and depopulation and of the causal importance of culture and choice in human populations.

Tools are needed to benchmark carbon emissions and pledges against criteria of equity and fairness. However, standard economic approaches, which use a transparent optimization framework, ignore equity. Models that do include equity benchmarks exist, but often use opaque methodologies. Here we propose a utilitarian benchmark computed in a transparent optimization framework, which, could usefully inform the equity benchmark debate. Implementing the utilitarian benchmark, which we see as ethically minimal and conceptually parsimonious, in two leading climate-economy models allows calculation of the optimal allocation of future emissions. We compare this optimum with historical emissions and initial Nationally Determined Contributions. Compared with cost-minimization, utilitarian optimization features better outcomes for human development, equity, and the climate. Peak temperature is lower under utilitarianism because it reduces the human development cost of global mitigation. Utilitarianism, therefore, is a promising inclusion to a set of benchmarks for future explorations of climate equity.